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PREFACE
The President of the United States approved the
Space Shuttle program in 1972, to become the
heart of the National Space Transportation System
(NSTS) and provide routine, economical access to
space. The launch of Columbia in 1981--the first
reusable vehicle to be launched and orbit the
earth--opened a new era. The development of the
Space Shuttle and its operation and maintenance
have involved several National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) centers, their indus-
trial prime contractors, and scores of subcontrac-
tors, including tens of thousands of people. This
must be considered one of the most complex
technical undertakings of all time.
After 24 successful Shuttle flights, the Space
Shuttle Challenger accident of January 28, 1986,
stunned the entire nation and indeed the world. In
response to the accident President Reagan estab-
lished the Presidential Commission on the Space
Shuttle Challenger Accident (frequently called the
Rogers Conlnlission, after its chairman) to inves-
tigate the accident and make recommendations for
the safe recovery of the Space Transportation
Svstem (STS). Among its recommendations, the
Rogers Commission called upon NASA to review
certain aspects of its STS risk assessment effort and
to "identify those items that must be improved
prior to flight to ensure mission success and flight
safety.'* It further recommended that an audit
panel be appointed by the National Research Coun-
cil (NRC) to verify the adequacy of the effort and
report directly to the Administrator of NASA. The
Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Haz-
ard Analysis Audit was established in response to
the recommendation. Beginning with the Commit-
tee's first meeting on September 22, 1986, this
report is the culmination of 14 months of investi-
gation, study, and deliberation.
While the Committee recognizes that it is not
possible, a priori, to guarantee mission success and
flight safety, we hope the Committee's conclusions
and recommendations will assist NASA in taking
those prudent additional steps which will provide
a reasonable and responsible level of flight safety
for the Space Shuttle. As the Challenger accident
made painfully obvious, no probe into space is
_" Report to the President by the Presidential Commission on the Space
Shuttle Challenger Accident, William P. Rogers, Chairman (June
t986).
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routine, and the Space Shuttle is still a develop-
mental vehicle. The risks of space flight must be
accepted by those who are asked to participate in
each flight as well as by those who are responsible
to the nation for achieving its goals in space. Such
risks should also be recognized by Executive Branch
officials and Congress in their review and oversight
of NASA endeavors.
The Committee has been favorably impressed by
the dedicated effort and beneficial results obtained
thus far by NASA and its contractors from the STS
risk assessment and risk management system. The
Committee is also gratified by the progress NASA
is making in strengthening this system. We appre-
ciate the close collaboration the Committee had
with NASA and contractor personnel, the interest
the)' showed, and their responsiveness to the Com-
mittec's suggestions. Nevertheless, although our
general impressions arc favorable, we do have
suggestions for improvement. It is against this
background that the recommendations in this re-
port should bc judged.
The Committee recognizes that thc NSTS risk
asscssmcnt and risk management activitics, both
existing and with the modifications proposed here,
are large and complex. This means that change
should be introduced with care. A systematic ex-
amination of the entirc set of processes supporting
risk assessment and management in order to op-
timize the total ensemble may be appropriate. Such
an examination may bc particularly useful in con-
junction with implementation of a new program
such as the Space Station.
Although this report and its recommendations
are directed to the NSTS Program, they are of
broader applicability. It certainly would be wise to
consider the lessons learned when structuring any
risk assessment and management system for other
programs having attributes similar to the NSTS
Program, such as the Space Station Program. It,
too, is a large program involving highly complex
technology which requires the major participation
of several NASA centers and prime contractors for
its execution.
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1 Executive Summary
The Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis
Audit Committee (SCRHAAC) was formed by the
National Research Council (NRC), at the request
of the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA), in response to a recommendation
of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident (also known as the Rogers
Commission). That Commission had recommended
that NASA review and evaluate certain aspects of
its process for ensuring the safety of the National
Space Transportation System (NSTS), and that an
NRC panel be appointed to audit the NASA review
effort and verify its adequacy.
The Committee monitored the overall NASA
review and evaluation effort while performing
detailed on-site reviews of its implementation for
selected elements and subsystems _ (e.g., the Space
Shuttle Main Engine, Solid Rocket Booster, Aux-
iliary Power Unit). As areas of particular concern
emerged, such as software issues, the adequacy of
Orbiter structural margins, integrated Space Trans-
portation System (STS) analysis in support of risk
assessment, and Orbiter steering on landing, the
Committee pursued those concerns in greater detail.
Various operational issues affecting Shuttle safety
(e.g., the application of Launch Commit Criteria
and the "cannibalization" of spare parts) were also
examined. Each of these audits was conducted
through a series of meetings with NASA and
contractor personnel on-site at the contractor fa-
cilities and NASA centers, and by reviewing avail-
able documentation. In addition, two NASA liaison
persons provided direct input on questions raised
There art' four malor flight "elements" in the Space Shuttle (Orbiter,
Space Shuttle Main Engines, Solid Rocket Boosters, and External
Tank), each of which is composed of several subsystems.
by the Committee on an ongoing basis and provided
substantial reports on certain points of concern.
The Committee appreciates that NASA has ac-
complished the design, development, verification,
and certification of the STS utilizing a management
approach and procedures that have been, in large
part, most successful. The Committee also recog-
nizes that the risk assessment and management
recommendations made in this report will only be
useful if they are introduced in rational, practical
stages. The Committee believes, however, that the
safety of continuing operations of the STS can be
improved by creating an integrated risk assessment
and management program which builds on the
largely qualitativc methods used previously. The
totality of the recommendations, once such a system
is implemented, should be extremely valuable in
the accomplishment of the NSTS Program in the
future, and should serve as a prototype for similar
programs in NASA as well.
During the course of its work, the Committee
produced two interim progress reports to the Ad-
ministrator of NASA in which more than a dozen
recommendations and suggestions were made. Some
of the concerns expressed in the interim reports
have been resolved since the reports were presented;
others remain at issue. All of the concerns identified
in those reports are reflected in the Findings and
Recommendations summarized in Section 1.3.
1.1. NASA'S SAFETY POLICY AND PROCESS
NASA policy regarding safety is established by
the Administrator; its essence (as stated in NASA
Policy Directive 1701.1) is to:
"a. Avoid loss _f life, injury of personnel, damage and
property loss.
"b. Instill a safety awareness in all NASA employees and
contractors.
"c. Assure that an organized and systematic approach is
utilized to identify safety hazards and that safety is
fully considered from conception to completion of all
agency activities.
"d. Review and evaluate plans, systems, and activities
related to establishing and meeting safety requirements
both by contractors and by NASA installations to
ensure that desired objectives are effectively achieved."
Every manager thoughout the organization is re-
sponsible for systematically identifying risks, haz-
ards, or unsafe situations or practices, and for
taking steps to assure adequate safety in the activ-
ities and products under his supervision. Out of
this broad policy framework are derived the more
specific safety requirements that are implemented
in successively greater detail down through Head-
quarters, program, and project organizations at the
NASA centers and contractors. The Committee
finds that the basic documents setting forth these
policies are complete and do establish a firm
foundation for the NASA-wide safety program.
Central to NASA's analyses to ensure reliability
of the Shuttle system is the Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA). FMEAs are performed
on all STS flight hardware as well as Ground
Support Equipment (GSE) which interfaces with
flight hardware at the launch sites to identify
hardware items that are critical to the performance
and safety of the vehicle and the mission, and to
identify items that do not meet design requirements.
Each possible failure mode is identified and then
analyzed to determine the resulting performance
of the system and to ascertain the worst-case effect
that could result from a failure in that mode. All
the identified "critical items" are then categorized
according to the worst-case effect of the failure on
the crew, the vehicle, and the mission. If the worst-
case effect is loss of life or vehicle, the item is
categorized as Criticality 1 (1R if there are redun-
dant units, and 1S if it would result from the failure
of a piece of ground support equipment). In the
same manner, Criticality 2 and 2R are cases where
loss of mission could result.
The result of this classification is a "Critical
Items List" (CIL) which includes for each item the
rationale for its retention on the STS, thus requiring
a waiver of the NASA policy against flying with
such items present. The retention rationale is the
primary input to NASA waiver decisions to fly the
Shuttle, exposing the STS and its crew to the risk
implicit in the use of the analyzed critical item.
The retention rationale is used to justify accepting
the design "as is," in the Committee's view; its
audits of the NASA review process discovered little
emphasis on creative ways to eliminate potential
failure modes.
The hazard analysis is another analytical tool
used to identify and, if possible, resolve hazardous
conditions that could develop while operating and
maintaining STS hardware and software. Hazard
analyses consider not only the failures identified in
the FMEA process, but also other potential threats
posed by the environment, crew-machine inter-
faces, and mission activities. Identified hazards and
their causes are analyzed to find ways to eliminate
or control the hazard. A hazard is said to be
"eliminated" when its source has been removed.
A "controlled hazard" is one that has effectively
been controlled by a design change, addition of
safety or warning devices, procedural changes, or
operational constraints. Any hazard that cannot
feasibly be eliminated or controlled is termed an
"accepted risk."
There are many other analysis and assessment
tools used by NASA. This complex mosaic of
analysis techniques is intended to provide an all-
encompassing approach to ensuring the design
reliability and safety of the STS. Some of the
techniques, such as the hazard analyses, tend to be
"top-down" approaches that examine certain cross-
systems causes and effects. Others, such as FMEA/
CIL, are narrower "bottom-up" analyses that pur-
sue a specific event to its conclusion--but only
with respect to the subsystem involved.
In March 1986, soon after the Challenger acci-
dent, direction was issued within NASA to reeval-
uate the FMEAs on all critical items on the STS,
"... to affirm the completeness and accuracy of
the FMEA/CIL for the current National STS de-
sign." Following reevaluation of the FMEA, each
Criticality 1 and 1R item, along with any new
items, or items for which the reevaluation had led
to a change in classification, was to be resubmitted
for review and approval of the waiver permitting
the item to be flown aboard the STS. Those items
not revalidated by the review were required to be
redesigned, certified, and qualified for flight. In
addition to the FMEA/CIL reevaluation, the direc-
tives stipulated that the hazard analyses and a set
of special Element Interface Functional Analyses
(EIFAs) were also to be reviewed for completeness
and accuracy.
Since the Challenger mission 51-L accident, a
substantial number of engineering changes have
been undertaken to improve Shuttle safety prior to
resumption of flight. The redesign activity has, for
the most part, preceded the FMEA/CIL and hazard
analysis reevaluations. However, as the reevalua-
tions proceeded, they disclosed a number of addi-
tional items which are being addressed before the
next flight.
1.2 THE COMMITTEE'S VIEW
As the Challenger accident made very evident,
space flight is not routine. Its risks must be accepted
by those who are asked to participate in each flight
as well as by those who are responsible to the
nation for achieving our goals in space. The Com-
mittee believes that the basis for NASA's acceptance
of those risks should, as far as possible, stem from
rationally derived criteria. This acceptance also
should depend very heavily on the quality of the
nlethodology and the degree of objectivity by which
the risks are determined, as well as the rigor by
which the risks are controlled (i.e., managed).
Very early in the work of the Committce, it
became clear that NASA's processes for analyzing
failure modes, effects, and hazards could only be
understood and evaluated intelligently when viewed
as elements of an overall program of risk assessment
and risk management. In the Committee's view,
any such program should include the following
basic elements:
Risk assessment:
--A comprehensive method for identifying po-
tential failure modes and hazards associated with
the system.
--A specific, quantitative methodology for iden-
tifying and assessing (or estimating) the safety risks
of the system.
Risk management:
--A management process by which the safety
risks can be brought to levels or values that are
acceptable to the final approval authority. Risk
management includes establishment of acceptable
risk levels; the institution of changes in system
design or operational methods to achieve such risk
levels; system validation and certification; and
system quality assurance. The basic organizational
elements are in place within NASA for assessing
and managing risk; however, there is a need for a
change in the scope of functions and the way that
they are carried out.
The Committee believes that the management of
the risks of the STS must be the responsibility of
line management (i.e., the NSTS Program Manager,
the Associate Administrator for Space Flight and,
ultimately, the Administrator of NASA). Only this
program management, not the safety organizations,
can make judicious use of the means available to
achieve operational goals while controlling the
safety risks at acceptable levels throughout the
evolution of the program. The safety organizations
at NASA centcrs and Headquarters are staff or-
ganizations-as such, they can and should be
responsible for providing assessments of the sys-
tem's risks. Thcy should also be responsible for
assuring that the activities associated with con-
trolling the risks to the specified levels have been
carried out and documented. Safety organizations
cannot, however, assure safe operation.
Certain shortcomings m process and methodol-
ogy exist which arc discusscd in Section 5 and
summarized in Section 1.3 below. In particular,
there is a fundamental problem in the nature of
and the methods used to develop the overall as-
sessments on which NASA line management bases
its decisions about how to reduce and control risk
in the STS.
Risks in STS operations now are assessed based
on subjective judgments and accepted on the basis
of qualitatwe rationales, although many quantita-
tive engineering analyses and test data relevant to
risk assessment are available and often are used in
arriving at what are finally qualitative, subjective
judgements. With such a non-specific (i.e., non-
value based) risk acceptance process there is little
basis for making objective comparisons of the
several major risk categories associated with the
STS, nor for carrying out risk evaluations by
independent agencies. Neither can one systemati-
cally track the efforts to reduce the risk or impact
of the various possible failures. Without more
objective, quantifiable measures of relative risk it
is not clear how NASA can expect to implement a
truly effective risk management program. However,
the Committee does not wish to suggest that NASA
subordinate sound technical judgement to numer-
ical analysis. Such an approach would be, in our
opinion, unrewarding and counterproductive.
3
1.3 FINDINGSAND RECOMMENDATIONS
Following are the major findings of the Com-
mittee and the specific recommendations associated
with them. The summary findings and recommen-
dations are extracted from Section 5 of the report,
which includes a discussion of each one. The
subsection numbering here parallels that in Section
5. For example, Subsection 1.3.1 corresponds to
Subsection 5.1, 1.3.2 corresponds to 5.2, and
1.3.9.1 corresponds to 5.9.1. In addition, the rec-
ommendations are numbered sequentially and iden-
tically in both sections. It should be noted that the
recommendations are not listed in any priority
order.
1.3.1 Critical Items List Retention Rationale Review
and Waiver Process
The Committee views the NASA critical items
list (CIL) waiver decision making process as being
subjective, with little in the way of formal and
consistent criteria for approval or rejection of
waivers. Waiver decisions appear to be driven
almost exclusively by the design-based FMEA/CIL
retention rationale, rather than being based on an
integrated assessment of all inputs to risk manage-
ment. The retention rationales appear biased to-
ward proving that the design is "safe," sometimes
ignoring significant evidence to the contrary (see
Section 5.1).
Although the Safety, Reliability, and Quality
Assurance (SR&QA) 2 organizations of NASA col-
lect, verify, and transmit all data related to FMEA/
C1L and hazard analysis results, the Committee
has not found an independent, detailed analysis or
assessment of the CIL retention rationale which
considers all inputs to the risk assessment process.
Recommendations (1):
The Committee recommends that NASA estab-
lish an integrated review process which provides a
comprehensive risk assessment and an independent
evaluation of the rationale justifying the retention
of Criticality 1 and 1R items. This integrated review
should include detailed consideration of the results
of hazard analyses and all other inputs to the risk
_'As of September 1987, the NASA Headquarters organization is
called Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance
(SRM&QA), while the similar organizations at the NASA centers are
still named SR&QA. In this report, SR&QA also is used to refer
generically to this function.
assessment process, in addition to the FMEA/CIL
retention rationale. Further, the review process
should assure that the waivers and supporting
analyses fully reflect current data and designs.
Finally, NASA should develop formal, objective
criteria for approving or rejecting proposed critical
item waivers.
1.3.2 Critical Items List Prioritization and Disposition
At present, in NASA instructions all Criticality
1 and 1R items are formally treated equally, even
though many differ substantially from each other
in terms of the probability of failure or malper-
formance, and in terms of the potential for the
worst-case effects postulated in the FMEA to be
seen if the particular failure occurs.
The large number of Criticality 1 and 1R items
at the time of the 51-L accident has since been
substantially increased due to changes in ground
rules for classification and the complete reevalua-
tion of the entire STS.
The Committee believes that giving equal man-
agement attention to all Criticality 1 and 1R
potential failures could be detrimental to safety if,
as is the case, some are extremely unlikely to occur,
or if the probability is very low that the postulated
worst-case consequences of the failures will result.
Treating all such items equally will necessarily
detract from the attention senior management can
give to the most likely and most threatening failure
modes.
Recommendations (2):
The Committee recommends that the formal
criteria for approving waivers include the proba-
bility of occurrence and probability that the worst-
case failures will result. We further recommend
that NASA establish priorities now among Criti-
cality 1 and 1R items, taking care not to use
ambiguous measures of risk and probability. NASA
should also modify the definitions of criticality in
terms of the probability of failure and probability
of worst-case effects. Finally, we recommend that
NASA Level I management pay special attention
to those items identified as being of highest priority,
along with the rationale that produced the priority
rating. Responsibility for attending to lower-prior-
ity items within the present Criticality 1 and IR
categories, when reclassified, should be distributed
to Levels II and III for detailed evaluation and
decision.
1.3.3HazardAnalysis and Mission Safety Assessment
NASA hazard analyses currently do not address
the relative probabilities of a particular hazardous
condition arising from failure modes, human errors,
or external situations.
The hazard analysis and the mission safety as-
sessment do not: address the relative probabilities
of the various consequences which may result from
hazardous conditions; provide an independent eval-
uation of the retention rationales stated in the input
CILs; or provide an overall risk assessment on
which to base the acceptance and control of residual
hazards.
Recommendations (3):
The Committee recommends that the FMEA/
CIi.s be used as one of many inputs considered in
the hazard analysis and system safety assessment.
We also recommend that the overall system safety
assessment encompass a quantitative risk assess-
ment which in turn uses the CILs and hazard
analyses as input. Finally, the Committee recom-
mends that this risk assessment be the primary
basis for retention or rejection of residual hazards
as well as critical items.
1.3.4 Relationship of Formal Risk Assessment Process
to Space Transportation System Engineering Changes
Elements of formal risk assessment, such as
FMEA/CILs and hazard analyses (HAs), appear to
have had little direct impact on the STS recovery
engineering process, as they have not figured prom-
inently in the majority of engineering change de-
cisions made by NASA management.
Recommendation (4):
The Committee recommends that NASA take
firm steps to ensure a continuing and iterative
linkage between the formal risk assessment process
(e.g., FMEA/CIL and HA) and the STS engineering
change activities.
1.3.5 Timely Feedback of Data Into the Risk
Assessment and Management Processes
The Committee has found many indications that
data from STS inspection, test and repair, and
inflight operations do not always feed back rapidly
enough or effectively enough into the risk assess-
ment and management processes.
Recommendations (5):
The Committee recommends that high-level NASA
management attention and priority be given to
increasing the efficiency of the flow, analysis, and
use of inspection, test and repair, test results, and
in-flight operations data throughout the decision-
making process. The Committee also recommends
that full implementation of the System Integrity
Assurance Program (SIAP), including its Program
Compliance Assurance Status System (PCASS), be
given a high priority. Diverse professionals (e.g.,
design and development engineers, operating per-
sonnel, statistical analysts) should be used in the
development of this program, with maximum pos-
sible early involvement by potential users and key
decision makers. The Committee further recom-
mends that procedures be implemented to ensure
that all mission anomalies detected in real time and
from recorded events, and those detected during
the near-term inspection of recovered hardware,
also are fed into the formal risk assessment and
management processes for action prior to commit-
ting to thc next flight. Finally, the Committee
recommends that all such anomalies be called to
the immediate attention of launch decision makers
who will justify in writing their decisions regarding
the disposition of the anomalies.
1.3.6 The Need for Quantitative Measures of Risk
Quantitativc assessment methods, such as prob-
abilistic risk assessment, have not been used directly
to support NASA decision making regarding the
STS, although quantitative analyses and test data
often are used in arriving at qualitative, subjective
judgments upon which decisions are based. Pow-
erful methods of statistical inference are now avail-
able which allow the integration of all sources of
information on risk, including data on partial
degradations and failures as well as engineering
models of failure modes.
NASA is not adequately staffed with specialists
and engineers trained in the statistical sciences to
aid in the transformation of complex data into
information useful to decision makers, and for use
in setting standards and goals.
Recommendations (6):
The Committee recommends that probabilistic
risk assessment approaches be applied to the Shuttle
risk management program at the earliest possible
date. Data bases derived from STS failures, anom-
alies, and flight and test results, and the associated
analysis techniques, should be systematically ex-
panded to support probabilistic risk assessment,
trend analyses, and other quantitative analyses
relating to reliability and safety. Although the
Committee believes that probabilistic risk assess-
ment approaches will greatly improve NASA's risk
assessment process, it recognizes that these ap-
proaches should not substitute for good engineering
and quality control practices in design, develop-
ment, test, manufacturing, and operations, all of
which must continue to receive high priority em-
phasis by NASA and its contractors. The Com-
mittee further recommends that NASA build up its
capability in the statistical sciences to provide
improved analytical inputs to decision making.
1.3.7 The Need for Integrated Space Transportation
System Engineering Analysis in Support of Risk
Management
NASA safety-related analyses tend to focus pri-
marily on single-event, worst-case failures to the
relative exclusion of possible multiple and syner-
gistic failures in different subsystems or elements
of the STS. In addition, the connection between
the various analyses appears tenuous. There does
not appear to be an adequate integrated-system
view of the entire STS.
Recommendation (7):
A "top-down" integrated system engineering
analysis, including a system safety analysis, that
views the sum of the STS elements as a single
system should be performed to help identify any
gaps that may exist among the various "bottom-
up" analyses centered at the subsystem and element
levels.
1.3.8 Independence of the Space Transportation
System Certification and Software Validation and
Verification Program
In general, hardware certification and verifica-
tion, and software validation and verification 3 in
STS are managed and conducted primarily by the
same organizational elements responsible for the
design and fabrication of the units. Thus, the
See Appendix A for definition of these terms.
independence of the certification, validation, and
verification processes is questionable. For example:
--The contractor that builds the Orbiters (Rock-
well International, STS Division) is also responsible
for preparing the documentation and performing
the work involved in certification, but does not
answer to an entity independent of the NSTS
Program with regard to the certification function.
--At Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), the
Engineering Directorate has the prime responsibil-
ity for design requirements for the propulsion
elements of STS and also has responsibility for the
review and approval of their certification. The
Program Office is responsible for the design and
development phase as well as for performing the
certification activities.
--At the Johnson Space Center (JSC), prime
responsibility for design requirements, design and
development, and certification for the Orbiter all
rest with the Program O[fice, supported by the
Engineering and Operations Directorates of the
Center.
--"Independent" validation and verification
(IV&V) of software is carried out by the same
contractor (IBM) that produces the STS software,
with some checks being made by the Johnson Space
Center (JSC).
Recommendation (8):
Responsibility for approval of hardware certifi-
cation and software 1V&V should be vested in
entities separate from the NSTS Program structure
and the centers directly involved in STS develop-
ment and operation. However, these organizations
should continue to conduct activities supporting
certification and IV&V.
1.3.9 Operational Issues
1.3.9.1 Launch Commit Criteria Waiver Policy
An average of two Launch Commit Criteria
(LCCs) are waived by NASA in the course of each
launch. The Committee questions the validity of
an operational procedure that "institutionalizes"
waivers by routinely permitting established criteria
to be violated.
Recommendation (9a):
The Committee recommends that NASA estab-
lish a list of mandatory LCCs which may NOT be
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waived by anyone. This should comprise the bulk
of the LCCs. A limited number of criteria would
be separately listed, for special cases, together with
a discussion of the circumstances under which they
may be waived and who may make the waiver
decision.
1.3.9.2 Human Factors as a Contributor to Risk
Human factors, which are considered in some
of the STS hazard analyses, do not appear to be
taken into account as the cause of failure modes
in the FMEAs. Since the FMEA is one of the
principal safety tools used in the evaluation of the
STS design, the Committee believes that the STS
design process should explicitly consider and min-
imize the potential contribution of humans to the
initiation of the defined failure modes.
Recommendation (9b):
The Committee recommends that the NASA
FMEA include human factors among the recog-
nized sources of potential causes of failure modes.
This step would provide another valid link between
the FMEA and the hazard analysis, which are now,
in our view, too tenuously connected.
I.L 9.3 Cannibalization of Spare Parts
By the time of the Challenger accident, "canni-
balization," the removal of parts at the Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) from one operational STS
element to fulfill spares requirements in another,
had become a prevalent feature of STS logistics,
thus introducing a variety of failure potentials
associated with human error. Cannibalization is
not evaluated as a producer of potential failure in
either the hazard analysis (where it would be most
appropriate) or the FMEA.
1.3.10 Other Weaknesses in Risk Assessment and
Management
I..3.10.1 "lTJeApparent Reliance on Boards and
Panels for Decision Making
The multilayered system of boards and panels
in every aspect of the STS may lead individuals to
defer to the anonymity of the process and not focus
closely enough on their individual responsibilities
in the decision chain. The sheer number of STS-
related boards and panels seems to produce a
mindset of "collective responsibility."
Recommendation (I Oa):
The Committee recommends that the Adminis-
trator of NASA periodically remind all NASA
personnel that boards and panels are advisory in
nature. He should specify the individuals in NASA,
by name and position, who are responsible for
making final decisions while considering the advice
of each panel and board. NASA management
should also see to it that each individual involved
m the NSTS Program is completely aware of his/
her responsibilities and authority for decision mak-
ing.
1.3.10.2 Adequacy of Orbiter Structural Safety
Margins
The primary structure of the STS has been
excluded, by definition, from the FMEA/CIL proc-
ess, based on the belief that there is an adequate
positive margin of safety. However, the Committee
questions whether operating structural safety mar-
gins have actually been proven adequate.
Completion of the Model 6.0 loads study and
the reevaluation of margins of safety based on
these loads will significantly improve NASA's grasp
of actual operating margins of safety.
Recommendations (9c):
The Committee recommends that NASA main-
tain its current intense attention toward reducing
cannibalization of parts to an acceptable level. We
further recommend that adequate funds for the
procurement and repair of spare parts be made
available by NASA to ensure that cannibalization
is a rare requirement. Finally, we recommend that
NASA include cannibalization, with its attendant
removal and replacement operations, as a potential
producer of failure in the integrated risk assessment
recommended earlier (Section 1.3.1).
Recommendations (10b):
The Committee recommends that NASA place a
high priority on completion of the Model 6.0 loads,
the reevaluation of safety margins for these loads,
and the early verification and continued monitoring
of the model 6.0 loads by permanently instru-
menting and calibrating at least the next full scale
STS vehicle to fly. We further recommend that
NASA complete and implement a comprehensive
plan for conducting periodic inspection and main-
tenance of the structure of the Orbiters throughout
the service life of each vehicle.
1..3.10.3 Sot?ware Issues
NASA FMEAs do not assess software as a
possible cause of failure modes.
There is little involvement of JSC Safety, Relia-
bility, and Quality Assurance in software reviews,
resulting in little independent quality assurance for
software.
A large amount of data--much of it flight spe-
cific-must be loaded for each Shuttle mission but
it is not subjected to validation as rigorous as that
for the software.
Recommendations (10c):
The Committee recommends that NASA: explore
the feasibility of performing FMEAs on software,
including the efficacy of identifying and predicting
fault and error modes; request JSC SR&QA to
provide periodic review and oversight of software
from a quality assurance point of view; provide
for validation of input data in a manner similar to
software validation and verification.
1.3.10.4 Differences in Procedures Among NASA
Centers
Differences in the procedures being used by the
main NASA centers involved in the NSTS Program
may reflect an imbalance between the authority of
the centers and that of the NSTS Program Office.
The Committee is concerned that such an imbalance
can lead to serious problems in large programs
where two or more centers have major roles in
what must be a tightly integrated program, such
as the NSTS and Space Station. Without strong,
central program direction and integration, the suc-
cess and safety of these complex programs can be
placed in jeopardy.
Recommendation (10d):
The Administrator should ensure that strong,
central program direction and integration of all
aspects of the STS are maintained via the NSTS
Program Office.
1.3.10.5 Use of Non-Destructive Evaluation
Techniques
Non-destructive evaluation (NDE) tests on the
Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) are performed at the
manufacturing plant. Subsequent transportation
and assembly introduce a risk of debonding and
other damage which may not be apparent upon
visual inspection. No NDE is done on the SRMs
in the "stacked" configuration at the launch facility.
New NDE techniques now being developed have
potential applicability to the STS.
Recommendation (lOe):
The Committee recommends that NASA apply
all practicable NDE techniques to the SRM at the
launch facility, at the highest possible level of
assembly (e.g., SRMs in the "stacked" configura-
tion), and emphasize development of improved
NDE methods.
1.3.11 Focus on Risk Management
The current safety assessment processes used by
NASA do not establish objectively the levels of the
various risks associated with the failure modes and
hazards.
It is not reasonable to expect that NASA man-
agement or its panels and boards can provide their
own detailed assessments of the risks associated
with failure modes and hazards presented to them
for acceptance.
Validation and certification test programs are
not planned or evaluated as quantitative inputs to
safety risk assessments. Neither are operating con-
ditions and environmental constraints which may
control the safety risks adequately defined and
evaluated.
In the Committee's view, the lack of objective,
measurable assessments in the above areas hinders
the implementation of an effective risk management
program, including the reduction or elimination of
risks.
Recommendations (11):
The Committee recommends that NASA con-
sider establishing a focused agency-wide Systems
Safety Engineering (SSE) function, at both Head-
quarters and the centers, which would:
--be structured so as to be integrally involved
in the entire set of design, development, validation,
qualification, and certification activities;
--provide a full systems approach to the contin-
uous identification of safety risks (not just failure
modes and hazards) and the objective (quantitative)
evaluation of such safety risks;
--provide the output of this function to the
NASA Program Directors in support of their risk
management; and
--support the ProgramDirectorsby providing
assurancethat their systemsare ready for final
safetycertificationto therisk levelsestablishedby
the NASAAdministrator.
The Committeealso recommendsthat the STS
risk managementprogram,basedin part on the
definition of the potential to reducethe levelof
riskdevelopedbythesystemsafetyriskassessment,
includea concertedeffort to removeor reducethe
risks.
1.4 CLOSING REMARKS
Although this report and its recommendations
aredirectedto the NSTSProgram,most of them
are of broaderapplicability. It would bewise to
considerthe lessonslearnedherewhenstructuring
ariskassessmentandmanagementsystemfor other
programs which have similar attributes, such as
the Space Station. The safety of other large systems
involving highly complex technology, and requiring
major participation by several NASA centers and
prime contractors, could benefit from an integrated
risk assessment and management program based
on the current NASA procedures supplemented by
those recommended in this report. For any new
program, such as the Space Station, there is the
opportunity to structure an optimum risk assess-
ment and management program at the outset by
assembling those elements of risk assessment and
management which will be most effective in estab-
lishing, monitoring, and controlling safety risks to
accepted levels. (See Section 6.)
2 Introduction
"Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis. NASA
and the primary Shuttle contractors should
review all Criticality 1, I R, 2, and 2R items
and hazard analyses. This review should iden-
tify those items that must be improved prior
to flight to ensure mission success and flight
safety. An Audit Panel, appointed by the
National Research Council, should verify the
adequacy of the effort and report directly to
the Administrator of NASA."
2.1 PURPOSE OF STUDY
The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster of January
28, 1987, stunned NASA and the entire nation. As
the shock of the accident began to subside, NASA
initiated a wide range of actions designed to ensure
greater safety in various aspects of the Shuttle
system and an improved focus on safety throughout
the National Space Transportation System (NSTS)
Program. A number of these actions were prompted
by recommendations of the Presidential Commis-
sion on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (also
known as the Rogers Commission).
Recommendation III of the Presidential Com-
mission (see box above) directed NASA to review
certain safety-critical items on the Shuttle as well
as the existing analyses of hazards that could affect
Shuttle operations and system safety, and to identify
needed improvements in the Shuttle system. It also
recommended the establishment of an audit panel,
under the auspices of the National Research Coun-
cil (NRC), to monitor that review effort and verify
its adequacy. At NASA's request, the NRC formed
the Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and
Hazard Analysis Audit to conduct this audit. The
Committee consisted of 12 people with expertise
in a range of relevant areas: space system devel-
opment and operations, aircraft development and
operations, propulsion systems, avionics, struc-
tures, statistics, reliability and safety, and risk
assessment and management of complex techno-
logical systems. They were asked to evaluate
NASA's effort in response to the Rogers Commis-
sion recommendation and to report their findings
and recommendations directly to the NASA Ad-
ministrator.
See Appendix B for the full text of the pertinent
establishing documents.
2.2 STUDY APPROACH
2.2.1 Interpretation of Task
Following its charge from the Rogers Commis-
sion and NASA, the Committee planned initially
to focus its audit strictly on certain specific features
of the NASA safety process:
• the Critical Items List (CIL) and the NASA
review of those Shuttle primary and backup
units whose failure might result in loss of life,
the Shuttle vehicle itself, or the mission (i.e.,
the Criticality 1, 1R, 2 and 2R items4);
• the Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA)
on which the criticality determinations are
largely based; and
• the hazard analyses and their review.
(See Section 3 for a description of these activities
and their interrelationships.)
4 See "Fable 3-1 for definitions of Criticality levels.
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Early in its study, the Committee recognized that
m fulfill its charge to "verify the adequacy of the
effort" it must broaden the scope of its audit to
include an assessment, from a risk management
point of view, of NASA's overall process for
identifying, assessing, reviewing, and implementing
changes in the Space Shuttle system. That broader
scope would include not only other safety analyses
and functions, but also the relationship of safety
elements and organizations to the continuing proc-
ess of Space Shuttle design and engineering. (See
Appendix B for the resulting Statement of Task.)
Thus, in the context of evaluating NASA's pro-
cedures for detecting, assessing, and dealing with
hazards and potential failure modes in the Shuttle
system, the Committee would seek to determine:
• What has NASA done in the past?
• What is it doing differently now?
• How adequate are these procedures?
• Whcre are the flaws in the process, if any?
2.2.2 Plan and Structure
The Committee began with a general review of
NASA's policies and procedures for reviewing safeg,-
critical items and analyzing hazards. This process
overview, provided in briefings by and discussions
with NASA officials and managers of the NSTS
Program and its component projects, provided not
only a general overview but also the status of the
reevaluation which NASA had undertaken of the
FMEA/CIL and hazard analyses. The general re-
view also included briefings and studies on the
ways in which other organizations and industries
(e.g., U.S. Air Force, nuclear power, and commer-
cial aviation) accomplish similar safety analyses
and reviews.
The Committee decided to conduct its audit of
the reevaluation on several levels. First, it would
conduct a detailed review of one or two major
Space Transportation System (STS) elements _, and
the reevaluation process and its results. The Space
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) and the Solid Rocket
Booster/Solid Rocket Motor (SRB/SRM) were se-
lected for this audit, since the Committee felt that
NASA terminology generally reters to the entire Space Shuttle as a
"'system" composed oi: four maior flight "elements": Orbiter, Space
Shuule Main Engines, Solid Rocket Boosters/Solid Rocket Motors,
and External Tank. Each of these elements is composed of maior
systems which are, in turn, made up of subsystems, units, and
components or piece parts.
the greatest hazards are in propulsion. During its
work, the Committee identified other areas of
concern which led to a detailed examination of a
number of different aspects of the STS safety-
related activities. Each of these audits was con-
ducted through a series of meetings with NASA
and contractor personnel on-site at contractor
facilities and NASA centers.
Concern about the potential weakness of NASA's
"top-down" analyses to complement the "bottom-
up" FMEA/CILs (which seemed to be the dominant
safety evaluation tool) led the Committee to initiate
audits related to the integrated system safety as-
sessments across all of the elements of the STS.
For example, it examined interactions arising from
the generation and distribution of electrical power
and fresh water aboard the STS, and the generation
and distribution of hydraulic power in the Orbiter
and thc SRB. This work is reflected particularly in
Section 5.7 of this report.
The 17-inch diameter fuel and oxidizer discon-
nect valves between the Orbiter and the External
Tank (ET) were selected for detailed examination
of the preparation and role of hazard analyses in
STS risk assessment to complement the broader,
more general treatment of this subject obtained in
briefings, discussions, and written answers to Com-
mittee questions. This audit contributed signifi-
cantly to Sections 5.3 and 5.11.
The Committee discovered early in its work that
the large number of Criticality 1 and I R items on
the STS are not ranked by priority of their impor-
tance and that NASA did not appear to be making
much use of modern analytical techniques in quan-
titatively assessing probabilities of failures and their
effects, and levels of risk in the program. This led
to a special investigation of the extent to which
such techniques are used in the NSTS program,
and of methods which might be of special value to
the program. (See especially Sections 5.2 and 5.6,
and Appendices D and E.)
Since the STS structure was excluded by NASA
from the FMEA/CIL process, and since there were
concerns about the actual margins of safety, the
Committee examined in some detail the past history
and current activity of NASA in this critical area
(see Section 5.10.2). The safety/risk assessment for
Orbiter software also is handled in a very different
manner than hardware (e.g., no FMEA/CIL).
Therefore, it too was subjected to a special audit,
the results of which are reflected primarily in
Sections 5.8 and 5.10.3.
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Finally, becauseof significant problems in the
past, the Committee examined in some detail, from
a safety standpoint, the history and current redesign
of the Orbiter nose wheel steering system, and the
main wheels and brakes.
These more detailed audits of selected subsys-
tems, when coupled with the broader investigations
of the SSME and SRB elements and the STS as a
whole, provided the basis for the Committee's
findings, conclusions, and recommendations in Sec-
tion 5 and supporting material in Appendices D
through F. The Committee did not examine the
interfaces between the STS and its payloads to the
extent that the members were comfortable in mak-
ing any specific conclusions and recommendations
beyond those for the NSTS Program in general.
2.2.3 Meetings and Site Visits
Apart from the meetings and site visits conducted
by individual and groups of Committee members,
the full Committee held a total of 12 meetings.
Nine meetings were largely fact-finding with NASA
and contractor personnel; three were devoted to
formulating conclusions and recommendations, and
preparation of this final NRC report (see Table
2-1). The Committee met with a large number of
NASA personnel representing Headquarters man-
agement, as well as program and project manage-
ment at all three of the NASA field centers having
primary involvement in the NSTS Program. Safety,
Reliability, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA)
organizations 6 were heavily represented among
those presenting briefings and working with the
Committee. Prime contractors for STS elements,
and contractors for several subsystems and STS
integration activities were also extensively repre-
sented, both at NASA centers and at their own
facilities. In addition, independent contractors in-
volved in the FMEA/CIL reevaluation were heard
from.
In addition to the meetings and site visits, input
was provided by NASA in two other very important
ways. First, two NASA liaison persons representing
Headquarters management and the NSTS Program
(SR&QA Office) facilitated the Committee's audit
and provided direct input on specific questions on
As of September 1987, the NASA Headquarters organization is
called Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance
(SRM&QA), while the similar organizations at the NASA centers are
still named SR&QA. In this report, SR&QA also is used to refer
generically to this function.
an ongoing basis. Secondly, a series of documents
were provided giving detailed answers to lists of
questions developed by the Committee on a wide
range of subjects. These "Q&A" documents were
supplemented by substantial reports from NASA
on certain points of concern.
It should be noted here that the Committee was
at all times impressed and gratified by the excellent
support that was consistently provided by NASA
management and staff to accommodate the Com-
mittee's audit and its inquiries.
2.2.4 Interim Reports of the Committee
In accordance with its charge, the Committee
issued two interim progress reports in the form of
letters to the NASA Administrator (see Appendix
C). The first letter report was dated January 13,
1987, some four months after the Committee first
met. Presented in person by Committee Chairman
Alton D. Slay to the Administrator and his key
deputies, it presented four specific suggestions for
improvement in aspects of the FMEA/CIL and
hazard analysis processes, based on the initial phase
of the Committee's audit. The Administrator dis-
cussed these matters with Chairman Slay, and then
responded formally to SCRHAAC on April 22,
1987, to describe actions taken with regard to the
Committee's concerns. As following sections will
detail, specific changes in procedure and approach
have already been made in response to two of the
four suggestions (see NASA responsc to the first
letter report, in Appendix C).
In addition, Committee Chairman Slay appeared
before the House Subcommittee on Space Science
and Applications (Committee on Science, Space
and Technology) on April 29, 1987, to discuss the
findings contained in the first letter report.
The Committee's second letter report was issued
July 22, 1987, and was again delivered personally
by the Chairman and discussed with the Admin-
istrator. It summarized SCRHAAC's continuing
activities and findings, also commenting on the
actions taken by NASA in response to the first
letter report. In this second report, eight new topics
were addressed, some of them expressing approval
of particular aspects of the STS risk assessment
and management process, and planned changes,
and others highlighting areas of concern on the
part of the Committee.
Some of the concerns expressed in the interim
reports have been resolved since the reports were
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TABLE 2-1 Meetings of the Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit
Date Location Participants Purpose
1. 9/22-23/86
2 10/27-28/86
3 11/10/86
4 t2,"15 16/86
5 t/'14 16/87
6 2,q0_11!87
7. 3/18/87
8 4.,'24 25/87
9 5,'28-29,"87
10 7.'13 14/87
11 9,'3 4,'87
12 10.12.87
NRC, Washington, DC
Rockwell STS Div.
Rocketdyne Div
Los Angeles, CA
NRC, Washington, DC
NASA JSC, Houston
MSFC Huntsville, AL
KSC FL
NRC, Washington, DC
Rocketdyne Div
Canoga Park, CA
NRC, Washington, DC
NRC Washington, DC
NRC, Woods Hole, MA
NRC Washington. DC
NRC, Washington. DC
NASA Headquarters, JSC, MSFC & KSC staff
Boeing Comm'l Aircraft representatives
Rockwell STS Div., Rocketdyne Div, NASA
HQ, JSC, MSFC, USAF Space Div. and
Aerospace Corp. staff
NASA Assoc Admins. for Space Flight &
SRM&QA, NSTS Program Manager
NSTS and JSC personnel (including Mission
Operations & Astronaut personnel)
MSFC and KSC leaders and staff related to
STS
MSFC & JSC Indpndnt contractor staff,
Quant. Risk Assess. (QRA) consultants
Rockwell STS Div. Rocketdyne Div., NASA
HQ, JSC, and MSFC staff
NASA HQ & JSC NSTS personnel NASA HQ
SRM&QA personnel
NSTSDep Dir. Operations JSC, HQ
personnel
Executive session
Executive session
Executive session
Process overview, Committee
planning
SSME, Orbiter FMEA/CIL &
hazard analysis audit
Discussion of concerns; draft
first interim report
Review STS risk mangement
and operations
Overview of MSFC & KSC
FMEA/CILs & hazard analyses
QRA, Independent contractor
FMEA/CIL reviews
SSME; STS integration
activities
SRM&QA status and functions
STS integration & software
STS oprns, payloads, PCASS,
system engineering, draft
second interim report
Review & discuss information
collected
Formulate conclusions, rec-
ommendations; review drafts
Review & approve final text
ACRONYMS
CIL
FMEA
HQ
JSC
KSC
MSFC
NASA
NRC
Critical Items List
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Headquarters (ol NASA)
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
Marshall Space Flight Center
Nalional Aeronautics & Space Administration
Nalional Research Council
presented; others remain at issue. All of the con-
cerns identified in those reports are discussed in
Section 5 of this report, h should be noted that
NASA's safety process in general, and the current
reevaluation in particular, have been undergoing
considerable change following the Challenger ac-
cident and during the Committee's audit. Indeed,
some of the changes have resulted from the Com-
mittee's discussions with NASA officials and from
its interim reports. Thus, many of the subjects
covered by this report have been "moving targets"
that continued to change as this report was being
prepared. However, the Committee believes that
the report reflects the facts and circumstances as
of September 1987.
2.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
Following this introduction is Section 3, which
presents an overview of NASA's safety process for
NSTS National Space Transportation System
PCASS Program Compliance Assurance and Status System
QRA Quantitahve Rrsk Assessment
SRM&QA Safety, Reliability Maintainability & Quality
Assurance
SSME Space Shuttle Main Engine
STS Space Transportalion System
USAF United States Air Force
the NSTS Program as the Committee understands
it. That section is provided as a tutorial for those
who may not be familiar with this complex process.
Section 4 briefly describes the Committee's con-
ception of modern risk management, including the
essential element of objective risk assessment, and
contrasts it with NASA's safety process in general
terms.
The heart of the report is Section 5, which
presents discussion, findings, and recommendations
regarding particular aspects of NASA's STS safety
assurance process. It comprises the results of the
Committee's audit. The section is divided into 11
subsections, each dealing with a different aspect of
the process (with some encompassing related but
distinct topics).
Section 6 is a brief summary of the main "lessons
learned" by SCRHAAC in the course of its audit.
These lessons, derived from the STS review, are
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considered to be applicable to other large and
complex technological systems which, by their size
and complexity, require the involvement of several
major centers and organizations for their execution.
Finally, a series of appendices are provided.
Some, like Appendix A ("Acronyms and Defini-
tions"), are intended as useful tools for the reader.
Others are provided as amplification or background
on various subjects addressed in the report. See the
Table of Contents for a complete listing.
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3 NASA's Safety Process For The
National Space Transportation
System Program
Before entering into a discussion of the Com-
mittee's findings regarding various specific aspects
of the process that NASA relies on to ensure the
safety of the Space Transportation System (STS),
it may be useful to provide a basic overview of the
elements and purposes of that process. Readers
who are already familiar with the structure and
purposes of NASA's present safety process may
wish to skip over this "orientation" section and
begin reading at Section 4.
The measures taken to ensure safety follow basic
NASA policy issued at the Administrator level. The
implementation of that policy is guided and over-
seen by descending levels of management through-
out NASA Headquarters and the NASA field cen-
ters and their contractors involved in STS
development and operation. Various organizations
within NASA have different and overlapping sets
of responsibilities with respect to safety of the STS.
At the heart of the safety process is a set of analyses
of the system configuration and function. NASA's
activities in the safety area since the Challenger
(51-L) disaster occurred have centered on these
analyses and on the needed engineering changes in
the STS system which the analyses have helped to
identify.
This section is intended to be only a factual
description of NASA's safety process, with empha-
sis on policy and structure (as perceived by the
Committee). The Committee's analysis and com-
ments are presented beginning in Section 4.
3.1. POLICY ON SAFETY
NASA policy regarding safety is established by
the Administrator through NASA Policy Directive
(NPD) 1701.1, "Basic Policy on Safety." The pur-
pose of this document is to prescribe "the basic
policy for planning, developing, conducting, and
evaluating agency activities to ensure the highest
practicable standards of safety in all NASA pro-
grams." The essence of the policy is to:
"'a. Avoid loss of life, injury of personnel, damage and
property loss.
"'b. Instill a safety awareness in all NASA employees and
contr_lctors.
"c. Assure that an organized and systematic approach is
utilized to identify safety hazards and that safety is
fully considered from conception to completion of all
agency activities.
"d. Review and evaluate plans, systems, and activities
related to establishing and meeting safety requirements
both by contractors and by NASA installations to
ensure that desired objectives are effectively achieved."
The accompanying NASA handbook (NHB 1700.1
[VII) states that "... the steps necessary to achieve
safety of operations begin with initial planning and
extend through every facet of NASA's activities.
Under this concept, every manager thoughout the
organization is responsible for systematically iden-
tifying risks, hazards, or unsafe situations or prac-
tices, and for taking steps to assure adequate safety
in the activities and products under his supervi-
sion."
Out of this broad policy framework are derived
the more specific safety requirements that are
implemented in successively greater detail down
through Headquarters, program and project or-
ganizations at the NASA centers, and contractor
organizations.
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3.2 MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
3.2.1 Program Management
The development and operation of the STS is
carried out through a National Space Transpor-
tation System (NSTS) Program. This Program draws
on resources functionally located at three of the
NASA field centers. Prior to the Challenger mission
51-L the NSTS Program was managed out of
Johnson Space Center (JSC), in Houston; JSC is
also responsible for the Orbiter element of the STS
as well as the integration of all STS elements.
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), in Alabama,
is responsible for the propulsion elements of the
STS: the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), Solid
Rocket Booster (SRB), which includes the Solid
Rocket Motor (SRM), and External Tank (ET).
Kennedy Space Center, in Florida, is responsible
for major ground support equipment (GSE), and
launch and landing operations.
After mission 5 l-L, the NSTS Program Director
was brought to NASA Headquarters (Level 1) to
manage the program from a location closer to top
agency officials and at a level which has oversight
of all three field centers. The Deputy Director
(Program) of the NSTS Program remains at JSC;
the recently established position of Deputy Director
(Operations) is located at KSC. At each NASA
center there are Project Managers responsible for
the particular elements and systems. These Project
Managers, in a matrix organizational arrangement,
report functionally to the NSTS Program Director
as well as organizationally to the center manage-
ment. Reporting to the Project Managers are var-
ious Subsystem Managers who are directly respon-
sible for the engineering effort on their subsystems.
Thus, within the center organization there are
engineers and other personnel supporting the NSTS
Program.
Management levels within the NSTS Program
are referred to as "Level I, Level II", and so on
according to the hierarchy shown in Figure 3-1.
Each level of management has a specific scope of
responsibility, as described in the figure. Basically,
Level I is Headquarters, primarily concerned with
policy and broad program formulation and man-
agement; Level II is the major program manage-
ment level; and Level III is the project management
level. The Level I Program Director is at Head-
quarters, and reports to the Associate Administra-
tor for Space Flight. Level 11 for development resides
at JSC (viz., the Deputy Director [Program]) and
at KSC for operations (the Deputy Program Direc-
tor [Operations] ), while Level llI is dispersed across
all of the participating NASA centers.
l DIRECTOR NSTS(HQS)
DEPUTY
PROG
(JSC)
DEPUTY
OPNS
(KSC)
JSC MSFC KSC VLS
PROJECT MANAGER
I
CONTRACTORS/DESIGN ACTIVITIES
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
FIGURE 3-1 National Space Transportation System
LEVEL h
TOP LEVEL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS,
BUDGETS AND SCHEDULES. CONTROL OF
CHANGES ABOVE $1 MILLION/YEAR OR TWO
MILLION TOTAL OR THOSE IMPACTING LEVEL
I REQUIREMENTS OR SCHEDULES.
LEVEL Ih
MANAGEMENT AND INTEGRATION OF ALL
ELEMENTS OF THE PROGRAM. INTEGRATED
FLIGHT AND GROUND SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS,
SCHEDULES AND BUDGETS; CONTROL OF
PROJECT INTERFACES; CONTROL OF CHANGES
EXCEEDING PROJECT BUDGETS, OR THOSE
IMPACTING LEVEL II REQUIREMENTS,
INTERFACES, OR SCHEDULES.
LEVEL II1:
PROJECT ORIENTED FLIGHT AND GROUND
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS, SCHEDULES, AND
BUDGETS; CONTROL OF CHANGES WITHIN
PROJECT LEVEL BUDGETS, SCHEDULES, AND
SPECIFICATIONS.
LEVEL IV:
DETAILED FLIGHT AND GROUND SYSTEM
REQUIREMENTS WITHIN ASSIGNED PROJECT.
CONTROL AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
DETAILED DESIGN.
Program management relationships (after NASA).
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3.2.2 Review Boards
Each of the management levels has associated
with it one or more boards or panels that review
and approve or disapprove the actions proposed
by technical and other groups at the levels below.
The most important of these boards are the two
Program Requirements Control Boards (PRCBs).
One PRCB is at Level II and the other at Level l,
chaired respectively by the NSTS Deputy Director
(Program) and the NSTS Program Director. These
boards meet together to review FMEA/CILs. The
main Level III boards are the Configuration Control
Boards (CCBs), one for each STS element and the
two launch sites (KSC and Vandenburg AFB); each
of the CCBs is supported by a number of Config-
uration Control Panels (CCPs). (See Figure 3-2.)
Each of these boards and panels has controlling
authority for "dispositioning" (deciding upon or
recommending) proposed changes to its documen-
tation, hardware, and software--to the extent that
thc change does not conflict with rcquiremcnts,
schedules, budgets, etc., established by a higher-
level board. Level !I/I PRCB approval is requircd
for all changcs to flight hardware after delivery to
NASA and for all changes to flight hardware that
interfaces with GSE.
There arc a considerable number of other Level
II and II1 boards that are responsible for review of
specific technical and management aspects of STS
design, development, and operation. All of them
feed, ultimately, through the Level 11/I PRCBs,
which arc the highest boards for configuration
control. These boards and their functions (some of
which are shown in Figure 3-2) will be described
further in Section 3.3, and from a different stand-
point in Section 5.10.1.
3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES
As was noted in Section 3.1, in theory, safety in
all its forms is equally the responsibility of all
NASA managers and workers, as well as those of
their contractors. In practice, roles and responsi-
bilities are necessarily defined and allocated across
various functional organizations. Within the NSTS
Program, these safety-related roles are shared by
the engineering organizations in the project offices;
the Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality
Assurance (SRM&QA) organization at Headquar-
ters and the corresponding SR&QA organizations
at the centers; the NSTS Engineering Integration
Office; and, to a lesser extent, the operations
organizations (i.e., the Astronaut Office and Mis-
sion Operations Directorate).
3.3.1 Engineering Project Offices
]he engineering organization within each ele-
ment project office at the centers is responsible to
a Project Manager and the Program Director for
the performance and reliability of hardware/soft-
ware systems they develop. Safety is thus an in-
herent feature of the system design, development,
testing, and production processes. Since it is engi-
neers who design the unit or system, test it, certify
it for operation, and inspect it after flight, it is they
who have the greatest ability to understand and
anticipate the ways in which the unit or system
might fail.
For that reason, NASA engineers have primary
responsibility for carrying out the most technical
of the safety analyses described in Section 3.4 (i.e.,
the Failure Modes and Effects and Analysis [FMEA])
and for establishing the rationale for retaining
critical items identified through the FMEA. They
participate secondarily in other safety analysis
efforts. However, few of the engineers have any
formal grounding m safety engineering techniques
and methodologies.
3.3.2 Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality
Assurance
Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
(SR&QA) Offices (the maintainability function was
added at Headquarters in 1986) have hmg existed
in one form or another within the various NASA
centers as staff organizations reporting to the center
director. (See Figure 3-3, for example.) The cor-
responding Headquarters organization has existed
as a policy-setting group reporting, until 1986, to
the NASA Chief Engineer.
Center SR&QA staff are detailed to programs
such as the NSTS Program, where they develop
functional units of staff dedicated to various aspects
of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance.: Their
role is to provide oversight of the engineering design
and development activities, and to advise the Pro-
ject Manager and the various configuration control
boards on the safety and other relevant aspects of
systems under review. They are also responsible
-The center SR&QA _rganizatmns have, as of the time of writing,
not a&_pted the "M" in their organization name. We have elected to
adhere to current NASA practice to avoid confusion.
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FIGURE 3-3 Organization of NASA Johnson Space Center (NASA)
for keeping records on problems and anomalies
encountered in the development and operation of
the STS.
SR&QA, through its Safety Divisions, has pri-
mary responsibility for conducting hazard analyses
of the STS (see Section 3.4.2 for a description).
This is one of the most important safety-related
analyses conducted on the STS, in many ways
complementing the FMEA.
In the wake of the Challenger accident, the
functions and authority of SR&QA were expanded
in scope, and the Headquarters organization was
restructured. A new position of Associate Admin-
istrator for SRM&QA was established, with appeal
rights to the Administrator of NASA on any de-
cision relevant to the safety of the STS and its
crew. The new Associate Administrator intends to
establish the SRM&QA function as an effective
check and balance to the overall NASA operation,
one that will provide a "second-look assessment"
of the entire process from design through opera-
tions. Figure 3-4 depicts the new SRM&QA or-
ganization at Headquarters.
3.3.3 Engineering Integration Office
The NSTS Engineering Integration Office is lo-
cated at JSC, where it handles certain special aspects
of STS design and development that are crucial to
the safe functioning of the overall system. These
include: systems integration and interface design
between the different STS elements, analyses of
integrated structural loads and thermal effects,
software requirements and configuration control,
and ground systems and operations requirements.
Shuttle avionics and ascent flight systems--two
systems involving electronics and software func-
tions which cut across various STS elements--are
also among the responsibilities of this office.
The organization of the office is shown in Figure
3-5. Note that the figure identifies a separate review
structure for systems integration and software. The
Systems Integration Review (SIR) Board is a Level
II board that supports the Level II and I PRCBs in
all the integration areas, including ascent and entry,
flight control, and thermal design. The Shuttle
Avionics Software Control Board (SASCB) is the
controlling authority for avionics software. Addi-
tionally, a Mission Integration Control Board
(MICB), shown in Figure 3-2, is the controlling
authority for changes to delegated mission integra-
tion requirements that do not affect other Level II
requirements, budgets, or schedules.
The Engineering Integration Office is also re-
sponsible for carrying out a series of Element
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FIGURE 3-4 Organization of the new office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance at NASA
Headquarters (NASA),
Interface Functional Analyses (EIFA), described in
Section 3.4.3 below.
3.4 SAFETY ANALYSES
3.4.1 The Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and
Critical Items List
At the heart of NASA's effort to ensure reliability
of the Shuttle system is the Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis. FMEAs are performed on all STS
flight hardware as well as Ground Support Equip-
ment which interfaces with flight hardware at the
launch sites to identify hardware items that are
critical to the performance and safety of the vehicle
and the mission, and to identify items that do not
meet design requirements. (NASA does not perform
FMEAs on software; also excluded from the FMEA
by definition are STS primary structure and, orig-
inally, pressure vessels.) This analysis, carried out
by the element contractor, begins with an identi-
fication of the functional units of each system and
a determination of the potential modes of failure
for each unit. Each possible failure mode is then
analyzed to determine the resulting performance
of the system and to ascertain the worst-case effect
that could result from a failure in that mode. All
the identified items are then categorized according
to the worst-case effect of the failure on the crew,
the vehicle, and the mission.
Table 3-1 shows the FMEA/C1L criticality clas-
2O
sifications, which are based on sevcrity of effect.
ltcms in the top four categories--Criticality 1, 1R,
2, and 2R--comprise a Critical Items List (CIL).
Essentially, this is a listing of all hardware items
and their failure modes which do not meet certain
design and reliability, requirements (related to safety)
set for the Shuttle system by Level I management.
Those requirements (specified in JSC 07700, Vol.
1, Appendix A, para. 2.8) are as follows:
• "Redundancy requirements for all flight ve-
hicle subsystems. • . [with specific exceptions]
•.. shall be established on an individual basis,
but shall be no less than fail-safe•
• "Redundant systems shall be designed so that
their operational status can be verified during
ground turnaround and to the maximum ex-
tent possible while in flight."
Therefore, in addition to single-point failures, the
CIL also includes items that could fail in one mode
and result in loss of the capability of redundant
(backup) systems, items whose status is not readily
detectable in flight, and redundant systems in which
a single failure under certain conditions may result
in loss of the total system capability.
Critical items with these failure modes must be
subjected to design improvements or to corrective
action to meet the fail-safe and redundancy re-
quirements, before the Shuttle can fly with them
present. If that is not feasible, a waiver request
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TABLE 3-1 FMEA/CIL Criticality Classification
Criticality Category Potential Effect of Failure
For Ground
1
1R
2
2R
3
Loss of life or vehicle
Redundant hardware element, failure of which could cause loss of life or vehicle
Loss of mission
Redundant hardware element, failure of which could cause loss of mission
All others
Support Equipment only:
1S Failure of a safety or hazard monitoring system to detect, combat, or operate when
required and could allow loss of life or vehicle
2S Loss of vehicle system
must be submitted to NASA management to present
the rationale for retaining an item that does not
meet thc requirements. Types of data included in
this "retention rationale" include design, test, and
inspcction data, failure history, and operational
experience. Figure 3-6 shows an example of a CIL
document, including the retention rationale.
An approved waiver must support the decision
to accept the risk represented by the critical item
and ensure that maintenance, test, or inspection
procedures will minimize the potential for the
failure to occur. Figure 3-7 depicts the review and
approval process for critical items. Note that the
key approval reviews are done by the CCB and
PRCB review boards described in Section 3.2.2.
After the PRCB meets, a directive is issued that
documents items for which waivers have been
granted and lists actions assigned by the Board.
Each critical item, along with its approved waiver,
is maintained by the NSTS Program, and any
subsequent changes affecting the CIL must be
approved by the NSTS Program Director.
The FMEA/CIL was originally conceived as a
design tool, used to ensure the early identification
and disposal of critical failure modes, as well as to
support other reviews of the STS design. Since
mission 51-L it is now also an operational and
management tool, used for problem analysis, to
assess the efficacy of corrective actions, to identify
maintenance checkout requirements and inspection
points, and to reflect trends in failure history.
3.4.2 Hazard Analysis
Hazard analysis is another analytical tool used
to identify and, if possible, resolve hazardous
conditions that could develop while operating and
maintaining STS hardware and software. Hazard
identification is performed collectively by the NSTS
engineering, safety, and operations organizations.
Sources of information used to identify hazards
include the FMEA/CIL, as well as various design
reviews, safety analyses, crew procedures devel-
opment, flight anomaly reports, and other sources.
Hazard analyses thus consider not only the failures
identified in the FMEA process, but also other
potential threats posed by the environment, crew/
machine interfaces, and mission activities. There
are several different types of hazard analyses, as
listed in Table 3-2. A typical Hazard (analysis)
Report (HR) is shown as Figure 3-8.
Identified hazards and their causes are analyzed
by Safety Division staff of the SR&QA offices at
the NASA centers (and their contractors) to find
ways to eliminate or control the hazard. A hazard
is said to be "eliminated" when its source has been
removed. A "controlled hazard" is one that has
effectively been controlled by a design change, the
addition of safety or warning devices, procedural
changes, or operational constraints. Any hazard
that cannot feasibly be eliminated or controlled by
these means is termed an "accepted risk", and
requires review and approval by Level III and I1
management boards and their chairmen. SR&QA
maintains a closed-loop tracking system for hazard
documentation, resolution, and approval. The basic
steps in hazard processing and review are depicted
in Figure 3-9 and Figure 3-10.
Indicated in both of the latter figures is a Mission
Safety Assessment (MSA). This is a report, prepared
by the Safety Division for each STS flight mission,
which provides an integrated and comprehensive
assessment of all activities and hazards associated
with a mission, including turnaround activities. It
also provides a way to identify and "baseline"
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FIGURE 3-6 An example of a Critical Items List document (NASA).
hazards (i.e., to establish their "normal"--ac-
cepted--state or level) for future flights.
3.4.3 Element Interface Functional Analysis
Provision is made in NASA's risk managemcnt
process for checking cross-clement interface failure
modes and effects by a number of means. One
method used is the Element Interface Functional
Analysis, prepared by the NSTS Engineering Inte-
gration Office with the support of Rockwell Inter-
national. EIFAs arc analyses of various functional
failure modes that can occur at element-to-element
interfaces as a result of a hardware failure in either
element. There are three EIFAs: Orbiter/ET, Or-
biter/SSME, and Orbiter/SRB-ET. (A fourth EIFA,
on ground/flight systems, is now being generated.)
The purpose of these analyses is to correlate
clement hardware failures with failure modes at
the element interface to determine the effect on the
mission, vehicle, or crew safety. EIFAs also look
for failure propagation across interfaces. The EIFA
activity helps to ensure that FMEA items are
correctly classified as to their criticality.
3.4.4 Other Analyses
Providing basic input to the hazard analysis is a
diverse group of safety analyses. NHB 5300.4 (ID-
2) describes these analyses as follows:
"Safety analyses are performed at the integrated and element
(STS) levels and down to the component level to assure
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TABLE 3-2 Types of Hazard Analyses _O_" POOR QUAL[TY_
Type of Analysis Program Phase Why Used
Preliminary Hazard
Analyses
Fault Tree Analyses
Sneak Analysis
Software Hazard Analysis
Operations Hazard
Analysis
Mission Level Hazard
Analysis
Mission Safety Assessment
Concept/design and
development
Concept/design and
development/operations
Design and development
phase (when detailed de-
sign available)/operations
Design and development
phase/operations
Design and development
phase/operations
Design and development
phase/operations
Design and development
phase/operations
Allows top level hazard definition by generic hazard and
lends itself to expansion as the program progresses.
Allows in-depth analysis of selected critical areas and
relationships among events.
Allows identification of latent nonfailure conditions that may
allow undesired conditions or prevent desired conditions
Allows independent verification that software code imple-
ments approved requirement
Allows identification of hazardous conditions during opera-
tions caused by such things as out-of-sequence operation,
omitted steps, and interaction of elements
Allows detailed analysis of mission events considering hard-
ware, crew, ground operations, and software interactions
Allows assessment of previously conducted analyses for
completeness and accuracy, provides analyses and pro-
vides visibility of hazards by mission phase and event.
(Source: NASA JSC)
identification of hazardous conditions, hazard causes, hazard
effects, hazard levels, corrective actions, and rationale for
hazard closure."
An important subset of safety analyses arc the
systems safety analyses, defined as follows (in NHB
1700.1 (V3), System Safety):
"Systems safety analyses are performed for the purpose of
identifying hazards and establishing risk levels . . . in support
of this concept the analyses perform five basic functions:
"a. Provide the foundation for the development of safety
criteria and requirements.
"b. Determine both whether and how the safety criteria
and requirements provided to engincering have been
included m the design(s).
"c. Determine whether the safety criteria and requirements
created for that design have provided for adequate
safety for the system.
"d. Provide part of the means for meeting pre-established
safety goals.
"c. Provide a means of demonstrating that safety goals
have been met."
Two other important safety analyses are the
Integrated Hazard Analysis (IHA) and Critical
Functions Assessment (CFA). The NSTS Engineer-
ing Integration Office, with the support of Rockwell
International (the integration support contractor)
produces an IHA when a potential risk situation
or unsafe condition is perceived, the resolution of
which involves two or more STS elements. These
analyses arc rcviewcd by the System Integration
Review Board (SIR), &scribed earlier.
The CFA, a oile-time effort completed in 1978,
examined critical functions during each mission
phase and identified hardware and software changes
which would improvc safety. The CFA included
certain multiple and cascading failure combina-
tions; it is currently being reexamined by Rockwell
International to verify the results of the initial
assessment and provide an update to the current
STS configuration.
3.4.5 Overall Scope of Analyses
The various analysis techniques employed by
NASA are intended to provide an all-encompassing
approach to ensuring the design reliability and
safety of the STS. Some of the techniques, princi-
pally the hazard analyses and EIFA, tend to be
"top-down" approaches that examine certain cross-
systems causes and effects. Others, such as FMEA/
CIL, are narrower "bottom-up" analyses that pur-
sue a specific event to its conclusion--but only
with respect to the piece of hardware involved. In
a briefing to the Committee, Rockwell International
presented its view of this interaction, summarized
in Figure 3-11.
The FMEA/CIL, EIFA, and other safety analyses
feed into the various hazard analyses in a one-way
flow culminating in the Mission Safety Assessment.
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TABLE 3-3 Critical Item Review Teams
Shuttle Element Prime Contractor Independent Review Contractor
Orbiter (JSC)
External Tank (MSFC)
Solid Rocket Motor (MSFC)
Solid Rocket Booster (MSFC)
Space Shuttle Main Engine
(MSFC)
Rockwell International, STS Division
Martin Marietta, Michoud Aerospace
Div.
Morton Thiokol, Inc., Wasatch
Operations
United Technologies Corp., United
Space Boosters, Inc.
Rockwell International,
Rocketdyne Division
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co.,
Houston Division
Rockwell International, Space
Transportation Systems Division
Martin Marietta, Denver Aerospace Division
Martin Marietta, Denver Aerospace Division
Martin Marietta, Denver Aerospace Division
(Source: NASA)
As a practical matter (as discussed in Sections 5.1
and 5.3) the FMEA/CIL, with its retention ration-
ale, appears to be the dominant analysis, on which
the waiver and some of the engineering change
decisions are primarily based.
3.5 POST-51L REEVALUATION/REVIEW
3.5.1 NASA Management Directives
In March 1986, soon after the Challenger acci-
dent, direction was sent out from the Associate
Administrator for Space Flight and the NSTS Pro-
gram Director to the NSTS Proiect Offices to
reevaluate ("re-review") the FMEAs on all critical
items on the STS. The Program Director described
the purpose of the reevaluation as: "... to affirm
the completeness and accuracy of the FMEA/CIL
for the current National STS design. ''_ Following
reevaluation of the FMEA, each Criticality 1 and
1R item, along with any new items, or items for
which the reevaluation had led to a change in
classification, was to be resubmitted for review and
approval of the waiver permitting the item to be
flown aboard the STS. Authority for approval of
these waivers resides at the Level I PRCB, with the
NSTS Program Director having final sign-off au-
thority.
Those items not revalidated by the review were
required to be redesigned, certified, and qualified
for flight. In addition to the FMEA/CIL reevalua-
tion, the directives stipulated that the hazard analy-
ses and EIFAs also be reviewed.
Memorandum of March l,a,, 1986.
3.5.2 Process
FMEA/CIL. Each NSTS project and its prime
contractor carried out the FMEA/CIL reevaluation,
usually doing two separate reviews. In addition,
independent contractors not otherwise involved in
working on that element were selected to conduct
parallel reviews of the FMEA/CIL for each element
and to report the results of their assessments to
NASA's review team. These independent reviews
emphasized any analysis results that differed from
those identified by NASA or the element prime
contractor. The FMEA/CIL review participants are
listed in Table 3-3.
The processing flow for the reevaluation initially
varied somewhat from center to center, but was
essentially like that shown in Figure 3-12 (from
JSC). During the reevaluation, special effort has
been directed to identifying design enhancements,
operational and procedural checkout changes, or
software additions that reduce the criticality and/
or minimize the chance that the potential failure
mode will occur.
The main difference between the re-review and
the "normal review process" is the conduct of the
independent reviews. Another significant difference
is that the groundrules for determining Criticality 1
status were changed: FMEAs are now carried down
to the individual component level (even where
multiple identical components are involved), and
pressure vessels (formerly excluded) are now in-
cluded. These and other changes in procedure are
specified in a new document, NSTS 22206, "In-
structions for Preparation of Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis and Critical Items List," which
29
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was issued in October 1986 to standardize the
process across the program.
Hazard Analysis. A similar review of all ele-
ment and integrated system-level hazard analyses
is being undertaken in response to the Challenger
accident. As in the case of FMEA/CIL, each project
office, its prime contractor, and the independent
contractor are evaluating all hazard analyses and
Hazard Reports to verify their completeness and
accuracy. Figure 3-13 illustrates the current review
process.
Each hazard analysis assessment is being con-
ducted in accordance with the guidance provided
in a new document, NSTS 22254, '<Methodology
for Conduct of NSTS Hazard Analyses." This
document defines the policy and procedures re-
quired for preparing hazard analyses, Hazard Re-
ports, and Mission Safety Assessments.
The current review consists of a technical safety
evaluation of the source material used for all
analyses, studies, and investigations conducted from
the beginning of STS flight. Each subsystem as-
sessment is expected to ensure that all hazards have
been identified, that dispositions arc accurate, and
that identified risks are acceptable.
3.5.3 Relation to Engineering Redesign Activity
Since the mission 51-L accident, a substantial
number of engineering changes have been under-
taken to improve Shuttle safety prior to resumption
of flight. Shortly after the Challenger accident,
groups representing various organizational ele-
ments of NASA (design centers, Astronaut Office,
etc.) presented the NSTS Program Director with
lists of items which they considered as needing
attention. All were Criticality 1 or 1R items. From
these lists, a special Level II senior management
PRCB known as the System Design Review Board
recommended the selection of 90 items (consisting
of hardware, software, and procedures) to undergo
redesign, test, or analysis before the next flight of
the Shuttle. Other items were categorized as near-
term and "opportunity" actions. Since that time,
the number of mandatory next-flight changes across
the STS system has grown to 159.
The redesign activity has, for the most part,
preceded the FMEA/CIL and hazard analysis re-
evaluations. Relatively few of the early items iden-
tified for next-flight change derived from the re-
evaluation activity. However, as the reevaluations
proceeded they did disclose a number of items
which are being worked before the next flight.
FMEA/CILs and hazard analyses are being gener-
ated for all STS elements and modifications. The
PRCB constitutes itself as the System Design Review
Board to review all waiver recommendations on
critical items.
3.5.4 Relation to Flight Readiness Process
The results of the various safety-related analyses
feed into the flight review and readiness processes.
By the time of the Design Certification Review
(DCR), three months before launch, all FMEA/CIL
waiver decisions, Hazard Reports, and the Mission
Safety Assessment are available for review by the
relevant readiness review boards.
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3.5.5 Data Input and Output
Among the most important types of data for use
in developing and updating the CIL retention
rationale and conducting hazard analyses is feed-
back from actual use of the hardware. STS equip-
ment tests, preflight checkout, postflight inspec-
tions, and inflight operational experience and data
arc all crucial sources of this type of data. NASA
uses a number of special reports and reporting
systems to collect and integrate such data. They
include the following, whose names are self-ex-
planatory:
• Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
(PRACA) System
• Problem Reports (PRs)
• Discrepancy Reports (DRs) [for software]
• Unsatisfactory Condition Reports (UCRs)
• Failure Reports
The PRACA system is a large, distributed data
base (one for each STS element and one for KSC
ground support equipment) that contains all of the
reports listed above, along with data on corrective
actions taken. PRACA is the basis for many design
changes. Problems found in a postflight assessment
are logged into the PRACA system at the design
center for that element, and all problems are tracked
by JSC/NSTS via a flight anomaly report, or Failure
Report. The Failure Report is cross-correlated with
the FMEA/CIL number.
Steps are being taken to ensure that the results
of safety analyses are available to NASA managers
in a more thorough and timely fashion. For ex-
ample, NASA is setting up a closed-loop accounting
and review system, by which all Criticality 1, 1R,
and IS items are being tied to problem reports and
their resolutions. This new System Integrity Assur-
ance Program (SLAP), being developed under the
NSTS Engineering Integration Office, is intended
to ensure that STS flight and ground systems retain
their design performance, reliability, and safety. It
draws on the FMEA/CIL, hazard analyses, and
other existing safety analysis systems.
A major component of the SlAP is its Program
Compliance Assurance Status System (PCASS)--
essentially a computer-based management infor-
mation system. The PCASS will serve as a central
data base integrating a number of existing infor-
mation systems and sources across the NSTS. For
example, the PRACA will be a part of it, facilitating
the reduction and presentation of data on flight
anomalies. It will provide in near real-time, to users
such as the participants in Flight Readiness Re-
views, an integrated view of the status of problems
with the STS, including trends, anomalies and
deviations, and closure information. One of the
major advantages of PCASS is that it will give
SR&QA staff an easy route of access into the entire
system of data bases dealing with the STS. Even-
tually, it will provide automated information on
critical item status and hazard data, with a com-
puterized FMEA planned as one of the inputs.
NASA Headquarters SRM&QA is also planning
an extensive system for the documentation, re-
porting, review, and assessment of safety infor-
mation. The NASA Safety Information System
(NSIS) and the Shuttle Hazards Information Man-
agement System (SHIMS)--an STS hazards data
base--are two examples.
These input and output mechanisms provide the
essential connectivity of the safety analyses to the
continuing development, improvement, and oper-
ation of the STS within the NSTS Program.
32
4 Risk Assessment and Risk
Management: The Committee's View
4.1 GENERAL CONCEPT
Almost lost in the strong public reaction to the
Challenger failure was the inescapable fact that
major advances in mankind's capability to explore
and operate in space--indeed, even in routine
atmospheric flight--will only be accomplished in
the face of risk. The risks of space flight must be
accepted by those who are asked to participate in
each flight as well as by those who are responsible
for the program. The Committee believes that the
basis for NASA's acceptance of those risks should
stem as much as possible from rationally derived
criteria. This acceptance also should depend very
heavily on the quality of the methodology and the
degree of objectivity by which the risks are deter-
mined, as well as the rigor by which the risks are
controlled (i.e., managed).
The Committee began its audit activities by
focusing specifically on the FMEA, the CIL, and
the hazard analysis process. However, very early
in the data gathering phase it became clear that
NASA's processes for analyzing failure modes,
effects, and hazards could only be understood and
evaluated intelligently when viewed as elements of
an overall program of risk assessment and risk
management. In the Committee's view, any such
program should include the following basic ele-
ments:
1. A comprehensive method for identifying po-
tential failure modes and hazards associated
with the system.
2. A specific, quantitative methodology for iden-
tifying and assessing (or estimating) the safety
risks of the system.
3. A risk management process by which the
safety risks can be brought to levels or values
that are acceptable to the final approval
authority. Risk management includes:
-- establishment of acceptable risk levels;
institution of changes in system design or
operational methods to achieve such risk
levels;
-- system validation and certification; and
-- system quality assurance.
In this usage, we define a "safety risk" as the
probability (likelihood or chance) of suffering a
particular consequence of a failure mode, mishap,
or hazard. For a large, complex system such as the
STS, there is a set of system risks each of which is
comprised of many contributing risks. Thus, we
use the plural "safety risks" of the system, since
one may choose to manage these risks to different
levels.
There are actually two major functions present
in the listing above. Risk assessment is comprised
of the first two elements, identification and assess-
ment of both the failure modes and hazards, and
the safety risks associated with them. Risk assess-
ment is or should be a staff function, the results
of which are provided as input to management.
Risk management, on the other hand (the third
element above), must primarily be a line manage-
ment function. Within NASA, SRM&QA at Head-
quarters and SR&QA at the centers are staff
organizations. The Associate Administrator for
SRM&QA reports to the NASA Administrator.
Line management authority for NSTS extends from
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the Administrator to the Level I Associate Admin-
istrator for Space Flight to the NSTS Program
Director and thence through the Level II Program
Office to the Level III project managers.
The concept of risk assessment and risk man-
agemcnt is employed very explicitly within some
private industries and public enterprises engaged
in the engineering development of complex systems.
The nuclear power industry is one such, and the
commercial aerospace industry is another. Within
the USAF Systems Command (including the Space
Division, which develops military launch vehicles
and spacecraft), risk assessment consists of a wide
range of qualitative and quantitative tools, includ-
ing the FMEA and hazard analysis. Risk manage-
ment is viewed as a formal process involving the
establishment, assessment, and control of risk to
predetermined acceptable levels.
Figure 4-1 illustrates a generic type of program
planning and tracking chart that is used in risk
management by the USAF. Levels of risk in the
system, as evaluated by a specific risk assessment
methodology, are plotted against time (and the
cost) to correct the problems contributing to risk.
In this generic example, actual risk lags and exceeds
the planned levels of risk for each category of risk,
and throughout most of the program. The planned
risk presents a target toward which the system risk
is actively managed. The risk levels assessed at the
conceptual design stage must eventually be evolved,
through engineering, down to levels acceptable to
the approval authority (i.e., high level, program
line management). This is accomplished through a
'<systems safety engineering" function that is an
integral part of the engineering design and devel-
opment process from its inception.
4.2 NASA'S PROCESS: OVERALL
COMMENTS
The fundamental view of risk assessment and
management discussed above took shape over the
first few months of the Committee's activities. It
formed a framework within which the Committee
could conduct the subsequent stages of the audit
and more confidently evaluate NASA's STS safety
program--of which the FMEAs, CILs, and hazard
analyses are only a few important parts. Much of
the remainder of this report reflects the results of
our inquiry into specific aspects of the ways in
which NASA assesses and manages risks in the
NSTS program. But we believe it is important,
before plunging into specifics, to provide a sense
of the "big picture" within which the Committee
conducted its audit, and to give a general assessment
of how NASA's current process (as described in
Section 3) relates to that picture.
4.2.1 NASA Risk Assessment
NASA defines risk as: "the chance (qualitative)
of loss of personnel capability, loss of system, or
damage to or loss of equipment or property."
[NHB 5300.4 (1D-2), p. a-4]
To identify potential failure modes and hazards,
NASA uses input from many different sources:
analyses, data gathering processes, design reviews,
etc. Figure 4-2, obtained from the SR&QA Office
at JSC, lists most of these sources for the NSTS.
(However, the Committee is not aware of any
FMEAs or hazard analyses being conducted on
software.) if employed rigorously, these tools pro-
vide a good basis for achieving element 1 of the
three specified in Section 4.1. However, this list of
sources might more appropriately be titled "Iden-
tify Potential Failures and Hazards," because most
of the activities listed do not deal with risk. For
example, the failure modes analysis identifies pos-
sible hardware failure modes, but usually says little
about the risk associated with each of them. When
the effects analysis is added in, then part of the
input needed to establish risk has been gained, but
still nothing is inferred about the probability of
occurrence of either the failure itself or the various
possible effects that might result. A similar situation
occurs in the identification of hazards.
One can categorize failure modes on the basis
of the consequences of their worst-case effects, as
is done in a very rough way in the Critical Items
List, for failure modes whose worst-case effects
lead (for example) to loss of life or vehicle. Such a
categorization is useful for calling urgent attention
to certain failure modes and their attendant haz-
ards. Nevertheless, the listing of such items does
not establish their contribution to the various risks
of the system. In the NASA safety process, each
item on the CIL has a retention rationale written
for it. These retention rationale statements usually
contain information which could, if used properly,
contribute to a process for estimating the associated
risk. However, the rationales appear to be used
strictly as arguments for a waiver of the NSTS
requirement that no single-point Criticality 1 or
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WAIVERS AND DEVIATIONS
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LESSONS LEARNED--OTHER PROGRAMS
ALERTS
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS ASSESSMENT
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REAL TIME OPERATION
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FIGURE 4-2 Techniques for the identification of potential sources of risk in the NSTS Program (after NASA JSC
SR&QA).
1R failure modes be present when a mission is
launched (see Sections 3.4.1 and 5.1).
Similarly, in NASA's hazard analysis process,
hazards are categorized as to level and status.
Hazards are defined as either critical or cata-
strophic, depending on whether or not there is time
for any possible emergency action to be taken.
Each "closed" hazard is categorized as being elim-
inated, controlled, or an "accepted risk." Ration-
ales are written to justify accepting the uncontrolled
hazards; many times the same rationale is employed
that was used for retaining the critical failure modes
(see Section 5.3 for elaboration). However, as in
the case of the CILs, these justifications do not
establish the risk levels of the hazards. Thus,
although the term "risk assessment" is used in
many different ways and places in NASA docu-
ments and presentations, the Committee found that
nowhere was the total activity described that is
needed to accomplish element 2 in Section 4.1
above (i.e., a quantitative methodology for assess-
ing safety risks).
In NASA's definition of risk (above), the word
"chance" is used as the measure (or basis of
comparison) of the risk. The definition clearly
implies evaluation of a set of risks based on the
chance of occurrence of each of the various con-
sequences described. However, NASA acknowl-
edges, and our reviews have confirmed, that these
"chances" are not formally or specifically esti-
mated; nor are they documented. Rather, STS risks
are assessed based on subjective judgments and the
approval of qualitative rationales by various board
and panel chairmen, and Level II and I authorities,
as described in Section 3. However, many quanti-
tative engineering analyses and test data relevant
to risk assessment are available and often are used
in arriving at what are finally qualitative subjective
judgements. With such a non-specific (i.e., non-
value based) risk acceptance process there is little
basis for making objective comparisons of the
several major risk categories associated with the
STS, nor for carrying out risk evaluations by
independent agencies. Neither can one systemati-
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tally evaluatethe resultsof efforts to reduce the
risk of the various possible losses. Without more
objective, quantifiable measures of relative risk it
is not clear how NASA can expect to implement a
truly effective risk management program.
4.2.2 NASA Risk Management
The various NASA documents identified in Sec-
tions 3.1 and 3.4, with some of their key provisions
noted, basically describe a framework within which
to operate an effective risk management program.
At the core of such a program is the idea of risk
management through the control of hazards. Re-
sidual hazards (risks) that cannot be designed away
would be controlled at least to levels consistent
with program obiectives and cost constraints. The
definition and analysis of hazards and levels of risk
associated with a system and its operation was to
be performed within a system safety function. Since
the effective level of hazard control was not always
expected to be perfect, a "residual hazard risk
analysis" would be performed to provide the re-
tention rationale for accepting such hazards and
for continuing to operate (perhaps with con-
straints).
In parallel with and providing inputs to this
system safety function is a reliability activity. This
function was to be basically concerned with estab-
lishing a data base for selection of components
which would meet allocated failure probability
requirements; performing failure modc and effects
analyscs; establishing redundancy criteria and con-
figuration definitions, maintainability criteria, and
life limits; and preparing critical items lists con-
taming itcms with single-point failure modes which
could cause catastrophic results.
A third element in the overall safety and risk
management program is quality assurance. This
function, as defined by NASA, would be responsible
for assuring that the hardware and software pro-
duced for the system was produced in a controlled
way and met all requirements of the quality control
critcria documents. This assurance role also in-
cludes supcrvision of personnel certification and
establishment of non-destructive testing methods
to detcct flaws in components and non-conforming
materials.
These functions provide the basic staff capability
which line management can bring to bear on the
management of risk in thc NSTS Program. NASA's
own explicit view of risk management for the NSTS
was described to the Committee at JSC. It is
conceived to be a synthesis of activities in four
broad categories:
• Programmatic
• Engineering/development
• Mission operations
• Product assurance
As depicted in Figure 4-3, activities in all cate-
gories are conducted throughout all phases of the
NSTS Program, from concept definition to flight
operations. The risk management process is said
to be characterized by top-down direction and
control, with "bottom-up" response and account-
ability from the staff organizations and line man-
agement at the NASA centers. The process of risk
assessment and management is described as one of
"independent but integrated participation" by Pro-
gram management, design/development (project
engineering), operations (Astronaut Office and
Mission Operations Directorate), and SR&QA.
These terms arc kev: the degree of independence
and integration of organizations and functions
within the overall process comprise a maior, re-
curring theme of the discussion presented in the
following Section 5.
4.3 SUMMARY
The basic organizational elements are in place
within NASA for assessing and managing risk;
however, there is a need for a change in the scope
of functions and the way that they are carried out.
Certain shortcomings in process and methodology
exist which are discussed in the following section.
In particular, there is a fundamental problem in
the nature of and the methods used to develop the
overall assessments on which NASA line manage-
ment bases its decisions about how to reduce and
control risk in the STS. Also, it appears to the
Committee that there is no clear, formal, and
rigorous view among NASA line managers--at
least on any consistent basis--of the nature and
goals of risk management.
To reiterate what was said earlier, the Committee
believes that risk management for any system
involving complex engineering must be the respon-
sibility of line management--i.e., (in the case of
the NSTS) the system Program Manager, the As-
sociate Administrator for Space Flight and, ulti-
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mately, the Administrator of NASA. Only this
program management, not the safety organizations,
can make judicious use of the means available to
achieve the operational goals while evolving the
safety risks down to acceptable levels, as described
carlier. The safety organizations at NASA centers
and Headquarters are staff organizations--i.e., they
can and should be responsible for providing the
assessments of the system's risks. They should also
be responsible for assuring that the activities as-
sociated with controlling the risks to the levels
assessed have been carried out and documented.
Safety organizations cannot, however, assure safe
operation; they can only assure that the safety risks
have been evaluated by approved, proper, rigorous,
quantitative, and objective methods, and that the
system configuration and its operation are being
controlled to those risk levels,
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s National Space Transportation
System Risk Assessment and Risk
Management: Discussion and
Recommendations
5.1. CRITICAL ITEMS LIST RETENTION
RATIONALE REVIEW AND WAIVER
PROCESS
The Committee views the NASA critical
items list (CIL) waiver decision making process
as being subjective, with little in the way of
formal and consistent criteria for approval or
rejection of waivers. Waiver decisions appear
to be driven almost exclusively by the design-
based FMEA/CIL retention rationale, rather
than being based on an integrated assessment
of all inputs to risk management. The retention
rationales appear biased toward proving that
the design is "safe," sometimes ignoring sig-
nificant evidence to the contrary.
Although the Safety, Reliability, and Quality
Assurance (SR&QA) organizations of NASA
collect, verify, and transmit all data related to
FMEA/CIL and hazard analysis results, the
Committee has not found an independent,
detailed analysis or assessment of the CIL
retention rationale which considers all inputs
to the risk assessment process.
As set forth in the NASA documents identified
in Section 3.1, both the performance of the Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and the iden-
tification of critical items are intended to be carried
out under the aegis of the reliability function. In
principle, the FMEA should be both a design tool
to provide an impetus for design change, and a
tool for the evaluation of the final configuration in
order to define the necessary control points on the
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hardware. The identified critical items would re-
quire supporting retention rationale and waivers
as appropriate in order to be included in the overall
as-flown system configuration. How this retention
rationale was to be generated, who developed it
and who evaluated it against what safety criteria
became crucial questions for the Committee's re-
view of the whole process.
According to prescribed procedures, the hazard
analyses being performed by the safety function of
SR&QA, and the FMEA and CIL identification
performed by the reliability function, were to come
together in the generation of Mission Safety As-
sessment (MSA) reports which would contain
analyses and justification of the retention rationale
for the critical items and their associated "hazards",
as well as a safety-risk assessment of the resulting
units, subsystems, and systems. The hazard analysis
and Mission Safety Assessment parts of this overall
safety and risk assessment process as it was sup-
posed to be done prior to 1986 are shown in Figure
5-1, obtained from JSC's SR&QA.
As Figure 5-1 indicates, according to specified
NASA procedure the CIL retention rationale is to
be used as one of many inputs to the more com-
prehensive hazard analysis. In reality, however, the
hazard analysis is often simply a derivative of the
CIL and its retention rationale, and is not used as
a major basis for waiver decisions. Examination
by the Committee showed that often these retention
rationales were simply discussions of the hard-
ware's specifications, design, and testing. They were
generated primarily by the functional development
engineers responsible for the design. They are
intended to be justifications, and do not, in our
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view, provide a true assessment of the risk of the
hazards.
Sometimes the rationale appears to be simply a
collection of judgments that a design should be
safe, emphasizing positive evidence at the expense
of the negative, and thus does not give a balanced
picture of the risk involved. For example, the CIL
retention rationale of December 1982, for the Solid
Rock_'t Motor (SRM) indicated in support of re-
tention that: there had been no failures in three
qualification, five development, and ten flight mo-
tors; there had been no leakage in eight static firings
and five STS flights; 1076 Titan III joints (presum-
ably of similar design) were tested successfully; etc.
Missing from the retention rationale was, among
other points, any discussion of the dissimilarities
between the SRM and Titan II1 (e.g., insulation
design and combustion pressure on the O-ring);
the O-ring erosion observed in the Titan Ill program
and on the second STS flight; a failure during an
SRM burst test; and, since the rationale was not
updated, all of the O-ring anomalies seen after
I)ecember 1982. Furthermore, in many cases we
reviewed:
• No specific methodology or criteria are estab-
lished against which these justifications can
be measured.
• The true margins against the failure modes
often are not defined or explicitly validated.
• The probability of the failure mode is never
established quantitatively.
• Design "fixes" are accepted without being
analyzed and compared with the configuration
they are replacing on the basis of relative risk.
The point is worth reiterating: The retention ra-
tionale is used to justify accepting the design "as
is"; Committee audits of the review process dis-
covered little emphasis on creative ways to elimi-
nate potential failure modes.
Since 51-L, there has been a major increase in
the attention and resources given to STS SR&QA
and risk assessment and management functions at
all levels of NASA and its contractors. In 1986,
NASA appointed an Associate Administrator at
Headquarters for Safety, Reliability, Maintainabil-
ity, and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA) and charged
him with establishing a NASA-wide safety and risk
management program. To implement this program,
policy directives are being developed relating to
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various procedures and operational requirements.
Specific instructions and methodologies to be used
in the conduct of various analyses and assessments,
such as hazard analyses, are being developed.
Independent institutional assessments and audits
will be made of SR&QA activities and technical
effectiveness at each NASA center.
Some important elements of this revamped NASA
safety program--including hazard analysis and
mission safety assessment--are depicted in Figure
5-2, which was obtained from the JSC SR&QA
organization in May 1987. Several things shown
in the figure should be noted. First, there is now a
specific new set of NSTS instructions to all con-
tractors and NASA organizations for conducting
hazard analyses, and for preparing FMEAs and
CILs for the NSTS (these new instructions affect
the activities in the boxes in Figure 5-2 marked *).
Second, it can be seen that the FMEA/CIL docu-
ments are intended to be one of many inputs into
the hazard analysis and Hazard Report, which in
turn are shown as an input into the Mission Safety
Assessment.
Howevcr, since (as discussed in Section 4.2) the
Hazard Reports do not providc a comprehcnsive
risk asscssment, nor are they cvcn required to be
an independent evaluation of the retention rationale
stated in the CILs, the Committee believes that
NASA plans--at least for the near term--to con-
tinue using the retention rationale of the CILs
directly and individually as the basis for Criticality
1 and 1R waiver justifications to Levels II and I.
We have indicated this by adding the Criticality 1
and 1R waiver path within the dashed lines on the
left side of Figure 5-2. The current plan is to take
the critical item waiver requests to the PRCB and
Level I via a data package prepared byJSC SR&QA.
It is our impression, however, that most of the
arguments in this data package will still basically
be those contained in the original CIL retention
rationale. Thus, we see too little in the way of an
independent detailed analysis, critique, or assess-
ment of the risk inherent in Engineering's rationale.
Since mid-1986, NASA and its contractors have
been performing a massive rework of all STS
program FMEAs, updating the resulting CILs, and
reviewing all prior HAs. This new FMEA/CIL effort
has had value in identifying new failure modes that
were missed earlier or introduced through past
changes, and those resulting from new changes
made mandatory before next flight. However, the
new NSTS instructions for preparing FMEA/CILs
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FIGURE 5-2 NASA JSC safety analysis, hazard reports, and safety assessment process in 1987, as modified
by the Committee (adapted from NASA JSC SR&QA)
(NSTS 22206) have also resulted in a large incrcasc
in the numbcr of Criticality 1 and 1R items. The
Committee believes this new complexity will pose
additional severe problems for both the mechanics
and credibility of the CIL and waiver processes.
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The strong dependence on the CIL retention
rationales in waiver decisions makes it critical that
they be comprehensive and up to date. It is not
clear to the Committee whether, in the pre-51L
environment, changes in the STS configuration or
the operational experience base led directly and
surely to review and appropriate updating of the
relevant CIL retention rationale. In the wake of
the 51-L accident, the NSTS program issued a
document (NSTS 22206) which is intended to
strengthen the process for updating the retention
rationale. Once a retention rationale has been
accepted and a waiver granted for a critical item,
any changes to the item itself, the FMEA, or the
CIL that could affect the retention rationale mean
that the C1L must be resubmitted to the Level II/I
PRCB for its approval (NSTS 22206, p.2-7,
para.2.2.6). Any change, whether it be to the test
environment, level, procedures, methods, or fre-
quency, is to be reflected in changes to the retention
rationale. If crew procedures are changed to reduce
risk, corresponding changes are also to be made in
the retention rationale.
The question is whether this updating is con-
ducted regularly and in a consistently rigorous
fashion. Although this policy is new and may not
yet have been fully imposed in all quarters, NASA
and contractor personnel interviewed by the Com-
mittee seemed variously uncertain about or una-
ware of these requirements and how they are met.
Updating the retention rationale seems to many to
be considered a routine bookkeeping chore, of
secondary importance, yet these rationales are the
primary basis for granting waivers.
During its audit the Committee developed a
concern that the FMEA and associated retention
rationale on a given critical item may sometimes
fail to provide data in various important categories
of information, such as the effects of environmental
parameters. The lack of data in a certain case may
or may not be significant with respect to the threat
that item represents. Yet the absence of such data,
even though it resulted in uncertainty, in the past
has sometimes had the effect of bolstering the
rationale for retention and providing unwarranted
confidence in readiness reviews. This problem was
especially in evidence with Mission 51-L. Data
suggesting that temperature was a factor in the
erosion of the O-rings did exist, but (according to
the Rogers Commission) the relevant analyses ap-
parently were considered to be inconclusive by
those responsible, and these data did not appear
in the retention rationale. Thus, the rationale im-
plied that there were no data to suggest that
temperature was a problem. Strengthening and
closing the problem reporting loop since the acci-
dent may well reduce the likelihood of similar
future occurrences. Still, we note that the "negative
answer" indicates uncertainty about the issue at
hand. If the uncertainty is crucial to the decision
process, then it implies the need for more experi-
ments, tests or analyses to reduce the uncertainty.
(Appendix E includes an analysis of the O-ring
temperature effect and the uncertainty implied by
extrapolation to low temperatures.)
Thus, the Committee's central concerns here are
the reliance on and quality of the retention ration-
ale, and the fact that we can perceive no docu-
mented, objective criteria for approving or rejecting
proposed waivers. CIL waiver decision making
appears to be subjective, with no consistent, formal
basis for approval or rejection of waivers. All items
are considered and discussed at length during the
CCB and PRCB reviews. It appears that, if no
action item is generated as a result of the review,
the critical item waiver is approved. There was no
formal "approved or disapproved" step in meetings
audited by the Committee, although we are in-
formed that such approvals do appear in the
minutes of tile meetings. NASA managers empha-
size that Level III engineers and their "Level IV"
contractors are accorded a high level of responsi-
bility and accountability throughout the program,
and that their opinions and analyses are the real
bases for making retention decisions; these engi-
neers bear the burden of proving that the rationale
is strong enough to justify retention and waiver of
the item.
However, the Committee believes that engineer-
ing judgment on these matters is not enough. Such
judgment is crucial, but it is often too susceptible
to vagaries of attention, knowledge, opinion, and
extraneous pressures to be the sole foundation for
decision making. We are concerned that, for all
the reasons discussed above, without professional,
detailed evaluation against specific criteria for re-
ducing risk (not just review by panels and boards),
the retention rationales can be misleading or even
incorrect regarding the true causes and probabilities
of the failure modes for which retention waivers
are being requested (see discussion of probabilistic
risk assessment in Section 5.6).
Recommendations (1):
The Committee recommends that NASA estab-
lish an integrated review process which provides a
comprehensive risk assessment and an independent
evaluation of the rationale justifying the retention
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of Criticality I/1R and 2/2R items. This integrated
review should include detailed consideration of the
results of hazard analyses and all other inputs to
the risk assessment process, in addition to the
FMEA/CIL retention rationale. Further, the review
process should assure that the tvaivers and sup-
porting analyses fully reflect current data and
designs. Finally, NASA should develop formal,
objective criteria for approving or rejecting critical
itent tvaivers.
5.2 CRITICAL ITEMS LIST
PRIORITIZATION AND DISPOSITION
At present, in NASA instructions all Criti-
cality I and I R items are formally treated
cqually, even though many differ substantially
from each other in terms of the probability of
failure or malperformance, and in terms of the
potential for the worst-case effects postulated
in the FMEA to be seen if the particular failure
Occurs.
The large number of Criticality 1 and 1R
items at the time of the 51-L accident has since
been substantially increased due to changes in
ground rules for classification and the complete
reevaluation of the entire STS.
The Committee believes that giving equal
management attention to all Criticality 1 and
1R potential failures could be detrimental to
safety if, as is the case, some are extremely
unlikely to occur, or if the probability is very
low that the postulated worst-case conse-
quences of the failures ,,,,,ill result. Treating all
such items equally will necessarily detract from
the attention senior management can give to
the most likely and most threatening failure
modes.
Critical items in the Shuttle system are catego-
rized according to the consequences of worst-case
failure of that item. However, it has been the case
that within each criticality category no further
ranking is formally made. In practice, managers
do sometimes discriminate within a category, e.g.,
in their decisions regarding those STS items which
should be fixed prior to next flight. Prior to the
51-L accident there were already 2369 Criticality
1 and 1R items (the most critical) present in the
Shuttle system. There has been a substantial in-
45
crease in the number of such items, now estimated
by NASA to be 4686, of which 2148 have been
approved by the PRCB (Director, JSC/SR&QA,
personal communication, November 10, 1987).
This increase resulted from the reevaluation of the
entire Space Shuttle system and the new ground
rules specified for the preparation of FMEAs--e.g.,
the carrying of analyses down to the individual
component level (even where multiple, identical
components are involved) and the inclusion of
pressure vessels which were formerly excluded (see
Section 3.5.2). To take just one example, the
number of Criticality 1 and 1R items in the SSME
turbomachinery rose from 8 to 67 under the new
ground rules. In view of this problem, NASA is
now taking steps to prioritize the most critical
items and will reevaluate the current scheme for
defining levels of criticality.
Initially, the reassessment process seemed to the
Committee to be too heavily focused on Level I.
The presence of a very large number of Criticality
1 and 1R items--even admitting that many are
clustered with identical items--obviously places a
hcavv demand on the time and attention of key
NASA decision makers and could prevent their
penetrating deeply enough into the analyses sur-
rounding each item to make a valid decision on all
of them. We were concerned not only about the
workload placed on Level I management, but also
about the danger that crucial technical details might
be lost or obscured as the rationale for retention
was presented at successively higher levels. Al-
though the same information is presented at the
Level ll and I PRCBs, it seemed entirely possible
that technical debates occurring at lower levels
might not be adequately relayed to Level I.
A post-51L organizational change that shifted
the Level II NSTS Program Director at JSC to Level
I at Headquarters has alleviated these concerns to
some extent. NASA recognized that the waiver
decision-making flow was not ideal--especially
from Level lI to Level I. Consequently, the Level I
NSTS Director (who also chairs the Level I PRCB)
now participates in the Level 11 reviews as a basis
for sign-off at Level 1. Thus, there is now a more
direct "hand-off" of concerns and rationales from
Level llI to Level l, via Level I1. Nevertheless, the
process still places a heavy workload on Level I,
and there is still a danger that important technical
information might be lost in transmission.
The organizational change streamlined the waiver
decision-making process, but it did not help in
handlingthe largenumberof Criticality 1 and 1R
itcms. Many of these items differ substantially from
each other in terms of the probability of failure or
malperformance, and in terms of the possibility
that the worst-case effects postulated in the FMEA
will be seen in the event the particular failure does
occur. (In this connection it might be noted that,
prior to 5 l-L, 56 Criticality 1 failures occurred on
the Orbiter during flight without any of the pos-
tulated worst-case effects resulting.) Thus, the items
vary considerably in their potential impact on
Shuttle operational safety--i.e., on risk.
Early in its audit the Committee began urging
NASA to find a way to prioritize the Criticality 1
and 1R items (see Appendix C, first interim report).
NASA managers tended to assert that, since all
Criticality 1 and IR items are (by definition) equally
catastrophic in their consequences, all should be
treated equally--and, indeed, we saw evidence in
our audits that they were handled with equal
attcntion. But it is the position of the Committee
that giving equal management attention to all such
items could be detrimental to safety if (as is the
cast') some are extremely unlikely to fail, or the
probability is very low that the postulated worst-
case consequences of the failures will result. The
most likely and most threatening failure modes
merit the most attention. It is illogical to dissociate
the probability of an event or its consequences
from decisions about the management of risk.
For exalnple, m the development of a probabil-
istic risk assessment for a modern nuclear power
plant, fault tree and event tree analyses typically
identify several million potential sequences of events
(including multiple independent failures and cas-
cading failures) that can lead to core melt-down.
However, only 20 to 50 of these sequences con-
tribute significantly to the risk, with five to ten of
them contributing 90% of the risk. These particular
sequences are exhaustively analyzed to identify
ways to substantially reduce the overall risk.
A secondary consideration of the Committee was
the possible impact of the disclosure that, as the
resumption of Shuttle operations nears, there are
more Criticality 1 and 1R items (with all of them
being waived) than there were before the accident.
That perception would not be justified by, and
would not fairly reflect, the real strides in system
safety that have been made since 51-L.
Responding to suggestions on the part of the
Committee, NASA developed and tested a number
of techniques that could be used to prioritize the
CIL on the basis of the relative risk each item
represents. One such scheme--termed the Critical
Item Risk Assessment (CIRA) procedure--was se-
lected and instructions for its implementation have
now been promulgated throughout the NSTS pro-
gram (NSTS 22491, June 19, 1987).
The CIRA procedure is currently qualitative in
nature--although it employs reliability and test
data to some extent. It is based instead on judg-
ments about the degree of threat inherent in dif-
ferent risk factors. The Committee is concerned
about the potential negative impact on the CIRA
of ambiguous measures of risk and probability.
However, the technique does lend itself to the
incorporation of more rigorous quantitative meas-
ures of risk and probability of occurrence as these
measures are developed for use within NASA. (See
Appendix E for a discussion of CIRA and one
approach to quantitative measures suggested by
the Committee.)
Current plans for the implementation of CIRA,
spelled out by the NSTS Deputy Director (Program)
m a memorandum dated July 21, 1987, are for
STS project managers to prioritize thc Criticality
1, 1R, and 1S items in each project after completing
the FMEA/CIL reevaluation and presenting the CIL
at the Level III CCB. By two weeks before Design
Certification Review, each project manager will
provide the NSTS Deputy Director (Program) with
a list of "the 20 items in his project that represent
the greatest risk to the program." The Deputy
Director will then compile and distribute a report.
This assessment effort will run parallel to, and may
not actually affect, the preparations for STS-26
(the next scheduled Shuttle flight). However, "an
alternate course of action" may be chosen for
subsequent missions. The Committee views this
implementation procedure with concern. It does
not appear to reflect a serious concern on the part
of the NSTS Program for the need to prioritize the
CIL by assessing relative risks.
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Recommendations (2):
The Committee recommends that the formal
criteria for approving waivers include the proba-
bility of occurrence and probability that the worst-
case failures will result. We further recommend
that NASA establish priorities now among Criti-
cality I and 1R items, taking care not to use
ambiguous measures o frisk and probability. NASA
should also modify the definitions of criticality in
termsof theprobability of failure andprobability
of worst-case effects. Finally, we recommend that
NASA Level I management pay special attention
to those items identified as being of highest priority,
along with the rationale that produced the priority
rating. Responsibility for attending to lower-prior-
ity items within the present Criticality I and I R
categories, when reclassified, should be distributed
to Levels II and Ill for detailed evaluation and
decision.
5.3. HAZARD ANALYSIS AND MISSION
SAFETY ASSESSMENT
NASA hazard analyses currently do not
address the relative probabilities of a particular
hazardous condition arising from failure modes,
htnnan crrors, or external situations.
Thc hazard analysis and the mission safety
assessment do not: address the relative prob-
abilities of the various consequences which
mav result from hazardous conditions; provide
an indepcndcnt cvalt, ation of thc retention
rationales statcd m the input CILs; or provide
an overall risk assessment on which to base
the acceptance and control of residual hazards.
Hazard analysis (HA) is intended to be a key
part of NASA's safety and risk management proc-
ess. Because it considers hazardous conditions,
whatever their source, it is a top-down analysis
that should encompass the FMEA and other bot-
ton>up analyses and cover the safety gaps that
these other analyses might leave. In reality, how-
ever, the HA has not played the central role it was
designed to play. Instead, the main focus has been
on the FMEA and its corresponding CIL retention
rationale. These are design-based analyses, prc-
pared by the project engincering staff. (See Section
5.1.)
Thc Committee's audit of the FMEA/CIL re-
evaluation and hazard analysis review produced,
at first, a somewhat confusing and contradictory
set of perceptions about the relationships between
these safety analyses and the nature of the overall
risk assessment and management process of which
they arc a part. Gradually, it became dear that
there were differences between the officially pre-
scribed process and the real process, as well as
diffcrences in the way the process is perceived by
various NASA personnel, depending on their func-
tion and point of view. Beyond that, there were
also differences among the NASA centers in the
implementation at the detail level.
Figurc 5-I (shown earlier), which was prepared
by the Safety Division at .]SC, depicts fairly accu-
rately the process, as the Committee has come to
undcrstand it, that was prescribed by NASA policy
at the time of the Challenger accident. Here, the
HA is clearly an important element, buttressed by
a number of complementary analyses including the
FMEA/CIL. The ultimate product of the safety
analysis is the Mission Safety Assessment (MSA),
feeding into the dcliberations of the various engi-
neering and readiness review boards. Figure 5-3,
also preparcd by the Safcty Division at JSC, shows
the process from the perspective of that Division,
focusing on the HA as the central activity. Note
that the FMEA/CIL is listed as one of many inputs
to thc hazard analysis. The actual process appears
to be quite different from the one suggested by the
prcccding two figures.
1)uring thc latter part of 1986 and the first few
months of 1987, our audit lcd to the impression
that, although some of the FMEA/CILs were inputs
into thc HA function, the real risk acceptance
process within NASA operated essentially as shown
in Figure 5-4 (obtained from JSC). One can see
from the diagram that the "Hazard Analysis As
Required" is a dead-end box, with inputs but no
output with respect to waiver approval decisions.
Our impression was supported by subsystem proj-
ect managcrs, engineers and their functional man-
agement at JSC. Many of them believed that the
CII. path shown in Figure 5-4 was the actual
approval route for retention of designs with Crit-
icality 1 and 1R failure modes.
A key problem, in our view, is that the risk
asscssment shown in the box entitled "Retention
Rationale and Risk Assessment" was not really an
independent assessment of the risk levels by profes-
sional system safety engineers; such individuals
(and they arc few in number within NASA) were
"left out of the loop." Neither did the assessment
contain an evaluation of how system hazards re-
suiting from critical item failure modes would be
controlled. In practice, in most cases reviewed by
the Committee, the retention rationales written on
the CIL forms were simply transferred to the hazard
analysis reports and became the basis for final
acceptance of residual hazards, and for decision-
making at Flight Readiness Reviews (FRRs).
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NASA does not use the HAs and (in turn) the
MSAs as the basis for the Criticality 1 and 1R
waivers. In fact, HAs for some important subsys-
tems were not updated for years at a time even
though design changes had occurred or dangerous
failures were experienced in subsystem hardware.
(An example is the 17-inch disconnect valves
between the ET and Orbiter.) The Committee's
audit showed that standards and detailed instruc-
tions for the conduct of HAs were not found to be
consistent throughout the STS program; NSTS
22254 was issued to correct that problem.
In summary, the Committee found in its review
of the HA process that:
1. HAs were done for only the largest subsystems
of the STS; they addressed certain overlays
of hazards but were not traceable to all
failures in units within the subsystems.
2. HAs were not done routinely for each major
subsystem.
3. The HA assumed worst-case consequences
and simply categorized hazard levels (cata-
strophic or critical) based on whether there
was time for counter-actions.
. The HA process called for an independent
evaluation of the HA results. Analyses of
catastrophic and critical hazards were to be
verified using risk assessment techniques.
However, the HAs did not address the relative
probability of occurrence of various failures,
based on actual flight and test information,
nor did they evaluate the validity of the CIL
retention rationale against any formal set of
criteria.
We found that many engineering personnel,
functional managers, and some subsystem man-
agers were unaware of what tasks must be done
to complete the hazard analysis, did not know
whether they had actually been done, and did not
contribute to them. Some, in fact, believed that
HAs were just an exercise done by reliability and/
or safety people and that they were redundant to
the FMEA/CILs. Their belief appears to be justified,
in that these HA activities did not seem to be
authoritatively in-line as part of a true hazard
control and risk management process. It appears
they were carried out in a relatively sterile envi-
ronment outside the mainstream of engineering.
The safety personnel did use the HAs along with
the FMEA/CILs to create Mission Safety Assess-
ments for the major elements of the STS and for
the overall missions. These MSAs were to provide
"a formal, comprehensive safety report on the final
design of a system." However, in practice, the MSA
reports essentially served as process assurance re-
ports. They listed the hazards and stated whether
they were eliminated or controlled; compared hard-
ware parameters with safety specifications; speci-
fied precautions, procedures, training or other safety
requirements; and generally documented compli-
ance with the various reliability and safety tasks.
They did not provide in-depth quantitative risk
assessments, and relied almost exclusively on the
CILs and HA reports for justification of acceptable
risks.
New design changes and/or flight data were
"examined" and "judged" for safety by various
personnel and boards at NASA Levels Ili, II, and
1; the vehicles for the approval of changes appear
to have been the FRRs and various special reviews.
The HA and MSA reports were not viewed as
controlling documents on a specific system config-
uration which was judged to be safe by the safety
organizations. The initial waivers to fly Criticality
1 and 1R items were not always redone in a timely
way after new data were obtained. Thus, our audit
supports the impression that the hazard analysis is
not used to its fullest advantage and that overall
system safety assessments, based on test and flight
data and on quantitative analyses, are not a part
of the process of accepting critical failure modes
and hazards.
Since the Hazard Report does not provide a
comprehensive risk assessment, or even an inde-
pendent evaluation of the retention rationale stated
in the input CILs, we believe the overall process
shown in Figure 5-2, representing NASA's current
plans, has serious shortcomings. The isolation of
the hazard analysis within NASA's risk assessment
and management process to date can be seen as
reflecting the past weakness of the entire safety
organization. For that reason, this issue of the role
of hazard analysis drives to the heart of our most
sweeping conclusion, which is that the information
flow, task descriptions, and functional responsibil-
ities implied by Figure 5-2 must be modified if
NASA is to achieve a truly effective risk manage-
ment process. Thc reordering of functions which
the Committee recommends is described in detail
in Section 5.11.
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Recommendation(3):
The Comnzittee recommends that the FMEA/
Cll.s be used as one of many inputs considered in
the hazard analysis and system safety assessment.
We also recommend that the overall system safety
assessme_a encompass a quantitative risk assess-
ment which in turn uses the CILs and hazard
analyses as input. Finally, the Committee recom-
mends that this risk assessment be the primary
basis for retention or rejection of residual hazards
as well as critical itenls.
5.4 RELATIONSHIP OF FORMAL RISK
ASSESSMENT PROCESS TO SPACE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
ENGINEERING CHANGES
Elements of formal risk assessment, such as
FMEA/CILs and hazard analyses, appear to
have had little direct impact on the STS re-
covery engineering process as they have not
figured prominently in the majority of engi-
neering change decisions made by NASA man-
agement.
The forcgoing sections have addressed the rela-
tionship between FMEA/CIL and hazard analysis,
and their relationship to the CIL retention rationale
review and waiver decision-making process. It is
important also to take a broader perspective and
examine the relationship of the risk assessment
process, as a whole, to the actual STS engineering
redesign activity' and recovery process.
Shortly after the Challenger accident, groups
representing various parts of NASA (design centers,
Astronaut Office, etc.) presented the NSTS Program
Manager at JSC with their lists of items deemed to
require attention. All were Criticality I or I R
items. From these lists, the JSC Level II Program
Requirements Control Board selected 90 (consist-
ing of hardware, software, and procedures) to
undergo redesign, test, or analysis before the next
flight of the Shuttle.
These decisions were made without formal ref-
erence to the FMEA. Since that time, the number
of mandatory next-flight changes across the STS
system has grown to 159. Of these, only a handful
have the FMEA/CIL/retention rationale (or the
hazard analysis) listed as the original source of the
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change (e.g., ! out of 23 on the SSME, 4 out of
48 on the Orbiter). Only a few of the mandatory
changes have arisen out of the current FMEA/CIL
reevaluation. Indeed, the redesign activity has, for
the most part, preceded these reevaluations. Most
of the mandatory changes were longstanding con-
cerns, identified before the 51-I. accident, which
were derived from flight experience, engineering
analysis, etc.
NASA and contractor personnel told the Com-
mittee that the stand-down provided an opportu-
nity to address known hazards--things that were
already "in the mill" heft)re the accident. Thus, the
FMEA/CIL and hazard analyses seem not to have
affected STS engmcering very significantly. Yet the
FMEA/CIL reevaluation and the hazard analyses
were the heart of the mandate the Committee (via
NASA) received from the Rogers Commission in
its recommendation 111(see Appendix By.
For this reason, the Committee was concerned
as it gained an increasing impression that the
FMEA/CII. and hazard analyses are fairly narrow
parts of the overall STS risk management/reliability
picture. The special System Design Review Boards
established in March 1986 to review design changes
slated for completion before the next flight appar-
ently did not take the FMEA/CILs formally into
account. As discussed in Section 5.3, the hazard
analyses in actual practice appear to have little or
no influence on the waiver decisions to accept
Criticality 1 and I R designs for flight. Also, the
original scheduling of the first flight some six
months after completion of the FMEA/CIL and
hazard analysis reevaluations seemed to presuppose
that no substantial design change requirements
would result from the process.
NASA and contractor personnel explained to the
Committee that the FMEA/CIL is primarily a design
tool, used as an input to Preliminary Design Review
in the early days of the Shuttle program. In their
view, the current reevaluation is essentially a design
validation effort; thus, they say, the fact that it has
disclosed few new critical items confirms the strength
of the original design. Furthermore, the}.' assured
the Committee, engineering changes are processed
through the same configuration control boards that
review the FMEA/CIL, and the total process is not
complete until the last change to be implemented
before flight has undergone a FMEA and been
dispositioned by' the board.
The Committee accepts this explanation. How-
ever, accepting it forces us to conclude that NASA
may have overemphasized the importance of the
FMEA/CIL reevaluation while simultaneously not
giving sufficient attention to its results. Also of
concern is the Committee's continuing impression
that the extensive FMEA/CIL effort has focused
on a "moving target," as the redesign work goes
forward without adequate feedback into that proc-
ess. For example, the contractor conducting an
independent FMEA on the Orbiter (McDonnell
Douglas) reported--and JSC confirmed--that per-
sonnel conducting the FMEAs have had to utilize
d
old "as-built" hardware drawings as a data base,
telephoning engineers whenever they believe an
item might have been modified since the original
design.
In its first interim report to NASA (see Appendix
C), the Committee recommended that NASA take
steps to ensure a close linking between the STS
engineering change activities and the FMEA/CIL-
hazard analysis processes. A subsequent revision
in the change review procedure appears to be
helping in that regard. It requires an assessment of
each proposed design change to determine if any
Criticality 1 or 2 hardware is affected. Furthermore,
NASA's Administrator has assured the Committee
that flight schedule considerations will not bc
allowed to reduce the rigor with which reviews
and analyses are conducted. The Committee is
substantially reassured regarding the strengthened
relationship between the risk assessment process
and STS engineering changes. However, concerns
remain regarding the long-term outlook for a strong
connection between these activities, as Shuttle op-
erations resume and engineering improvements
continue.
Recommendation (4):
The Committee recommends that NASA take
firm steps to ensure a continuing and iterative
linkage between the formal risk assessment process
(e.g., FMEA/CIL and HA) and the STS engineering
change activities.
5.5 TIMELY FEEDBACK OF DATA INTO
THE RISK ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
The Committee has found many indications
that data from STS inspection, test and repair,
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and inflight operations do not always feed
back rapidly enough or effectively enough into
the risk assessment and management proc-
CSSCS.
One of the key failures that led to the Challenger
disaster was that data regarding O-ring erosion in
earlier flights had not surfaced with enough visi-
bility or in a timely enough fashion to impact the
O-ring CIL retention rationale or the Flight Read-
iness Review for that ill-fated mission. The Com-
mittee has found numerous indications that data
from STS inspection, test and repair, and inflight
operations do not always feed back rapidly enough
or effectively enough into the risk management
process. For example, with a high Shuttle flight
rate (such as the rate of one per month being
experienced just prior to 51-L), there may be a lag
of two or more flights before in-flight anomalies
are reviewed by the responsible NASA managers.
A primary issue here is the feedback of opera-
tional experience, inspection, test and repair re-
ports, data and anomalies into the FMEA and the
CIL retention rationale, and their impact on waiver
and commit-to-launch decisions. Information that
could affect the CIL waiver retention rationale
often appears in other parts of the system long
before it finds its way into the rationale for reten-
tion. For example, the SSME prime contractor has
set up a board (Rocketdyne's Engineering Review
Board) to disposition every item identified as trou-
blesome by the project engineers. However, the
relevant CIL number and document is identified
only after disposition is made. Similarly, the effects
of activities such as inspection, test and repair, and
inflight operations appear not to be adequately
accounted for in hazard analyses.
Furthermore, it is not clear to the Committee
what processes exist for methodically incorporating
operational experience into performance analysis
programs and the system change process, or into
the FMEA/C1L. Mission Operations Directorate
(MOD) personnel atJSC have been heavily involved
in the FMEA/CIL and hazard analysis reevalua-
tions, and 14 astronauts have been assigned to
safety functions such as FMEA/C1L. This involve-
ment in reviews leads to the development of flight
rules, which, as one astronaut noted, is an effort
to address a problem through procedural changes
when it is too late for design changes. However,
flight rules and procedures development often do
lead to system design changes. (The Director of
MOD described 28 such changes made during
1985 and 1986.)
Another critical problem is the need to provide
rapid feedback of information on anomalies de-
tected during inspections, tests, and repairs as well
as those occurring in flight, into the Flight Readiness
Review (FRR) and the commit-to-launch decision.
For example, in the past, information from the
previous STS flight was not available in time to
influence tile decision to launch the next mission.
There is a well-established process for handling
and reporting in-flight anomalies. Once detected,
an anomaly is evaluated and tracked by a Mission
Evaluation Team (MET) (or the equivalent). A
Problem Report (PR)is prepared on each anomaly
which includes data and analysis regarding the
fault isolation and its possible resolution, and
potential effects on future flights and schedules.
The PR is then reviewed, evaluated, and approved
by the relevant project organizations, SR&QA, and
tile NSTS Deputy Director (Program). The PRs and
the status of their resolution are tracked in the
Problenl Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA)
System. Finally, all reported anomalics and other
concerns arc compiled into a list which is made
available to the FRR Board for the next scheduled
flight.
The problem has been the delays in the feedback
from anomaly detection on one flight to the FRR
for the next flight. NASA has a "quick look"
procedure for expediting the reportage of signifi-
cant anomalies up the management chain, but some
data will simply entail an irreducible lag. NASA
intends, for the initial flights of the Shuttle after
its resumption, to reduce all the data from each
flight before launching the next one. However,
after the first few flights, NASA plans to increase
the flight rate to a point where the data stream
from postflight activities will once again lag. Al-
though vigilance will certainly remain higher for
some time in the wake of the Challenger accident,
the Committee is nonetheless concerned that the
same dangerous preconditions will once again be
present.
NASA is now establishing a new closed-loop
accounting and review system known as the System
Integrity Assurance Program (SIAP). (See Figure
5-5). Among other things, this system will tie all
Criticality 1, IR, and 1S items (defined in Section
3.4. I and Table .3- i) to findings in the field. A key
feature of SlAP is its Program Compliance Assur-
ance Status System (PCASS). ]'his is essentially a
computer-based information system for the SIAP.
Still being developed, the PCASS will function as
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FIGURE 5-5 The NASA NSTS System Integrity Assurance Program (NASA).
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a central data base that integrates a number of
existing information systems and sources across
the NSTS (Figure 5-6). For example, the PRACA
system mentioned above will be a part of it,
speeding the transmission of data on flight anom-
alies.
The PCASS has the potential to provide in near
real-time, to decision makers such as the parti-
cipants in the FRRs, an integrated view of the
status of problems with the STS, including trends,
anomalies and deviations, and closure information.
However, the PCASS will be ineffective unless
inspection, repair, test, flight, and other data are
fed into the system in a timely manner, and the
data are available promptly in convenient, usable
form. For example, delays in reporting on anom-
alies and trends from previous flights can jeopardize
proper decisions to launch the next flight.
The Committee believes that the SIAP, including
the PCASS as an integrated data base, can and
should become a central element of STS risk as-
sessment and management. However, great care
must be taken to assure that the data base is
correctly and adequately maintained.
Essential to the successful assessment and man-
agement of risk is the certain and timely feedback
of preflight, flight, and postflight system perform-
ance data; along with inspection, test and repair
data; test results; and failure or degradation re-
ports. Thus, a prime need recognized by NASA
managers is to ensure that all problem actions are
promptly placed in the PRACA/PCASS system. In
many cases this involves a strong reliance on the
thoroughness of maintenance and handler person-
nel as well as project engineers. The paperwork
burden on NASA technical and safety personnel is
already enormous. But the timely and diligent
reporting and the proper evaluation of such data
are among the most important tasks they can
perform. It is precisely where the system broke
down in the months preceding 5 I-L.
Recommendations (5):
The Committee recommends that high-level NASA
management attention and priority be given to
increasing the efficiency of the flow, analysis, and
use of inspection, test and repair, test results, and
in-flight operations data throughout the decision-
making process. The Committee also recommends
that full implementation of the System Integrity
Assurance Program (SLAP), including its Program
Compliance Assurance Status System (PCASS), be
given a high priority. Diverse professionals (e.g.,
design and developnlent engineers, operating per-
sonnel, statistical analysts) should be used in the
development of this program, with maximum pos-
sible early mvoh,ement by potential users and key
decision makers. The Committee further recom-
mends that procedures be implemented to ensure
that all mission anomalies detected in real time and
from recorded events, and those detected during
the near-term inspection of recovered hardware,
also are fed into the formal risk assessment and
management processes for action prior to commit-
ting to the next flight. Finally, the Committee
FIGURE 5-6
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recommends that all such anomalies he called to
the inmwdiate attention of launch decision makers
who will justify in writing their decisions regarding
the disposition of the anomalies.
5.6 THE NEED FOR QUANTITATIVE
MEASURES OF RISK
Quantitative assessment methods, such as
probabilistic risk assessment, have not been
used to directly support NASA decision mak-
ing regarding the STS, although quantitative
analyses and test data often are used in arriving
at qualitative subjective judgments in reaching
decisions. Powerful methods of statistical in-
ference arc now available which allow the
integration of all sources of inl%rmation on
risk, including data on partial degradations
and failures as well as engineering models of
failure modes.
NASA is not adequately staffed with spe-
cialists and engineers trained in the statistical
sciences to aid in the transformation of com-
plex data into reformation useful to decision
makers, and for use in setting standards and
goals.
The key technical decision makers in NASA
operate as chairmen of bodies that review relevant
technical information. Their decisions involve re-
quirements, design, waivers, launch decisions, etc.
Much of this information is in the form of complex
engineering data. Data are routinely collected from
flight and ground tests, part changeout and failure
histories, anomaly reports, computer simulations,
and other sources. Some of these data are used in
various ways for design qualification, system cer-
tification, and configuration control. They are also
used to establish or verify redlines and safety
margins. They are sometimes employed in the
FMEA to support rationales for retention, and in
the hazard analyses to support classification of a
hazard. They may come into play in the waiver
process and the Flight Readiness Reviews. In other
words, numbers and statistics appear throughout
the risk management process, but they are generally
used as raw data, and in a qualitative way. Nu-
merical data have not normally been used directly
to generate indicators of risk or reliability. Even
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trend analysis, a relatively simple statistical tech-
nique for anticipating failures, has not been em-
ployed routinely or to maximum effectiveness.
The Committee was informed by a number of
NASA persons during discussions that early in the
history of the Apollo program a decision was made
not to use numerical probability analyses in NASA's
decision-making process. This disinclination still
prevails today. As a result, NASA has not had the
benefit of more modern and powerful analytical
assessment tools that have been developed in recent
years, and that are used by other high technology
organizations, such as in the communications and
nuclear power industries. Without such tools, it
would be very difficult at best for safety engineers
to transform the massive data base which has
developed in the STS program into specific infor-
mation regarding what was truly known and what
was not known. In addition, the failure to use
numerical probability analyses had the unfortunate
effect of denying NASA designers the required
statistical data base on various types of failures,
along with the better understanding of the mech-
anisms of failures that can be obtained from such
data.
Quantitative approaches to the overall analysis
of risk in complex systems are known by various
names, such as quantitative risk assessment and
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA); we use the
latter here. Using modern techniques of statistical
reference in combination with engineering models
of failure modes and system models, these ap-
proaches have become sophisticated and powerful
in recent years. They are employed by the nuclear
power, aircraft, and communications industries,
the military aerospace sector, and other developers
and operators of complex systems. While these
quantitative approaches are not a panacea, since
not everything affecting flight safety can be rigor-
ously quantified, they can permit more objective
assessment of the varying types and quality of
information and data which are available as well
as reflect the uncertainties introduced by incomplete
data or knowledge.
An approach to statistical inference that is par-
ticularly useful for assessing risk is the Bayesian
approach (using, for example, Weibull, binomial,
or Poisson likelihood functions). This allows the
integration of information from a variety of sources,
such as industrial data on components and mate-
rials, test data, analytical engineering models, field
data, and qualitative engineering judgment. The
Bayesianapproach (see Appendix D for more
details) produces a "State of Knowledge Curve"
(technically a probability density) for the parameter
of interest, such as the frequency of a Criticality 1
failure. The curve provides an estimate of the
frequency and measures the uncertainty in the
estimate. If only the data from the few or zero
observed failures during flights were used, then the
uncertainty would be too large to be useful. But
the relevant reformation goes well beyond that
scant data base. For example, it may include a
model of the mechanism which would cause the
failure mode. This cause model may inw)lve loads
and safety margins whose uncertainties have been
well characterized by existing engineering data
bases or carefully designed margin validation tests.
Suppose, however, that after a complete analysis,
the uncertainty about the frequency spans both the
safc and unsafe regions of the frequency scale. This
is not a sign that the analysis bas faik'd, but it is
an indicator that more (carefully designed) tests
are needed. The experience and intelligence of the
subject matter experts has already been fully re-
flected in the Bayesian analysis; so it is inappro-
priate to ask them now to resolve the uncomfortable
uncertainty. Only new information will do. If the
State of Knowledge Curve spans primarily the
unsafe region of the frequency scale, then a design
or procedure change is required. But if the safe
region of the frequency scale carries all the uncer-
tainty, then the uncertainty itself is of little con-
sequence because the risk is now low enough to
fly.
Probabilistic risk assessment identifies all possi-
ble failure scenarios along with their probabilities
of occurrence and their consequences. The methods
used in PRA to identify and organize these scenarios
into a structured pattern variously include the use
of master logic diagrams, fault trees, event trees,
and FMEAs, among others. Since NASA has a
great deal of experience with FMEAs in the design
process, it is logical that they be a principal input
to the PRA. Among the pay-offs to NASA from
using PRA is that literally thousands of scenarios
and their associated risks can be eliminated from
further consideration in the hazard analysis and
other risk assessment processes, if their contribu-
tions to total risk and/or their probability of oc-
currence are extremely low. (The specific limits
should be set by the top management of NASA.
However, failure scenarios that contribute less than
0.01 percent of the total risk or have a probability
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of occurrence of less than 10 r per flight would
appear to be reasonable candidates for removal
from further consideration.) Thus the proper use
of PRA methods could significantly reduce the time
and effort expended on risk assessment activities
while, at the same time, identifying in a quantitative
manner the most important contributors to overall
risk. By concentrating on these priority items,
NASA can reduce the overall risk and perhaps the
total cost of risk assessment.
Quantitative methods of analysis rely on the
modeling of statistical data of many kinds. For an
example of the application of a statistical technique
called logistics regression to reveal a statistically
significant trend and predict the probability of an
STS event while specifying the prediction uncer-
tainty, see Appendix E. It is essential that such
analyses be performed with the advice of profes-
sionals who understand the full range of analytic
tools available through the modern statistical sci-
ences. There currently are not enough professionals
in the statistical/analytical sciences among NASA's
civil service and contractor personnel to fully ana-
lyze such data on a regular basis. One result of
NASA's early decision not to use a specific relia-
bility or risk analysis approach (apparently because
of the lack of a large statistical data base) was that
NASA safety organizations were not staffed with
professional statisticians or safety-risk analysts, and
project engineers were not trained in modern sta-
tistical analysis techniques.
Partly in response to the Committee's interim
reports (Appendix C), NASA has begun taking
tentative steps toward the use of modern proba-
bilistic analysis and other analysis techniques. A
NASA handbook on PRA is being written. Con-
tractor studies have been initiated to conduct trial
PRAs of the Orbiter Auxiliary Power Unit and the
similar Hydraulic Power Unit in the SRB, as well
as on the Shuttle main propulsion pressurization
system. In addition, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
is conducting for NASA a study of ways to improve
the SSME certification process. They are using a
Bayesian approach with a Weibull likelihood func-
tion. The prior distribution is derived from engi-
neering models of failure mode life. The idea of
integrating engineering models with techniques of
statistical inference is very promising. Based on the
results of these studies, NASA plans to assess the
benefits and applicability of PRA to the STS risk
management process. The new Associate Admin-
istrator for SRM&QA has indicated that he will
personallyevaluatethetechniqueanddevelopand
pursuea strategyfor introducing it throughout
NASA.
The Committee is concerned that the test with
this very limited sample--particularly with the
evaluation criterion stated in the NASA response
to our first interim report (see Appendix C), namely
comparison of the PRA results with the (current)
"mainline FMEA/CIL activity"--could give a dis-
torted result and lead NASA not to introduce PRA.
We have cautioned NASA not to evaluate PRA
merely by comparing the results of two or three
disparate tests of PRA with the results obtained
earlier through the FMEA/CIL process. The crite-
rion should not only be whether a significant new
problem is identified by the PRA. What should be
asked is whether PRA would have helped in making
NASA's original decisions (e.g., regarding the waiver
on a Criticality 1 item), or would have given
increased confidence in the decisions that were
made. The PRA also should improve the under-
standing of the nature of the failure modes, and
increase the confidence in and objectivity of the
assessment of risk.
The judgment of experienced engineering prac-
titioners is crucial for ensuring system safety. How-
ever, a complex risk assessment process can actually
obscure some of the prime contributors to risk.
Probabilistic risk-analytic modeling techniques can
provide decision makers with an input that clarifies
the key choices facing them. Numbers and accom-
panying analyses should not drive decisions di-
rectly, but they can help ensure that system weak-
nesses and problems "bubble up" for consideration
and decision. Also, having available a detailed
quantitative breakdown of risk does provide ex-
perienced decision makers with a better basis for
intelligently managing risk. Clearly, however, the
Committee does not wish to suggest that NASA
subordinate sound technical judgement to numer-
ical analysis. Such an approach would be, in our
opinion, unrewarding and perhaps counterprod-
uctive.
Recommendations (6):
The Committee recommends that probabilistic
risk assessment approaches be applied to the Shuttle
risk management program at the earliest possible
date. Data bases derived from STS failures, anom-
alies, and flight and test resuhs, and the associated
analysis techniques, should be systematically ex-
panded to support probabilistic risk assessment,
trend analyses, and other quantitative analyses
relating to reliability and safety. Although the
Committee believes that probabilistic risk assess-
ment approaches will greatly improve NASA's risk
assessment process, it recognizes that these ap-
proaches should not be a substitute for good
engineering and quality control practices in design,
development, test, manufacturing, and operations,
all of which must continue to receive high priority
emphasis by NASA and its contractors. The Com-
mittee further recommends that NASA build up its
capability in the statistical sciences to provide
improved analytical inputs to decision making.
5.7 THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
ENGINEERING ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT
OF RISK MANAGEMENT
NASA safety-related analyses tend to focus
primarily on single-event, worst-case failures
to the relative exclusion of possible multiple
and synergistic failures in different subsystems
or elements of the STS. In addition, the con-
nection between the various analyses appears
tenuous. There does not appear to be an
adequate integrated-system view of the entire
STS.
NASA's risk management process provides some
mechanisms for identifying cross-element interface
effects and failure modes, including propagation
of failure modes to interfacing or physically adja-
cent modules or subsystems. One mechanism is the
Element Interface Functional Analysis (EIFA), de-
scribed in Section 3.4.3. There are three EIFAs:
Orbiter/ET, Orbiter/SSME, and Orbiter/SRB-ET (a
fourth ELLA, on ground/flight systems, is now being
generated). The hazard analysis is intended to be
a top-down analysis that addresses cascading fail-
ures. Interface Control Documents are a third
mechanism concerned with safety at the subsystem
interfaces. Finally, a Critical Functions Assessment
(CFA), conducted initially in 1978 to identify
critical functions during each mission phase, is
currently being reevaluated by Rockwell Interna-
tional. The CFA can include multiple and cascading
failure combinations.
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TheNSTSEngineeringIntegrationOfficeatJSC
is responsiblefor managing system integration
activities, the systems analysis and interface design
effort, and analysis of integrated structural loads
and thermal effects. As part of this responsibility,
a series of Level 11 Systems Integration Review
(SIR) panels are assigned to review the FMEAs on
both sides of an interface. The Office is supported
by Rockwell International in the provision of Space
Shuttle integration analyses--although Rockweli's
support responsibility apparently does not extend
to some areas (e.g., on-orbit or reentry phases) or
elements. The Engineering Integration Office, with
the support of Rockwell, also produces Integrated
Hazard Analyses (IHA) bridging two or more STS
elements.
To the extent that the hazard analysis is a top-
down analysis, it is important that its output lead
to the generation or modification of the FMEAs.
But there is no indication that this is happening.
For example, a member of the Committee audited
the FMEA/CILs and hazard analyses related to
potential interactions between the Orbiter fuel cells,
water management, active thermal control, and life
support subsystems; in particular, he looked for
indications of possible effects of the presence of
hydrogen in the cooling or potable water which
would result from a failure of the hydrogen sepa-
rator. The FMEA/C1Ls identified only two possible
effects: degradation of the performance of the flash
evaporator and a reduction of water storage ca-
pability. Other, potentially more damaging effects
not covered in the FMEA include: the effect of the
possible shutdown of flash evaporators between
140,000 and 100,000 feet on the active thermal
control system; the violation of water quality
standards, with resultant crew discomfort; and the
inability to accurately assess the amount of water
onboard. It should be noted that no hazard analysis
seems to exist related to the potential presence of
hydrogen in water; the Element Interface Func-
tional Analysis is not applicable because all of the
subsystems of concern are within the same element
(the Orbiter).
Although the FMEA/C1L is a bottom-up analysis,
it should be able to expose cascading failures
initiated by the subject failure. However, at present
the FMEA process usually does not consider the
cascading of failures beyond the first occurrence.
For example, it will not consider propagation of a
failure in the hydrogen separator into the flash
evaporator and the subsequent propagation into
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the thermal protection subsystem. The FMEA/C1L
ground rules restrict the analysis to individual
subsystems. Contractor pcrsonnel do analyze the
effects of a failure in the subject subsystem on
other subsystems, but no further.
External failures are considered in the redun-
dancy screen," but not in the FMEA. The Com-
mittee notes the dichotomy between the concern
with failure of redundant items, contrasted with
the lack of concern in the FMEA over nearly
simultaneous failures in separate subsystems which
could have an equally critical effect.
The prevailing impression of the Committee is
that, although there are several mechanisms that
take a partial systems view, and although the level
of effort is much greater than it was prior to 51-L,
the various analyses do not add up to a truly
integrated, total-systems analysis in support of risk
assessment. Nor are they linked to the FMEA/CIL
in such a way as to compensate for its limitations.
The existmg risk management process consists
primarily of separate, bottom-up lines of analysis,
without a thorough top-down, integrated systems
analysis.
Thc Associatc Administrator for SRM&QA has
been directed by the Administrator to develop a
new agency-wide risk management system that
integrates the various parts of the risk assessment
and management process. This is a promising
development. It is important for NASA to call
attention to the totality of "risk management" as
the sum of various processes, including total STS
risk assessment, that ultimately must be considered
on an integrated basis by line management as well
as by SRM&QA.
It may be noted that, of all the organizations
and groups observed by the Committee, operations
personnel (astronauts and flight controllers) appear
to have the broadest and most integrated perspec-
tive of the Shuttle system. Flight controllers in
training have actually found real problems on
spacecraft while performing cross-element analy-
ses. The continuous development and updating of
flight rules and procedures is an important source
of this perspective. For example, the Mission Op-
erations Directorate (MOD) flight rules sheet now
" The redundancy screen is a method h)r documenting the capabilities
for redundancy verification: A--capable ot checkout during normal
grot, nd turn-around between flights. B--loss of redundant element is
readily detectable m flight. C--there is a possible single event (e.g.,
contamination or explosion) which can cause loss oi all redundancy.
lists the relevant hazards, FMEAs, and CILs in a
matrix format. An experimental system being de-
veloped by MOD--the Shuttle Configuration
Analysis Program (SCAP) and Failure Analysis
Program (FAP)--is able to simulate multiple fail-
ures and thcir effects. This system could be useful
in integrated risk analysis.
Another strong example of the integrated, sys-
tems engineering approach is the Avionics Audit,
a scries of studies performed by Rockwell since
1979 on selected avionics hardware, software, and
Orbiter functions. An audit looks at failures across
the STS, including cascading failures and interac-
tions. The output of the audit is fed back into the
FMEA/CIL/retention rationale, hazard analysis, etc.,
to ensure that they are consistent and complete or
that a design change is implemented, with all
relevant documents being revised accordingly. Both
the Avionics Audit and the Critical Functions
Assessment are promising techniques. However,
thcv arc prcsently not scoped broadly enough, nor
arc there enough highly skillcd engineers available,
with an understanding of both the STS and the
audit techniques, to do the job. (We understand
that there are tcntative plans to expand the Avionics
Audit to embrace the entire STS.)
The expansion of effort on integrated analysis is
a positive sign. However, the Committee remains
concerned that we have not found at Level II a
consolidated, integrated STS systems engineering
analysis, including system safety analysis, that views
the sum of the Shuttle elements as a single system.
We hope that, in attempting to develop an agency-
wide risk management system, NASA will devise
an integrated STS system analysis and assessment
process which is closely coupled with the FMEA/
CIL and other components of risk management, to
ensure assessment of the truly critical safety items
in the STS. This would include all combinations
of hardware, software, and procedural failures and
malperformances, and cascading failures. Opera-
tions personnel should be brought heavily into play
in the development of such an integrated system
evaluation. Finally, the safety/risk management
process should be reviewed to identify ways to
improve both the coordination of analysis efforts
and the efficiency of the overall process. Care must
bc taken to assure that each part of the process is
necessary and contributes significantly to the over-
all STS risk management system.
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Recommendation (7):
A "top-down" integrated system engineering
analysis, including a system safety analysis, that
views the sum of the STS elements as a single
system should he perfornled to help identify any
gaps that may exist among the various "bottom-
up" analyses centered at the subsystem and element
levels.
5.8 INDEPENDENCE OF THE SPACE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
CERTIFICATION AND SOFTWARE
VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION
PROGRAM
In general, hardware certification and veri-
fication, and software validation and verifi-
cation of STS components are managed and
conducted primarily by the same organiza-
tional elements responsible for the design and
fabrication of the units. Thus, the independ-
ence of the certification, validation, and veri-
fication processes is questionable. For exam-
ple:
--The contractor that builds the Orbiters
(Rockwell International, STS Division) is
also responsible for preparing the docu-
mentation and performing the work in-
volved in certification, but does not answer
to an entity independent of the NSTS
Program with regard to the certification
function.
-- At Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC),
the Engineering Directorate has the prime
responsibility for design requirements for
the propulsion elements of STS and also
has responsibility for the review and ap-
proval of their certification. The Program
Office is responsible for the design and
development phase as well as for perform-
ing the certification activities.
-- At the Johnson Space Center (JSC), prime
responsibility for design requirements, de-
sign and development, and certification for
the Orbiter all rest with the Program Office,
supported by the Engineering and Opera-
tions Directorates of the Center.
-- "Independent" validation and verification
(IV&V) of software is carried out by the
samecontractor (IBM) that produces the
STS software, with some checks being
made by the Johnson Space Center (JSC).
STS certification methods and responsibilities are
described in the Shuttle Master Verification Plan
(NSTS-07700-10-MVP-01). This plan now is being
revised to define reverification requirements which
must be met prior to the return to flight. Figure
5-7 depicts the phases of the process and respon-
sibilities for preparation, review, and approval (i.e.,
by the contractor or NASA). Figure 5-8 shows the
time sequence for the various aspects of the certi-
fication-verification process for a subsystem, from
the establishment of requirements to operations.
According to the NASA Associate Administrator
for SRM&QA, his office is responsible for devel-
oping certification plans, reviewing the results, and
approving the certification of STS. However, as the
following discussion points out, the certification
process is actually carried out by the NASA centers
and their contractors who are building the STS.
Although the general approach to certification is
the same at the three centers involved in the STS
program (,ISC, MSFC, and KSC), there are several
differences in detail, especially with respect to the
degree of involvement of the SR&QA organizations
(Director, JSC SR&QA, personal correspondence).
At MSFC, the Engineering Directorate has the
prime responsibility for establishing design require-
ments and also for reviewing and approving cer-
tification. The Program Office has responsibility
for the design and development phase as well as
for the performance of certification activities. Under
the cognizance of the MSFC Chief Engineer, a lead
engineer is designated for each element (ET, SRB,
SSME) to oversee the certification activity. The
MSFC SR&QA office reviews and approves al!
certification and verification documentation, and
performs an independent verification assessment to
insure that all STS elements for which MSFC is
responsible are properly certified and qualified for
flight.
For the Orbiter, the JSC Program Office subsys-
tem managers (supported by the Engineering and
Operations Directorates of the Center) have prime
responsibility for design requirements, design and
development, and also the review and approval of
all aspects of certification of hardware. However,
the JSC SR&QA office is responsible for assuring
the adequacy of all flight equipment through review
and approval of all certification requirements, plans,
and test reports. In the case of unresolved differ-
ences between the Orbiter Project Manager and
the JSC Manager of SR&QA regarding a certifi-
cation issue, the appeal route is to the Director of
JSC. As shown in Figure 5-7, the Orbiter dement
contractor (Rockwell International, STS Division)
is responsible for preparing the documentation and
performing the work involved in certification.
At KSC, the verification program used during
the establishment of the Shuttle Launch and Land-
ing Site (LLS) was, because of the nature of that
facility, quite different from that used for flight
hardware. The LLS project at KSC certified that
critical ground systems meet design performance
requirements. KSC SR&QA and operating person-
nel also participate in facilities, systems, and equip-
ment certification.
STS Orbiter flight software is developed by IBM
under contract to NSTS/JSC. Another group of the
same contractor, but not reporting to the devel-
opment manager, carries out the independent val-
idation and verification (IV&V) of the software
produced by the development group. NASA per-
sonnel consider the multi-organizational, multi-
facility participation in software testing and veri-
fication to be a strong feature of their procedure.
The)' consider that IV&V is adequately performed
in two stages: (1) by a group in IBM separate from
the development group, and (2) through testing in
the Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL)
at JSC. However, the Committee noted very close
collaboration at JSC among NASA personnel and
support contractors involved in software develop-
ment, with little clear differentiation of roles and
responsibilities. While such an atmosphere pro-
motes teamwork and cooperation, it does not tend
to promote the maintenance of adequate checks
and balances required for truly independent IV&V.
The Committee agrees that the existing software
validation and verification process is well run, with
good quality control, and we believe it should be
retained. Indeed, performance of STS software has
never created a problem in STS operations. How-
ever, the Committee questions whether independ-
ent validation and verification by a second group
within the development contractor is sufficiently
independent. The degree of independence certainly
would lead to serious questioning by outsiders if
significant problems were to develop in the flight
software. The Committee further believes that the
SAIL, while it may be a good end-to-end test, is
not adequate to fulfill the purposes of IV&V. Also,
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The time sequence for the hardware certification-verification process in the I_STS Program (NASA).
members of the Committee were told by JSC
representatives that, because of limited staff, the
JSC SR&QA organization now provides little in-
dependent review and oversight of the software
activities in the NSTS program.
Based on the Committee's review of STS certi-
fication-validation-verification processes, it appears
that the work is managed and conducted primarily
by the same organizational elements responsible
for the design and fabrication of the STS units.
The SR&QA organizations seem to have a second-
ary role. Thus, the degree of independence of the
SR&QA hierarchy in the certification process is
questionable. This situation is in stark contrast to
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that which prevails for military aircraft, in which
a totally separate organization is responsible for
both certification and software IV&V. It also is in
contrast with the process prevailing in the com-
mercial aircraft industry, where the Federal Avia-
tion Administration is responsible for certification.
The FAA uses "Designated Engineering Represen-
tatives" (DERs) who are employed by the airframe
manufacturer but are responsible to the FAA while
serving as DERs. This approach provides for in-
dependence of the certification process from the
design, development and production of the air-
planes, while bringing to bear the experience of
hands-on engineering practitioners.
Recommendation(8):
Responsibility for approval of hardware certifi-
cation and software IV&V should be vested in
entities separate from the NSTS Program structure
and the centers directly involved in STS develop-
ment and operation. However, these organizations
should continue to conduct activities supporting
certification and IV&V.
5.9 OPERATIONAL ISSUES
Operational aspects of the NSTS program require
considerable attention in risk assessment and man-
agement. Three aspects are focused on here: Launch
Commit Criteria waiver policy, human error as a
contributor to risk, and cannibalization of spare
parts at KSC.
5.9.1 Launch Commit Criteria Waiver Policy
An average of tWO Launch Commit Criteria
(I.CCs) arc waived by NASA in the course of
each launch. The Committee questions the
validity of an operational procedure that "in-
stitutionalizes" waivers by routinely permit-
ting established criteria to be violated.
Launch Commit Criteria (LCCs) are technical
requirements and conditions pertaining to the STS
system, ground systems, and the physical environ-
ment that must be met before a launch can proceed.
NASA divides LCCs into three classes: mandatory,
highly desirable, and desirable. However, all LCCs
are subject to waiver based on the judgment of
responsible NASA managers, and typically a few
(an average of two) are waived for each launch.
To date, no LCC waiver has ever produced a
problem on a Shuttle mission. However, Committee
members questioned the validity of an operational
procedure that "institutionalizes" waivers by rou-
tinely permitting established criteria to be violated.
There was a general feeling that "waivable" criteria
are not valid criteria.
NASA officials told the Committee that an av-
erage of 2,000 LCCs come into play on a given
Shuttle launch, so that the number waived per
launch is an insignificant percentage of the total.
The great majority of these are apparently not
critical. Furthermore, they explained, in most cases
NASA engineers know that there is some extra
margin of safety between the LCC and the actual
reasonable limits of safety, because they have
learned more about the systems involved since the
time the LCC was established. Thus, a typical LCC
waiver represents fine-tuning--for example, a slight
deviation in leak rates or pressurization rates. Few
such waivers have ever led to design changes. The
Committee is not persuaded by these arguments.
As a result of the 51-L accident, NASA has begun
revising the ground rules for waivers and reassess-
ing the LCCs across the board. A time will be
selected (probably launch minus 5 min.) beyond
which waiver of an LCC cannot be executed unless
contingency procedures are prescribed in advance,
thus forcing a launch scrub. Furthermore, each
waiver will now trigger a formal reassessment of
the particular LCC that was waived, perhaps re-
sulting in a change to it.
Although these changes in policy are appropriate,
there are aspects of LCC policy that the changes
do not address. The Committee is uncertain about
what criteria are used to establish LCCs initially,
especially in the weather and environmental area.
For example, ice on the pad at the time of mission
51-L was later shown by films to be a serious
hazard; yet there was no LCC governing icing.
Similarly, there was not an LCC on temperature
at the SRB O-rings--only an unrealistic (as it turned
out) LCC on ambient air temperature. The Flight
Readiness Review Board for that mission was aware
of SRB O-ring erosion on past flights, but did not
recognize the effects of temperature on the O-ring.
At the same time, there is a concern that too
much faith may be placed in the LCCs. A possible
case in point is the Atlas Centaur launch failure of
March 1987, in which a decision was made to
launch the vehicle into a storm because lightning
strikes at the time of launch appeared to be beyond
the 5-mile range permitted by the LCCs. The Atlas
was destroyed by lightning shortly after launch,
and observers (including NASA personnel) later
said that conditions were clearly not suitable for
launch. ''_ In the view of the Committee, LCCs are
designed to permit launch; they should not be
allowed to force a launch. Experienced judgment
must continue to be exercised. But it would be
useful in this regard if LCCs were more accurate
and more comprehensive in their definition of
'" NASA: Report of tht' Atlas (Ientaur--67/FI.TSATCOM F-6 Inves-
tigation Board, 15 July 1987.
63
allowablelimits; in that case they would not be so
subject to waiver.
We note the U.S. Air Force system for indicating
the criticality of flight equipment by a "red cross"
(a mandatory NO-GO), "red diagonal" (system
not fully operational, but safe to fly), and "red
dash" (some inspection not done). A comparable
prioritization would be appropriate for NASA's
LCCs. Loss of an STS may be much more costly
in dollars and lives than loss of any USAF system,
and any means of focusing judgment should be
welcome. ]here must be room for experienced
judgment; but there must also be inviolable rules
that prevent errors in judgment being made under
pressure of time on certain critical LCCs. We
recognize the objections of launch directors to
inviolable criteria; but in our view the best launch
director is one who is willing to be conservative
and to live with a conservative system.
The Committee welcomes the present review of
LCC waiver policy. We believe that the presence
of the newly appointed NSTS Deputy Director
(Operations) will also help to ensure the application
of experienced judgment and knowledge whenever
I.CC waiver decisions are being made.
Recommendation (9a):
The Committee recommends that NASA estab-
lish a list of mandatory LCCs which may NOT be
waived by anyone. This should comprise the bulk
of the LCCs. A limited number of criteria would
be separately listed, for special cases, together with
a discussion of the circumstances under which they
may be waived and who may make the waiver
decision.
5.9.2 Human Factors as a Contributor to Risk
Human factors, which are considered in
some of the STS hazard analyses, do not appear
to be taken into account as the cause of failure
modes in the FMEAs. Since the FMEA is one
of the principal safety tools used in the eval-
uation of the STS design, the Committee be-
lieves that the STS design process should
explicitly consider and minimize the potential
contribution of humans to the initiation of the
defined failure modes.
NASA's risk assessment and risk management
process for the STS focuses primarily on failure of
hardware, and secondarily on software faults and
errors. Human error, which can be a major con-
tributing factor in accidents, is accorded relatively
little attention in the present risk management
system although it is considered in some of the
hazard analyses. While procedural aspects of STS
operations are regularly relied upon to justify the
retention of critical items, human factors do not
appear to be taken into account as a source of
failure modes in the preparation of the FMEAs.
Human error can affect both flight operations
(through crew operations and flight controller pro-
cedures) and ground operations (testing, certifica-
tion, maintenance, assembly, etc.). Hazard analyses
can consider human error in both types of opera-
tions activities; but the Committee has not found
that hazard analysis is regularly used to assess this
element of risk.
Procedures utilized in both ground and flight
operations arc controlled by formal Configuration
Control Boards. Personnel are, of course, trained
and certified for the operations that they will carry
out. Procedures are verified by a variety of methods,
including trainers, simulators, mockups, engineer-
ing models, and analysis tools.
The Committee initially had some concerns re-
garding the lack of involvement of flight operations
personnel in engineering redesign decisions and
safety reviews, but through discussions with NASA
personnel these concerns were largely resolved.
However, we remain troubled by aspects of ground
operations, with respect to their human error
potential. We note that two of the three fatal
spacecraft accidents in the U.S. manned space
program to date occurred on the ground, of which
one was caused by procedural errors on the part
of the ground crew. _' Removal and replacement of
parts, test, repair, and all the various ground
operations provide enormous potential for error
that can lead to serious problems. The potential
may be exacerbated by the fact that, at KSC,
ground personnel are relied upon to report any
errors they make which could induce damage; there
is little incentive for self-reporting.
A draft NASA Handbook on Systems Assurance,
recently prepared by the Safety Risk Management
_ Two Shuttle processing workers were asphyxiated and killed in late
1986 &wing a test revolving nitrogen gas. (The Apollo fire m 1967
was not caused by human error, but bv a shorted wire which initiated
a fire m the pure oxygen atmosphere.)
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ProgramOfficeof HeadquartersSRM&QA Safety
Division, places new emphasis on human error in
risk assessment. In a proposed risk assessment
model (Figure 5-9), sensitivity to human error is
presented as one factor that contributes to the
likelihood of a failure mode occurring. This is a
positive sign, but it now is far from being imple-
mented in the fabric of NASA system design and
safety assurance.
Recommendation (gb):
The Committee recommends that the NASA
FMEA include human factors among the recog-
nized sources of potential causes of failure modes.
This step would provide another valid link between
the FMEA and the hazard analysis, which are now,
iH our view, too tenuously connected.
5.9.3 Cannibalization of Spare Parts
Bv the time of the Challenger accident,
"'cannibalization," the removal of parts at the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) from one oper-
ational STS clement to fulfill spares require-
ments m another, had become a prevalent
fcature of STS logistics, thus introdt, cing a
variety of failure potentials associated with
human error. Cannibalization is not evaluated
as a producer of potential failure in either the
hazard analysis (where it would bc most ap-
propriate) or the FMEA.
NASA initiated a spares program in 1981, as
Shuttle test flights began. Early flights were sup-
ported with spare parts produced on order, a source
of trouble since parts were often not available in
a timely fashion. After other Shuttles came on line
and as the flight rate increased, parts shortages
became increasingly severe. Cannibalization was
often the only answer to meet the flight-rate de-
mand.
As the President of Rockwell International STS
Division said to the Committee, "In the last >'ear
of flight, cannibalization was the name of the gamc.
We were robbing Peter to pay Paul all throughot, t
the system." With budgetary constraints and cost
overruns a chronic reality, NASA apparently de-
cided to emphasize STS fabrication and launchings
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over purchasing adequate spare units; the result
was logistics problems.
From a safety standpoint, cannibalization raises
many problems. First, having workers enter one
vehicle and remove a part presents the danger that
they will inadvertently (and perhaps unknowingly)
damage an adjacent part of the vehicle. Second,
there is the risk that the part itself will be damaged
upon removal and transport. Third, there is the
chance that the part will be improperly replaced
in the vehicle for which it was cannibalized as well
as in the original vehicle when the part is returned
or replaced. The latter two possibilities are theo-
retically covered by post-installation checkout and
inspection, but the risk of error increases as the
incidence goes up. Workers are reqmred to report
any possible damage they cause, but the "honor
system" may not be 100% reliable. Finally, can-
nibalization per sc is not explicitly evaluated within
the hazard analysis process.
Figure 5-I() shows the incidence of cannibali-
zation over approximately the last year before the
accident. It can be seen that at least one-third of
the Orbiter Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) flown
on some missions were obtained through canni-
balization. A NASA official at KSC told the Com-
mittee that the problem of spares had become so
acute that, if Shuttle flights had continued uninter-
rupted, KSC would not have been able to sustain
STS operations.
The flight hiatus has given NASA time to improve
the spares inventory and to make some needed
changes in logistics management. Responsibility
for Orbiter logistics has been assigned to KSC. The
spares budget has been increased. Furthermore,
there has been a sharp drop in planned flight rate,
which should reduce the requirement for canni-
balization. Also, stricter management controls have
been placed on cannibalization, making it unlikely
that personnel will readily resort to this practice.
The program hopes to achieve a level of support
in which lack of spares would delay processing no
more than 5 percent of the time (the aerospace
industry standard). The new NSTS System Integrity
Assurance Program specifically prohibits cannibal-
ization except by approval of the chairman of the
PRCB, and requires the collection and analysis of
supportability trend data in support of logistics
managemcnt.
Reducing the repair time for spare parts is the
fastest way to improve the inventory and reduce
cannibalization. The repair processing time is cur-
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rentiy too long, but a gradual reduction in flow
time is expected to occur.
Recommendations (9c):
The Committee recommends that NASA main-
tam its current intense attention toward reducing
cannibalization of parts to an acceptable level. We
filrther recommend that adequate funds for the
procurement and repair of spare parts be made
available by NASA to ensure that cannibalization
is a rare requirement. Finally, we recommend that
NASA include cannibalization, with its attendant
removal and replacement operations, as a potential
producer o f failure in the integrated risk assessment
recommended earlier (Section 5.1).
5.10. OTHER WEAKNESSES IN RISK
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT
5.10.1 The Apparent Reliance on Boards and Panels
for Decision Making
The multilayered system of boards and panels
in every aspect ot the STS may lead individuals
to defer to the anonymity of the process and
not focus closely enough on their individual
responsibilities in the decision chain. The sheer
number of STS-related boards and panels seems
to produce a mindset of "collective responsi-
bility."
The NSTS Program is a large organization whose
mission involves the development, deployment, and
operation of a complex space vehicle in a wide
range of missions. Associated with each milestone
in the development of any NASA space system and
its constituent parts, or in the preparation for a
space mission, are one or more reviews. These
reviews may be made from the standpoint of
requirements, engineering design, development sta-
tus, safety, flight readiness, or resource require-
ments. Conducting each review is a team, panel,
or board, which may or may not be permanently
empaneled. As described in Section 3.2.2, in the
NSTS Program there are review groups at every
level of management, including the contractor or-
ganizations.
Figure 5-11 depicts the review groups associated
with the NSTS FMEA/CIL and hazard analysis
processes alone. There are also boards to review
design rcquirements and certification, software, the
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document (OMRSD) and the Op-
erations and Maintenance Instructions (OMI), the
Launch Commit Criteria, and mission rules. There
are flight readiness reviews at each stage of prep-
aration, with a Launch System Evaluation Advisory
Team to assess launch conditions and a Mission
Management Team to oversee the actual mission.
The Committee developcd a concern about a
possible attitudinal problem regarding the decision
process on the part of the NASA personnel engaged
in it. Given the pervasive reliance on teams and
boards to consider the key questions affecting
safety, "group democracy" can easily prevail, with
the result that individual responsibility is diluted
and obscured. Even though presumably the chair-
man of each group has official responsibility for
the decision, most decisions appear to be highly
participatory in nature. In a CCB review audited
by the Committee, for example, there were 25-35
people present and the role of thc chairman was
not especially distinct. Each action appeared to be
a consensus action by the board.
It is possible that this is a factor in the problem
identified by the Rogers Commission: "... a NASA
management structure that permitted internal flight
safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers"
(Vol. I, p. 82). For example, the Level II PRCB
conducts daily and weekly meetings--usually via
teleconference--in which as many as 30 pcople
participate. It is certainly conceivable that individ-
uals might be reluctant to express their views or
objections fully under such circumstances. Also,
passing decisions upward through the ranks of
review boards may reduce each chairman's sense
that his decisions are crucial. As a case in point, it
is clear from the report of the Rogers Commission,
and from statements made to the Committee by
NASA personnel involved, that the lines of au-
thority and responsibility in the flight readiness
review decision-making chain had become vague
by the time of mission 51-L.
In discussing this issue, NASA's Associate Ad-
ministrator for SRM&QA pointed to the SR&QA
directors at the field centers as the individuals with
primary responsibility for the safety of the Shuttle
system. They are said to have full "responsibility,
authority, and accountability." Ncvertheless, these
individuals do make inputs to larger and higher
boards, so that in the end all decisions become
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collectiveones, lacking the crucial mindset of
individualaccountability.
It is possiblethat a semanticproblemis partly
at fault here,in that NASA managersoften refer
to "the board" as being synonymouswith its
chairman, with respect to decision authority.
Nevertheless,a mindsetis therebyestablishedin
which it is not clearwhethertheseare individual
or group decisions.
TheCommitteecontrastedtheNSTSsystemwith
that of the U.S.Air Force,in which the board
(includingits chairman)makesrecommendations
to thedecisionmaker.Onepositivepoint in favor
of NASA'ssystemisthat, there,thechairman(who
is the decision maker) is required to listen "in
public" to all dissenting views.
The Committee recognizes the important role
played by the man)' panels and boards in the NSTS
program in providing coordination, resolving prob-
lems and technical conflicts, and reviewing and
recommending actions. These entities allow the
different interests and skill groups to bring forward
their inputs, contribute their knowledge, and thus
minimize the risk that a proposed action will
negatively affect some aspect of the STS.
Recommendation (lOa):
The Committee recommends that the Adminis-
trator of NASA periodically remind all NASA
personnel that boards and panels are advisory in
nature. He should specify the individuals in NASA,
by name and position, who are responsible for
making final decisions while considering the advice
of each panel and board. NASA management
should also see to it that each individual involved
in the NSTS Program is completely aware of his/
her responsibilities and authority for decision mak-
ing.
5.10.2 Adequacy of Orbiter Structural Safety Margins
The primary structure of the STS has been
excluded, by definition, from the FMEA/CIL
process, based on the belief that there is an
adequate positive margin of safety. However,
the Committee questions whether operating
structural safety margins have actually been
proven adequate.
Completion of the Model 6.0 loads study
and the reevaluation of margins of safety based
on these loads will significantly improve
NASA's grasp of actual operating margins of
safety.
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NASA groundrules exclude primary structure
from the FMEA/CIL process. NASA has apparently
assumed that the structural reliability of the STS
(including the Orbiter, External Tank, and Solid
Rocket Boosters) is close to 1.00, because the
operating loads are believed to be less than the
proof load to which the vehicle has been subjected.
It is true that some structures have reliability
approaching 1.00; examples include bridges, build-
ings, and even commercial airliners. But there is a
considerable difference between the Shuttle, a first-
of-its-kind vehicle operated under unique condi-
tions and challenging environments, and a com-
mercial airliner, which is designed and tested to
loads and conditions that are well understood. In
addition, in the case of a commercial airliner the
certifying agency (FAA) and operator organizations
act as independent rule makers and auditors. No
such independent check and balancc exists for the
STS, where NASA controls all functions in-house
(including requirements, analysis methods, testing,
and certification)--primarily within the NSTS pro-
gram.
The original development plans for the Orbiter--
the most complex and vulnerable element, and the
only manned element--included a conventional
structural test program for certification of the
structural integrity. A complete, full-scale structural
test article (an Orbiter vehicle) was to be included
which was to be loaded to 1.4 times the operating
limit load in the most critical conditions. (This
compares to the conventional value of 1.5 used by
the military and the FAA.) Due to budget problems
NASA decided to eliminate one of the planned
flight vehicles and convert the static test article
(#099, Challenger) to a flight vehicle after a series
of proof tests to only 1.20 times the limit load.
Some loading conditions actually did not exceed
1.15 times the limit load. Therefore, the tests did
not even verify a 1.4 strength margin over limit
loads. Subsequent flight test data and calculations
show that in some areas the maximum operating
loads are actually 15% to 20% higher than those
originally postulated, so that the static proof load-
ing tests demonstrated only approximate limit
conditions. Thus, today there is no demonstrated
verification of safety margins for critical elements
of the Orbiter.
The model of loads and stresses on the Orbiter
used in its original design has been revised once.
By 1983 even these data had become suspect, and
another complete revision of loads using the latest
test and analysis data was begun. Calculated strength
margins from this study (called Model 6.0) are
expected to be available by November 1987.
The Committee believes that the margin of actual
strength over maximum expected limit load for
critical areas of the Orbiter structure is not well
known. Partly this is because loading conditions
are complex and unprecedented, and partly it is
because very little (if any) of the flight structure
was actually tested to failure. The Committee agrees
with the decision not to use the FMEA/CIL process
on STS structures. However, we remain concerned
about the uncertainty in the actual strength margins
of safety. The Model 6.0 loads calculation now
nearing completion should correct the known dis-
crepancics in external loads. Verification of the
Model 6.0 loads by data routinely gathered from
an instrumented and calibrated flight vehicle, be-
ginning with the next flight, can help verify the
model and establish the margins of safety more
dcfinitivelv. This knowledge will greatly improve
NASA's ability to keep Shuttle operations within
a safe envelope of structural loads.
Implicit in the safe operation of any such struc-
ture is a monitoring system to assure that deteri-
oration of structural integrity does not occur. An
effort now underway could add materially to
NASA's ability to operate the Orbiter's structure
safely over its service life. People with airline
experience, working under Rockwell International,
are developing a maintenance and inspection plan
for the structure. A well-planned periodic inspec-
tion of this sort is essential, and is the best preven-
tive for unpleasant occurrences due to structural
deterioration or other causes.
Recommendations (10b):
The Committee recommends that NASA place a
high priority on completion of the Model 6.0 loads,
the reevaluation of safety margins for these loads,
and the early verification and continued monitoring
of the model 6.0 loads by permanently instru-
menting and calibrating at least the next full scale
STS vehicle to fly. We further recommend that
NASA complete and implement a comprehensive
plan for conducting periodic inspection and main-
tenance of the structure of the Orbiters throughout
the service life of each vehicle.
5.10.3 Software Issues
NASA FMEAs do not assess software as a
possible cause of failure modes.
There is little involvement of JSC Safety,
Reliability and Quality Assurance in software
reviews, resulting in little independent quality
assurance for software.
A large amount of data--much of it flight
specific--must be loaded for each Shuttle mis-
sion but it is not subjected to validation as
rigorous as that for the software.
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The Shuttle onboard data processing system
consists of five general purpose computers (GPCs)
with their input and output devices, and memory
units. Four of the five GPCs contain the primary
software system, known as the Primary Avionics
System Software (PASS); the fifth is a redundant
computer which contains the Backup Flight System
(BFS). The PASS is developed by IBM, and the BFS
is built by Rockwell.
In addition to flight software code, there are also
flight software initialization data, called "I-loads",
which are mission-unique parameter values. The
basic code is reconfigured for specific missions,
with about two such "reconfigured flight loads"
per flight. After the software requirements are
approved, three levels of development tests are
performed leading to the First Article Configuration
Inspection, or FACI. At the FACI milestone, the
software package is handed off to the contractor's
verification organization for independent testing,
called Independent Validation and Verification
(IV&V), which leads to the Configuration Inspec-
tion (CI) and delivery to NASA. (The degree of
independence of the IV&V was discussed in Section
5.8.) Following mission-specific reconfiguration and
testing in the SAIL and other JSC laboratories, the
package is ready for Flight Readiness Review.
A Shuttle Avionics System Control Board (SASCB)
is the Level II flight software control board, to
which the Program Requirements Control Board
has delegated responsibility for software configu-
ration control. The Manager of the NSTS Engi-
neering Integration Office chairs this board and
signs the flight readiness statement on software;
thus he is the focus of configuration control and
managementauthority for software. At Level 11I
there is a Software Control Board, corresponding
to the Configuration Control Board for hardware
issues.
The testing, control, and performance of STS
software seem quite good. Out of some half-million
lines of code in the Shuttle flight software, typically
an average of one error is discovered beyond the
CI. With the emphasis placed on early detection
of errors, error rates are quite low throughout the
total 10 million-line Shuttle software system. Only
once has a software problem disrupted a mission
(on STS-7, uncertainty about the effect of installed
software code on a particular abort scenario caused
a launch scrub). Both the developers and the
"independent" certifiers perform their own inspec-
tions of the code. Special "code audits" are also
carried out to reinspect targeted aspects of the code
on a one-time basis, based on criticality, complex-
ity, Discrepancy Reports (DRs), and other consid-
erations. Software quality control includes weekly
tracking of DRs through the Configuration Man-
agement database (which tracks all faults, their
causes and effects, and their disposition); trends of
l)Rs arc reported quarterly.
Although generally impressed with the Shuttle
software development and testing process, the
Committee made a number of specific findings.
First, we note that software is not a FMEA/CIL
item. NASA personnel state that all software is
considered to be Criticality 1, with each problem
being fixed as soon as it is detected through testing
and simulation. The Committee believes that iden-
tification and prediction of software faults or error
modes may be feasible by dividing the software
into functional modules and then considering the
various possible failures (e.g., improper constants,
discretes or algorithms, missing or superfluous
symbols).
There is little involvement of the JSC SR&QA
organization in software reviews, due to the limi-
tations on staff. As a result, there is little inde-
pendent quality assurance for software.
Finally, we note that a large amount of data_
much of it flight specific--must be loaded for each
Shuttle mission. However, the data and its entry
are not validated with the same rigor as in the
IV&V of the software.
Recommendations (lOc):
The Comminee recommends that NASA: explore
the feasibility of performing FMEAs on software,
including the e,Fficacy of identifying and predicting
fault and error modes; request JSC SR&QA to
provide periodic review and oversight of software
from a quality assurance point of view; provide
for validation of input data in a manner similar to
software validation and verification.
5.10.4 Differences in Procedures Among NASA
Centers
Differences in the procedures being used by
the main NASA centers involved in the NSTS
Program may reflect an imbalance between
the authority of the centers and that of the
NSTS Program Office. The Committee is con-
cerned that such an imbalance can lead to
serious problems in large programs where two
or more centers have major roles in what must
be a tightly integrated program, such as the
NSTS and Space Station. Without strong,
central program direction and integration, the
success and safety of these complex programs
can be placed m jeopardy.
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In March 1986, the NASA Associate Adminis-
trator for Space Flight and the Manager of the
Level II NSTS Program issued memoranda setting
forth NASA's strategy for returning the Space
Shuttle safely to flight status. Their orders rescinded
all Criticality 1, IR, and 1S waivers and required
that they be resubmitted for approval. The process
also required the reevaluation of all FMEA/CILs
and retention rationales, as well as hazard analyses.
Other instructions required that a contractor be
selected for each STS element (that contractor not
otherwise being involved in work on the element)
to conduct an independent FMEA/C1L. No specific
guidelines were issued by the NSTS Office for the
conduct of the independent evaluations; the meth-
ods to be used were determined by the NASA
centers concerned. Also, the FMEA/CIL reevalua-
tions were initiated using pre-51L FMEA/CIL in-
structions, in which there were differences in ground
rules between JSC and MSFC. (In October 1986,
the NSTS Program Office issued new uniform
instructions, NSTS 22206, for the preparation of
FMEA/CILs, but it took several months for revised
directions to reach the STS contractors.) Thus,
some differences emerged in the nature and results
of the reevaluation conducted by different con-
tractors,
Thesedifferencesareespeciallynoticeablewith
respecto theFMEA/CIL reevaluationprocedures.
TheCommitteefoundthat, at MSFC,all contrac-
tors hadbeeninstructedto conducta newFMEA,
"from scratch."At JSC,the independentcontrac-
tors were told to prepare a new FMEA, but the
prime contractors were instructed to reevaluate the
existing FMEA. At KSC, where FMEAs are con-
ducted only on ground support equipment, a single
group (not the original designer) was reevaluating
each category of FMEA, working with the existing
FMEA. Procedures with respect to the independent
reviews also differed. At MSFC, the independent
contractor first performed its FMEA and developed
any necessary retention rationales; it then com-
pared those results with the FMEAs and retention
rationales prepared by the prime contractor and
wrote specific Review Item Discrepancies (RIDs)
on points of difference or disagreement. At JSC,
no RIDs were written and no retention rationales
wcrc prepared bv the independent contractor. Fur-
tbcrmorc, some Orbiter subsystems wcrc initially
cxc]udcd from the review.
Initially, the Committee was concerned that these
differences in procedure might reduce the validity
and effectiveness of the FMEA/CII. reevaluation
process. Howe_cr, an audit by the Committee of
the documentation and review process used by .ISC
in the casc of the Orbiter indicated that it is a
reasonable alternative to the RID process employed
by MSFC. Nevertheless, the Committee suggested
in its second interim report to NASA (see Appendix
C) that the NSTS Program Office "review the
FMEA/CIL reevaluation processes as implemented
for each STS element to assure itself that any
differences will not compromise the quality and
completeness of the overall STS FMEA/CIL effort."
This more specific concern for procedural dif-
ferences led, moreover, to a broader concern over
the nature of management control within NASA.
Differences in procedures used by the NASA centers
in this context and others (e.g., with respect to the
independence of STS certification, as discussed in
Section 5.8) lead the Committee to suspect that an
imbalance may exist between the authority of the
centers and that of the NSTS Program Office. The
Committee is concerned that such an imbalance
can lead to serious problems in large programs
where two or more centers have major roles in
what must be a tightly integrated program, such
as the NSTS and Space Station. Without strong,
central program direction and integration, the suc-
tess and safety of these complex programs can be
placed in jeopardy.
Recommendation (10d):
The Administrator should ensure that strong,
central program direction and integration of all
aspects of the STS are" maintained via the NSTS
Program Office.
5.10.5 Use of Non-Destructive Evaluation Techniques
Non-destructive evaluation (NDE) tests on
the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) are performed
at the manufacturing plant. Subsequent trans-
portation and assembly introduce a risk of
dcbonding and other damage which may not
be apparent upon visual inspection. No NDE
ix done on the SRMs in the "stacked" config-
uration at the launch facility.
New NI)E techniques now being deveh, ped
have potential applicability to the STS.
Problems have bccn detected by NASA and its
contractor on the STS Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)
with debondmg between the propellant, liner, in-
sulation, and case. In April 1986, a USAF Titan
34D (comparable in design to the SRM) experi-
enced a destructive failure shortly after launch, due
to debondmg. No such severe consequences have
been seen from SRM debonding, but bond line
problems are nevertheless viewed as critical failure
modes, especially given the redesign of the SRM
joints. Voids within the propellant mass are also
of concern. Destructive inspection of the SRM (e.g.,
cutting and probing) is not feasible, so non-destruc-
tive methods must be used. On the SRM, most of
these tests are performed at the manufacturing
plant; later transportation and assembly introduce
a risk of debonding and other damage which may
be more difficult to detect at the launch site.
There are essentially two issues here: the tech-
niques employed and the location where inspection
is done. Shuttle SRM NDE assessment to date has
employed a combination of visual, ultrasonic, and
radiographic techniques. The range of NDE tech-
niques considered by NASA (but not necessarily
tested) as of January 1987 is shown in Table 5-1.
According to NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel, acoustic and thermographic techniques are
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TABLE 5-1 Non-Destructive Evaluation Methods Considered By NASA
Method Looks For Remarks
Ultrasonics Unbonds: case/insulation, inhibitor/propellant, and propel- Propellant/liner to be confirmed.
Radial radiography
Tangential
radiography
Thermography
Mechanical
Oblique-light
video
Computed
tomography
Holography
Acoustic emission
lant/liner
Propellant voids/inclusions
Gapped unbonds: Propellant/liner, flap bonds, and flap
bulb configuration
Unbonds: case/insulation inhibitor/propellant, and propel-
lant/liner
Unbonds: near joint end case/insulation
Gapped edge unbonds: case/insulation and inhibitor/pro-
pellant
Gapped unbonds: all intersecting interfaces, propellant
voids/inclusions
Unbonds: near joint end case/insulation
Unbonds: case/insulation
Limited experience base;
prop/liner to be confirmed
Complex insulation geometry
Magnifies and automates visual
unbond inspection
Long term
Excitation and scale concerns
Long term
(Source NASA MSFC)
thought to be those with the greatest near-term
potential for improving NDE capabilities with
respect to the SRM. t_ Another promising group of
techniques is based on X-ray technology. The
USAF, in its Titan recovery program, has empha-
sized NDE techniques including ultrasonic, thcr-
mographic, and X-ray. _ Similar efforts arc being
pursued in the Navy's Trident program._4
With respect to the issue of location, NASA has
determined that the "stacked" configuration of the
SRM is not amenable to NDE of critical areas
using available methods. However, NASA engi-
neers believe that the assembly, rollout, and pad
hold-down loads on the SRM will not cause de-
bonding. Therefore, inspections are conducted at
key processing points in the plant and at critical
SRM segment locations before stacking at Kennedy
Space Center. Nevertheless, the Committee remains
concerned about the possibility of damage resulting
from transportation, assembly, and rollout.
We recognize that NASA is (and has been) paying
serious attention to the NDE issue. However, we
believe that the technologies are developing rapidly
enough that continued close attention is warranted.
Recommendation (10e):
The Committee recommends that NASA apply
all practicable NDE techniques to the SRM at the
launch facility, at the highest possible level of
assembly (e.g., SRMs in the "stacked" configura-
_-' NASA: Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report h_r 1986
(February 1987).
_ Lt. Col. Frank Gayer, USAF Space Division, personal communica-
tion.
_4 Dale Kenemuth, SP-273, Dept. of the Navy, personal communica-
tion.
tion), and enlphasize development of improved
NDE methods.
5.11 FOCUS ON RISK MANAGEMENT
The current safety assessment processes used
by NASA do not establish objectively the levels
of the various risks associated with the failure
modes and hazards.
It is not reasonable to expect that NASA
management or its panels and boards can
provide their own detailed assessments of the
risks associated with failure modes and haz-
ards presented to them for acceptance.
Validation and certification test programs
are not planned or evaluated as quantitative
inputs to safety risk assessments. Neither are
operating conditions and environmental con-
straints which may control the safety risks
adequately defined and evaluated.
In the Committee's view, the lack of objec-
tive, measurable assessments in the above areas
hinders the implementation of an effective risk
management program, including the reduction
or elimination of risks.
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Throughout its audit the Committee was shown
an extensive amount of information related to
program flow charts, organizations, review panels
and boards, information transmission, and reports.
But the Committee did not become aware of an
organization and safety-engineering methodology
that could effectively provide an objective assess-
ment of risk, as described in Section 4. Throughout
the flow of NASA reports and approvals, both
before the 51-L mission and after, judgments are
made and statements of assurance given by persons
at every level which are based on data and assertions
having a wide range of validity. The Committee
believes that it is not reasonable to expect program
management or NASA Level I management to
provide its own in-depth evaluation of presented
hazard risks. Nor will other panels or boards be
able to do so without the necessary professional
staff work being done. That work, in turn, cannot
be performed without methods for assessing risk
and controlling hazards. The methods must include
the establishment of criteria for design margins
which are consistent with the acceptable levels of
risk.
The Associate Administrator for SRM&QA, in
his new plan for management of NASA's SR&QA
activities, stipulates that the SR&QA directors of
the NASA centers are responsible for assuring the
safety of their Center's products and services.
However, we conclude that unless the safety or-
ganizations at the centers have (1) the appropriate
methodology and tools (both analysis programs
and personnel), and (2) the authority to establish
criteria for safety margins, specific requirements on
verification test programs, environmental con-
straints on operations, and total flight configuration
validation, they cannot be held responsible for
assuring an acceptable level of safety of flight
systems. (In fact, they can never "assure safety,"
but only assure that the risks have been assessed
objectively by approved methodologies, and that
they are being controlled to the levels accepted by
the appropriate NASA authorities.)
Figure 5-12 shows that even in the current post-
51-L planning, the final result of the hazard analysis
and safety assessment process is a NASA Space
Shuttle Hazards Data Base. Having an approved
list of accepted, identified hazards and a sophisti-
cated closed-loop accounting and review system
(the SLAP) may be useful. However, nearly every
catastrophic accident since the beginning of the
missile and space programs was caused by some
already-identified hazard related to potential failure
modes. The essence of safety-risk management, in
the Committee's view, is not just the identification
and acceptance of potential hazards, nor even the
performance of a risk assessment for each failure
mode and hazard; it is getting control of the
conditions which turn potential into real. The
FMEAs, CILs, hazard reports, and safety assess-
ments identify risks, summarize information, ref-
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erence data, provide status, etc. They do not analyze
or establish the risk levels. Neither do they assess
quantitatively the validity of the test programs in
establishing failure margins, or define the operating
conditions or environmental constraints which af-
fect the risk levels.
We believe that the key requirements and con-
cepts contained in various relevant NASA docu-
ments (see Section 3, for example) provide a good
overall framework within which a comprehensive
systems safety and risk management program could
be defined and implemented. It is the opinion of
the Committee that such a program would require
bringing together appropriate activities into a fo-
cused "Systems Safety Engineering" (SSE) function
at both Headquarters and the centers. This SSE
function would apply across the entire set of design,
development, qualification and certification, and
operations activities of the NSTS. These activities
would be an integral engineering element of the
NSTS Program. They would involve more than just
the preparation of reviews, reports, or data pack-
ages. Instead, systems safety engineering would
combine the functions of reliability and systems
safety analysis. It should be responsible for defining
the requirements and procedures, and performing
or managing, as appropriate, at least the following
functions which comprise the basis of a risk as-
sessment and risk management system:
1. Identification of failure modes and effects
2. Establishment of design criteria for redun-
dancy
3. Identification of hazards and their potential
consequences
4. Identification of critical items
5. Evaluation of the probability of occurrence
of causes and consequences of failure modes
and hazards
6. Establishment of safety-risk level criteria for
design margins and hazard controls
7. Design of qualification and certification test
programs
8. Objective assessment of safety risks
9. Development of acceptance rationale for
retained hazards and hazard reports
10. Specification of environmental and operat-
ing constraints at all levels (parts, subsystem,
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12.
element, and system) to assure that validated
margins are not violated
Quantitative evaluation of flight data to
update safety margin validations
Oversight of quality assurance functions to
control safety risks
13. Overall system safety risk assessment and
definition of the potential to reduce the level
of risk.
All of the above systems safety engineering func-
tions (elaborated upon in Appendix F) are necessary
both for achieving credible risk assessment and for
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defining the risk controls requiredto justify ac-
ceptanceofcriticalfailuremodesandother hazards.
During design and development, the quantitative
evaluation of relative risks for each design against
acceptable criteria for levels of risk should be
considered as an integral part of the systems en-
gineering activity. These activities also would pro-
vide a definitive basis for establishing the design
margins and operational constraints needed to
reduce the overall risk to the accepted level and
subsequently control the risk.
Function 13 above (definition of the potential to
reduce the level of risk) is an essential input to risk
management. The Committee has the impression
that changes to the STS often are considered only
if they will improve its performance or reduce risks
to that level which has previously been accepted
in the program. The Committee believes that such
risks, accepted in the past, logical as that may have
appeared to be at the time, should not continue to
be accepted without a concentrated effort to plan
and implement a program to remove or reduce
these risks.
The magnitude of the preceding tasks point to
the need for a large number of highly qualified
profcssional systems safety engineers (i.e., svstcms
engineers with a safety orientation) at NASA and
at its major contractors. We were disturbed to
learn from the Director of the Safety Division at
Headquarters SRM&QA that, as of April 25, 1987,
he had only one professional systems safety engi-
neer m his division, and that he expects to add
only two more in the near term and four additional
ones in the long term. It is troubling to the
Committee that this important and extremely com-
plex systems engineering function should be so
scvcrely constrained by staff limitations, in light of
the cost of the Shuttle and the risk to its crew.
Taken together, the tasks listed above have the
highest leverage on overall risk assessment and the
control of the causes of hazard. Only professionally
dedicated systems safety engineers working to-
gether can develop the expertise and motivation to
carry ()tit these functions properly. They can per-
form thcir control of validation and certification
programs in an objective way (if not functionally
assigned to program organizations). The need for
independent entities to perform certification and
software IV&V to provide substantiation and con-
fidence was discussed in Section 5.8. This risk-
managed approach to the validation and certifi-
cation functions, including the feedback of flight
data, should not be done by those responsible for
design and development. They are performance
oriented; they generally do not design hardware
configurations to facilitate margin validation, and
their proposed certification programs usually are
not oriented to the demonstration of failure mar-
gins.
Finally, it seems to the Committee that it is not
managerially reasonable to make an organization
responsible for holding system safety to an agreed
level of risk without according it responsibility and
authority over all of the above functions, which
actually control the risks.
Another major element of an overall risk man-
agement program is the quality assurance (QA)
function. Quality assurance certifies that the hard-
ware and software have been produced to the exact
designs which describe the validated and qualified
system. The "'configuration" includes all aspects of
the hardware and software, including the environ-
ments which in any way influence the properties
of materials, stress margins, or temporal behavior
of parts, subsystems, and elements.
In 1986, responsibility for policy and oversight
of thc quality assurance function was assigned to
the new office of the Associate Administrator for
SP, M&QA. This is appropriate, because overall
risk management and total systems safety are
dependent on the quality assurance function
throughout NASA. The QA function should be
performed separately from the systems safety en-
gineering functions (although there is certainly a
strong oversight interaction between the two).
Quality assurance should be a responsibility of
cach NASA center (and, of course, each contractor).
Its purpose is not to design but to control and
assure. As part of this function it should control
the entire set of final released engineering docu-
ments describing the complete configuration of the
system. As the Committee understands it, that is
precisely NASA's current practice.
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Recommendations (11):
The Committee recontmends that NASA con-
sider establishing a focused agency-wide Systems
Safety Engineering (SSE) function, at both Head-
quarters and the centers, which would:
--he structured so as to be integrally involved in
the entire set of design, developnlent, validation,
qualification, and certification activities;
--provide a [tell systems approach to the continuous
identification of safety risks (not just failure
modes and hazards) and the objective (quanti-
tative) evaluation of such safety risks;
--provide the output of this function to the NASA
Program Directors in support of their risk man-
agement;
--support the Program Directors by providing
assurance that their systems are ready for final
safety certification to the risk levels established
by the NASA Administrator.
The Committee also recommends that the STS
risk management program, based in part on the
definition of the potential to reduce the level of
risk developed by the system safety risk assessment,
include a concerted effort to remove or reduce the
risks.
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6 Lessons Learned
Although this report and its recommendations
are directed to the NSTS Program, they are of
broader applicability. It would be wise to consider
the lessons learned by the Committee when struc-
tt, ring a risk assessment and management system
for other programs with similar characteristics,
such as the Spacc Station Program. These charac-
teristics would include large size, use of highly
complex technology, and major participation by
several NASA centers and prime contractors. The
following are generalized conclusions derived from
the preceding sections. Numbers in parentheses
refer to the principal sections of the report from
which the conclusions were derived.
6.1 ELEMENTS OF AND
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK
ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT
In the Committee's view, any large, complex,
multi-center program should entail an overall risk
assessment and risk management process which
includes the following basic elements:
Risk assessment:
--A comprehensive method for identifying po-
tential failure modes and hazards associated with
the system.
--A specific, quantitative methodology for iden-
tifying and assessing (or estimating) the safety risks
of the system.
Risk management:
--A management process by which the safety
risks can be brought to levels or values that are
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acceptable to the final approval authority. Risk
management includes establishment of acceptable
risk levels; the institution of changes in system
design or operational methods to achieve such risk
levels; system validation and certification; and
svstcm quality assurance. (4.1)
The (7ommittcc believes that risk management
must bc the responsibility of line management (i.e.,
the program manager and, ultimately, the Admin-
istrator of NASA). Only this program management,
not the safety organizations, can make judicious
use of the means available to achieve the opera-
tional goals while reducing the safety risks to
acceptable levels. The safety organizations at NASA
centers and Headquarters are staff organizations--
i.e., they can and should be responsible for provid-
ing the assessments of a system's risks. They should
also bc responsible for assuring that the activities
associated with controlling the risks to the levels
assessed have been carried out and documented.
Safety organizations cannot, however, assure safe
operation; they can only assure that the safety risks
have been properly evaluated, and that the system
configuration and operation is being controlled to
those risk levels which have been accepted by top
management. (4.1, 4.3)
In each such major program, the risk assessment
and management processes should be supported
by a focused agency-wide Systems Safety Engi-
neering function, at both Headquarters and the
centers involved in the program, which would:
--be structured so as to be integrally inw)lved
in the entire set of design, development, validation,
and qualification activities;
--provide a full systems approach to the contin-
uous identification of safety risks (not just failure
modesandhazards)andtheobjective(quantitative)
evaluationof suchsafetyrisks;
--provide the output of this function to the
programdirectorinsupportof his riskmanagement
process;
--support the progranl director by providing
assurancethat his systemis readyfor final safety
certification to the risk levelsestablishedby the
NASAAdministrator.(5.1l)
This focusedsystemssafetyengineeringwould
combine the functionsof reliability and systems
safetyanalysis.It shouldberesponsiblefor defining
the requirementsand proccdures,and performing
or managing,asappropriate,at leastthefollowing
functionswhichshouldcomprisethebasisof arisk
assessmentand risk managementsystem:
1. Identificationof failuremodesand effects
2. Establishmentof designcriteria for redun-
dancy
3. Identificationof hazardsandtheir potential
consequences
4. Identificationof critical items
. Evaluation of the probability of occurrence
of causes and consequences of failure modes
and hazards
6. Establishment of safety-risk level criteria for
design margins and hazard controls
7. Design of qualification and certification test
programs
8. Obiective assessment of safety risks
9. Development of acceptance rationale for
retained hazards and hazard reports
10. Specification of environmental and operat-
ing constraints at all levels (parts, units,
subsystem, element, and system) to assure
that validated margins are not violated
11. Quantitative evaluation of flight data to
update safety margin validations
12. Oversight of quality assurance functions to
control safety risks
13. Overall system safety risk assessment and
definition of the potential to reduce the level
of risk.
All of these systems safety engineering functions
(elaborated upon in Appendix F) are necessary
both for achieving credible risk assessment and for
defining the risk controls required to justify ac-
ceptance of critical failure modes and other hazards.
Durmg design and development, the quantitative
evaluation of relative risks for each design against
acceptable criteria for levels of risk should be
considered as an integral part of the systems en-
gineering activity. Finally, these activities would
provide a definitive basis for establishing the design
margins and operational constraints needed to
reduce the overall risk to the accepted level and
subsequently to control the risk. They also can
provide a rational basis for decisions on which
risks should be reduced through changes in design
or procedures. (5.11)
In controlling risks, there must be a formal,
continuing, and iterative linkage between the risk
assessment and risk management processes, on the
one hand, and the system's engineering change
activities, on the other. (5.4)
As a program moves toward its operational
phase, a system should be established for the rapid
and effective feedback of inspection and test results,
and repair and flight data into the risk assessment,
risk management, and decision making processes.
In the case of flight programs, this should include
ensuring that all mission anomalies detected in real
time and from recorded events, as well as those
detected during the near-term inspection of any
recovered hardware, are promptly fed into the
formal risk assessment and management processes
for action prior to committing to the next flight;
all such anomalies should be called to the immediate
attention of launch decision makers. (5.5)
6.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROGRAM
DIRECTION AND INTEGRATION
An imbalance between the authority of the NASA
centers and that of the Program Office could lead
to serious problems in a large program where two
or more centers have major roles in what must be
a tightly integrated program, such as the STS and
Space Station. Without strong, central direction
and integration, the success and safety of these
complex programs can be placcd in jeopardy. The
Administrator of NASA should ensure that strong
direction and integration of all aspects of such a
program are maintained at Levcl! via the Program
Office. (5.10.4) Therc also must be clear and
unambiguous direction of the program at all levels.
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Those responsiblefor decisionsshouldbe desig-
natedandknownto all. Boardsandpanelsshould
be advisory to thesepersonsand not decision
makingbodiesin themselves.(5.10.1)
6.3 THE NEED FOR QUANTITATIVE
MEASURES OF RELATIVE RISK
Top management and program attention should
be focused on those items with the greatest risk to
the safety of a system by means of a prioritization
of all contributors to the overall risk. (5.2) Ac-
ceptable levels of risk in each program should be
set by the Administrator of NASA. However,
suitable quantitative meast, res of risk, such as
probabilistic risk assessment, are required to ob-
lectively define the acceptable levels, track progress
toward achieving these levels, and evaluate alter-
hate courses of action to reduce risk. (5.6, 5.1 I)
6.4 THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED REVIEW
AND OVERVIEW IN THE ASSESSMENT OF
RISK, AND IN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION
OF RETENTION RATIONALES
Fhcrc should bc an integrated rcview process
which provides a comprehensive, overall assess-
merit of risk (including a13 #ldepe;tdettt evaluation,
constantly updated, of retention rationales) upon
which to base any decisions to grant waivers which
permit operating with items that appear on the
Critical Items List. (5.1, 5.3, 5.11) A balance is
ncedcd bcm'een "bottom-up" assessment tools (e.g.,
FMEA/CIL) and "top-down" analyses (e.g., hazard
analyses). In particular, thc "top-down" analysis
processes must encompass an integrated system-
wide engineering analysis, including a system safety
analysis. (5.7)
6.5 INDEPENDENCE OF THE
CERTIFICATION OF FLIGHT
HARDWARE AND OF SOFTWARE
VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION
Responsibility for approval of hardware certifi-
cation and software Independent Validation and
Verification (IV&V) should be vested in entities
separate from the program management structure
and the centers directly involved in the program's
development and operation. However, the latter
organizations should continue to conduct activities
supporting ccrtification and IV&V. (5.8)
6.6 SAFETY MARGINS FOR FLIGHT
STRUCTURES
Safety margins for flight structures should be
established which are in consonance with the ac-
cepted levels of safety risk for the program. How-
ever, great care is needed to properly verify that
the margins have been achieved and are maintained
in the flight structures. Verification can include the
use of analytical models, but should be supported
by static tests before flight, and--in the case of
reusable flight hardware--continued monitoring in
flight by permanently instrumenting, calibrating,
and analyzing data from a representative flight
system. Also, in the case of reusable hardware and
man-rated systems destined to remain in orbit for
long periods of time, comprehensive plans should
be developed and implemented for conducting
periodic inspection and maintenance of the struc-
ture of each system throughout the service life of
each vehicle or platform. (5.10.2)
6.7 OTHER
There are other important factors in risk assess-
ment and management which have been discussed
m this report with respect to the STS as it existed
following the Challenger accident. However, they
are items which are considered to be less important
than those enumerated above or not generally
applicable to several other programs. Where ap-
plicable, they certainly should be given serious
consideration in structuring the risk assessment and
management program. These other factors are
listed here by title and section reference:
Operational Issues (5.9)
--Launch Commit Criteria Waiver Policy (5.9.1)
--Human Factors as a Contributor to Risk
(5.9.2)
--Cannibalization of Spare Parts (5.9.3)
Other Weaknesses in Risk Assessment and Man-
agement (5.10)
--Software Issues (5.10.3)
--Use of Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE)
Techniques (5.10.5).
For any new program, such as the Space Station,
there is the opportunity to structure an optimum
risk assessment and management program at the
outset which builds on the experience gained in
the NSTS Program and assembles those techniques
which will be most effective in establishing, mon-
itoring, and controlling risks to accepted levels.
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS
Acrotlyms:
AFSIG
ALT
APU
ASAP
BFS
CB
CCB
CCP
CDR
CFA
C!
CIL
CIRA
CR
DCR
DER
DES
i) R
ERB
EtFA
EMF
ET
Ascent Flight Systems Integration Group
Approach and Landing Test
Auxiliary I}ower Unit (in the Orbiter)
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Backup Flight System
Control Board (generic)
Configuration Control Board
Configuration Control Panel
Critical Design Review
Critical Functions Assessment
Configuration Inspection
Critical Items last
Critical Item Risk Assessment
Change Request
Design Certification Review
Designated Engineering Representative (for the FAA)
Data Exchange System
Discrepancy Rep{}rt
Engineering Review Board
Element interface Functional Analysis
Electromotive force
External Tank
FAA
FACI
FAP
FMEA
FMEA/CIL
FRR
GFE
GPC
GSE
HA
HPU
HQ
HR
IBM
IHA
IUS
IV&V
JSC
KSC
Federal Aviation Administration
First Article Configuration Inspection
Failure Analysis Program
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, and Critical Items List
Flight Readiness Review
Government Furnished Equipment
General Purpose Computer (on the Orbiter)
Ground Support Equipment
Hazard Analysis
Hydraulic Power Unit (in the SRB)
Headquarters (of NASA)
Hazard Report
International Business Machines
Integrated Hazard Analysis
Inertial Upper Stage
Independent Validation and Verification
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
PRECF_R)ING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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PA_Q
LCC
I.I.S
I,RI_J
LOV
MET
MFG
MICB
MOD
MPTA
MSA
MSFC
MVGVT
NASA
NDE
NHB
NMI
NPD
NRC
NSIS
NSTS
OASCB
OM!
OMRS
OMRSD
PASS
PCASS
PDR
PR
PRA
PRACA
PRCB
QA
QRA
QRM
RID
RISD
RMPP
SAIL
SASCB
SASR
SCA
SCAP
SCRHAAC
SHIMS
SIAP
SIMR
SIR
SR&QA
Launch Commit Criteria
Launch and Landing Site
Line Replaceable Unit
Loss of Vehicle
Mission Evaluation Team
Manufacturing
Mission Integration Control Board
Mission Operations Directorate (at JSC)
Main Propulsion Test Article
Mission Safety Assessment
Marshall Space Flight Center
Mated Vehicle Ground Vibration Test
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Non-Destructive Evaluation
NASA Handbook
NASA Management Instruction
NASA Policy Directive
National Research Council
NASA Safety Information System
National Space Transportation System
Orbiter Avionics Software Control Board
Operations and Maintenance Instructions
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
Primary Avionics Software System
Program Compliance Assurance Status System
Preliminary Design Review
Problem Report
Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (system)
Program Requirements Control Board
Quality Assurance
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Quantitative Risk Model
Review Item Discrepancy (report)
Rockwell International, Space Division
Risk Management Program Plan
Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory
Shuttle Avionics Software Control Board
Shuttle Avionics Systems Review
Shuttle Carrier Aircraft
Shuttle Configuration Analysis Program
Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee
Shuttle Hazard Information Management System
System Integrity Assurance Program
Systems Integration Management Review
Systems Integration Review (board)
Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
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SRB
SRM
SRM&QA
SSE
SSM
SSME
SSUS
STS
UCR
USAF
VLS
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor (of the SRB)
Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance
Systems Safety Engineering
Subsystem Manager
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Space Shuttle Upper Stage
Space Transportation System
Unsatisfactory Condition Report
United States Air Force
Vandenberg Launch Site
Definitions:
Certification
Qualification
Validation
Verification
--consists of qualification tests, major ground tests, and other tests and/or analyses
required to determine that the design of hardware from component through
subsystem level meets requirements; a part of verification.
--is used in terms of qualification tests (see certification), to establish that an item
meets requirements.
--the confirmation of s()mc state or condition determined earlier.
--the process of planning and implementing a program that determines that Shuttle
systems meet all design, performance, and safety requirements. The verification
process (for both hardware and software) includes all development, certification
and acceptance testing, flight demonstration, appropriate pre-flight checkout,
post-flight activities, and analyses necessary to support verification.
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APPENDIX B
ESTABLISHING REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS
The Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit C()mmittee of the National Research Council
tlcld its opening meeting on Scptember 22, 1986, in Washington, D.C. This appendix contains the
following key refercnces leading up to its establishment.
Page
Report of the I'residential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, William P.
Rogers, Chairman, June 6, 1986. Excerpt: Vol. I, pp. 198-199, Rccommendations: introduction
and Recommendation III. 88
Letter from the President of the United States to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, June 13, 1986, directing that the recommendations of the Presidential
Commission be implemented. 90
Letter from the Administrator of NASA to the Chairman, National Research Council, July 3.
1986, requesting the NRC to form an audit panel as called for in Recommendation III of the
Prcsidcntia[ Commission. 91
l,etter from the Chairman of the National Research Council to the Administrator of NASA,
July 15, 1986, agreeing to cstablish an audit panel under the National Research Council. 93
Report to the President: Actions to hnplement the Recommendat,ms of The Presidential
(_ommission on the 5pace 3hutth' (;h,dlenger Accident, NASA, July 14, 1986, excerpt from
p. 19. 94
Statement of Task, Committee on Space Shuttle Criticality Revicw and Hazard Analysis Audit,
November 12, 1986 (revision). 95
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Presidenlial Commission
on Ihe
Space Shullle Challenger Accidenl
June 6, 1986
Dear Mr. President:
On behalf of the Commission, it is my privilege to present
the report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident.
Since being sworn in on February 6, 1986, the Commission
has been able to conduct a comprehensive investigation of the
Challenger accident. This report documents our findings and
makes recommendations for your consideration.
Our objective has been not only to prevent any recurrence
of the failure related to this accident, but to the extent pos-
sible to reduce other risks in future flights. However, the
Commission did not construe its mandate to require a detailed
evaluation of the entire Shuttle system. It fully recognizes
that the risk associated with space flight cannot be totally
eliminated.
Each member of the Commission shared the pain and anguish
the nation felt at the loss of seven brave Americans in the
Challenger accident on January 28, 1986.
The nation's task now is to move ahead to return to safe
space flight and to its recognized position of leadership in
space. There could be no more fitting tribute to the Challenger
crew than to do so.
Sincerely,
William P. Nogers
Chairman
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
6(X) Maryl,md Avcnu('. _.W. Washington, I).C 20024- (202)453 144)5
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EXCERPTS FROM:
Report of the Presidential Commission on the
Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
William P. Rogers, Chairman
June 6, 1986
Pages 198-199
Recommendations
T hc (;_)mmissi(m has c(mducted an ex-
tcnsive invcstigati<m _t tilt' Chalh'n-
g r a(¢ident t_ determine the prob-
_l.t)]e (+al.lSt. +tl+l(I ne(essalv corrective
acti_ms. Based _m thc lin(tings and (tetermmations
(_1 its investigati(m, the (:ommission has
unanim(mslv adopted recommendations to help
assure the return t_) sM'e tlight.
The (:<mttnission urges that the Administrator
<>t NASA submit, (>ne year from nov+', a report
t<_ the President on the progress that NASA has
nla&' in etli'cting the (;ommission's recornmen-
dati<ms set torth beh)w:
III
Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis.
NASA and the primary Shuttle c(mtractors
should review all Criticality 1, 1R, 2, and 2R
items and hazard analyses. This review should
identit\' those items that must be improved prior
to tlight to ensure mission success and flight safe-
tv. An Audit Panel, appointed by the National
Research Council, should verify the adequacy of
the eftort and report directly to the Administrator
of NASA.
89
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 13, 1986
Dear Jim:
I have completed my review of the report from the Commission
on the Space Shuttle CHALLENGER Accident. I believe that
a program must be undertaken to implement its recommenda-
tions as soon as possible. The procedural and organizational
changes suggested in the report will be essential to resuming
effective and efficient Space Transportation System operations,
and will be crucial in restoring U.S. space launch activities
to full operational status.
Specifically, I would like NASA to report back to me in
30 days on how and when the Commissionls recommendations
will be implemented. This report should include milestones
by which progress in the implementation process can be
measured.
Let me emphasize, as I have so many times, that the men
and women of NASA and the tasks they so ably perform are
essential to the nation if we are to retain our leadership
in the pursuit of technological and scientific progress.
Despite misfortunes and setbacks, we are determined to press
on in our space programs. Again, Jim, we turn to you for
leadership. You and the NASA team have our support and
our blessings to do what has to be done to make our space
program safe, reliable, and a source of pride to our nation
and of benefit to all mankind.
I look forward to receiving your report on implementing the
Commissionts recommendations.
The Honorable James C. Fletcher
Administrator
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546
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Nabonal Aeronautics and
Space Admtn_stration
Washington, D C
20546
Office of the Adm_n_st,-ator
JUL 3
Dr. Frank Press
Chairman
National Research Council
2101 Constitution Avenue
Washington, DC 20418
Dear Frank:
On May 20, 1986, I wrote to you requesting that the National Research
Council (NRC) form an oversight committee to review the work of NASA and our
contractors in the necessary redesign, retest, and recertification of the
Solid Rocket Motor (SRM). Your letter of June 2, 1986, provided NRC
acceptance of this request, and the committee is now heavily involved in its
work. I believe that a very effective relationship has been established among
the parties involved. These actions are consistent with the first
recommendation of the Presidential Con_nission on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident.
I must now, however, ask you for further assistance as we take the
actions necessary to return the Shuttle to flight status. Recommendation III
states that NASA and the primary Shuttle contractors should review all
Criticality i, IR, 2, and 2R items and hazard analyses and that the review
should identify those items that must be improved prior to flight to ensure
mission success and flight safety. The Commission also recommends that "An
audit panel appointed by the National Research Council should verify the
adequacy of the effort and report directly to the Administrator of NASA."
This letter is to request that the NRC form such an audit panel, verify the
adequacy of the effort, and report to me.
The review of these criticality items is under way within the STS program
at this time and is anticipated to be completed in early 1987. The current
review is being conducted at the individual project level with program level
reviews scheduled to begin in the fall. A review of our approach by your
panel would be most helpful prior to the beginning of the program level
reviews. Subsequent plans for participation by the panel in the process and
tile reviews will be developed following this initial review.
NASA will provide the audit panel with access to all information and
technical data necessary to perform the functions of the review. Background
and orientation briefings will be provided by NASA and appropriate contractor
personnel to permit the panel to proceed with their assessment. Additional
meetings and data exchanges with NASA and/or contractor personnel will be
arranged as requested by the panel.
The principal NASA contact during the course of the review will be
Mr. Jay F. Honeycutt of the Office of Space Flight, telephone 453-1261.
The expense of the work of the committee will be covered by an addition to
NASW-3511.
I appreciate the willingness of the National Research Council to
undertake this audit responsibility.
Sincerely,
'/ C_] etcher
.."James
Administrator
/
J
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OF_II r OF [}H CHAIP,.M:\_'
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
P. IOI (-ONBTITLrTION' AVEN'UE x}_'AAFI]U(2TON', D (Z _0418
July 15, 1986
The Honorable
James C. Fletcher
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Jim:
I write in response to your letter of July 3, 1986,
requesting that the National Research Council appoint
an audit panel to review the NASA approach to resolving
flight-critical items. The National Research Council
will undertake this task, and will work to get started
expeditiously. As you know, members of the NRC staff
have already met with NASA headquarters management to
discuss the scope of this effort.
We will begin by having a one or two day scoping effort
to better understand the NASA criticality review system
as well as alternative review and evaluation procedures
that are used in analogous situations. Upon conclusion
of this first discussion, we should be ready to select a
panel and proceed with the effort.
Yours sincerely,
Chairman
cc: Philip E. Culbertson
Jay F. Honeycutt
THE NATIONAL RESEARCH co[r_crL IS THE PRINCIPAL OPERAVING A(zE_CY OF THE NATIONA.L ACADE,kPf OF %C[E\tE5 _,x,'D Dt_ "¢ATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING
TO SER_,T COUI:RMMEN'T AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Report to the President
Actions to Implement
the Recommendations
of The Presidential Commission
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
EXCERI'T FROM PAGE 19:
The Commission recommended that the
National Research Council (NCR) appoint
an Audit Panel to verify the adequacy of
this effort and report directly to the Admin-
istrator of NASA. This request has been
made by NASA and accepted by the NRC.
The NRC is forming the panel and NASA
will support them as required.
July 14, 1986
Washingnon, I).("
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Code Designator for Group:
Ccamdssion on Engineering and
Technical Systems
ASSEMBLY OR OCM_ISSION
Ccamdttee on Space Shuttle Criticality
Review and Hazard Analysis Audit
C_[FYfEE
Aeronautics and Space Eng'g. Board
DIVISION, OFFICE OR BOARD SUB-UNIT
OF TASK
(Make clear what is expected of the group described and by whc_ the project
is sponsored. Limit to not more than this page. )
As reccmmerded in the report of the Presidential Ccmmdssion on the Space
Shuttle Challenger Accident, the Committee will audit the review by NASA and
its primary Shuttle contractors leading to the identification by NASA of
those items that _st be improved prior to resumption of flight to ensure
mission suocess and flight safety. Particular attention will be given to the
Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA) , Critical Item Lists (CIL), and
Hazard Analyses. The audit will corce_ntrate on procedures, techniques, and a
sampling of specific actions taken by NASA and the contractors in order to
verify the adequacy of the effort. Tne results of the audit will be reported
directly to the Administrator of NASA by a series of letter reports and a
final report.
The Executive Committee of the Governing Board of the National Researv_
Council approved this effort at its meeting on August 26, 1986
The work of the Ommnittee is carried out under Contract No. NASW-3511
with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
November 14, 1986
Date of Statement
September 5, 1986
(Date of previous statement if applicable)
RECORDS FORM #i
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APPENDIX C
LETTER REPORTS TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF NASA
AND NASA RESPONSE
Prior to this final report, the Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee issued
two interim letter reports to the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
The Administrator of NASA provided a response to the Committee regarding the first interim report. It
also was referenced in NASA's Report to the President of June 1987. These documents are contained in
this appendix.
Page
First interim letter report to the Administrator of NASA fron3 Committee Chairman Alton D.
Slay, .January 13, 1987, 4 pp. 98
Reply to Committee Chairman Alton D. Slay from the Administrator of NASA regarding the
first report, April 22, 1987 102
Report to the President: Implementation of the Recommendations of The Presidential Commission
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, NASA, June 1987, excerpts from pp. 41-42 104
Second interim letter report to the Administrator of NASA from Committee Chairman Alton
I). Slay, July 22, 1987, 8 pp. 107
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AERONAUTICS AND SPA(£
ENGINEERING BOARD
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
COMMISSION ON ENGINEERING AND TEC!INICAL S_STEMS
21L/1L onMllulton A_t,nuv _\a_tlm_hq_ D _ 2Li41_
January 13, 1987
The Honorable James C. Fletc/%er
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Jim:
This is an interim progress report of the Shuttle Criticality Review
and Hazard Analysis Audit Cc_ttee. _ National Researc/% Council
formed this cc_ttee in response to your request for an audit of the
NASA response to the Presidential C_ssion _ticn III
rsgazding criticality review and hazard analysis.
The Committee has been a functioning entity since its first meeting on
September 22, 1986. We have thus far received presentations from and
engaged in detailed discussions with NASA Headquarters, the National
Space Transportation System program office, Johnson Space Center,
Marshall Space Flight Center, and Kennedy Space Center. similar
meetings were held at Rocketdyne (Space Shuttle Main Engine) and
_i International (Orbiter), and by a working group at Morton
Thiokol (Solid Rocket Motor). All of the participants described their
efforts and progress in reevaluating the Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) status and in reassess-
ing hazard analysis and risk management. _ Committee also has
received a briefing on and discussed the p_ being used by the
U.S. Air Force Systems Ccmmard-Space Division to determine launch
readiness and safety status. %_ne Titan 34D Recovery Program was
described as an exa_le.
%_ne Ccranittee has been favorably impressed by the dedicated effort
extremely beneficial results obtained thus far frQm the FMEA/CIL and
hazard analysis p_. We are very appreciative of the frank and
open manner in which NASA and contractor personnel have worked with
the Cc_mittee. Our suggestions have been received in a very respon-
sive manner in all quarters. We wish to commerd Admiral Truly, Arnold
Aldrich and the NASA Shuttle team involved in the FMEA/CIL-hazard
analysis processes for the significant work they have performed so
far. Although our general impressions are favorable, _ do have some
suggestions for improwm_.nt. In summary, they are:
Criticality 1 and IR items should be assigned priorities
based on the probability of _.
o Since many of the Criticality 1 and IR items differ substan-
tially in terms of the probability of failure, NASA should
consider modifying the definition of critical it_m_ to
account for these diff--.
The National Research Coumnl ts the principal operating agency o[ the National Academy o[ Sclentes and the Nahonal Academy o[ Engmcenng
to serue government and other organizations
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NASA should incorporate its present total syst_ review proce-
dures in an integrated systems assessment process coupled
closely with the FMEA/CIL reevaluation now being undertaken.
Linkage between the STS eng_ing change activities and the
FMEA/CIL-hazard analysis processes should be assured.
SETTING PRIORITIES FOR CRITICALITY 1 AND IR
NASA does not now set priorities for Criticality 1 and IR items nor
does it consider the probability of oocurrence of an event in the
treatment of these items. Tne Ccmm/ttee _ that NASA devise
some mechani_ for and assign priorities to the Criticality 1 and IR
items. It suc_ests that probability of occurrsr_ should be an
important element of any such priority reasoning. Basing priorities
on this fundamental _ of risk will help NASA and those
interested in its progress to evaluate the adequacy of changes being
made to Shuttle hardware, software, or procedures in the interest of
enhancing safety.
Essential to the success of any risk assessment process is the certain
and timely feedback of preflight and postflight system performance
data, along with test data and failure or degradation reports. Such
inputs are critical to any sucoessful FMEA/CIL and hazard analysis
program and can form the basis for more precise evaluation of risk.
While it is clear to the flmmuittee that these data are used in readi-
ness reviews and other NASA activities, it is not clear that they are
used in the FMEA/CIL or hazard analysis processes. Tne C_ttee
believes that this information can, if properly used, assist greatly
in the FMEA/CIL and hazard analysis prooesses and in the determination
of priorities.
Tne present decision-making process within NASA with regard to
FMEA/CIL appears to be based on the judgment of experienced practitio-
ners and has received very little contribution frum quantitative anal-
ysis. We believe that the failure of NASA to use numerical ted%niques
as an input to decision-making detracts from the ov_l effectiveness
of the FMEA/CIL and hazard analysis processes. Such techniques could
provide a more realistic assessment of risk, at least on a relative
basis. We do not wish to suggest that NASA subordinate technical
judgment to numerical analysis. Such an approach would be, in cur
opinion, unrewarding and perhaps counterproductive.
Currently waiver authority for all Criticality 1 and IR it,s rests
with NASA Level I. _he Cc_ttee believes that Level I should focus
its attention on the highest priority items resulting from the
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suggested selection process, alc_g with the rationale that produced
the priority rating. The waiver decision authority for the remainder
of the Criticality 1 and IR items should be delegated to Levels II and
perhaps Ill.
DEFINITION OF (_TTICALITY CATEGORIES
The Ommnittee notes that the dedicated _ of the entire NASA
organization and its contractors has produced a variety of items
which, by precise definition, _ be placed in the Criticality 1 or
IR categories. Many of the items differ m/bstantially fzr_ one
in terms of the probability of failure or malperformance and
thus their potential impact on Shuttle operational safety.
Ccmmittee suqqests that NASA consider a mcxiification of the Critical
Items List to account for these differerces, help the priority
selection process, and better focus present or future efforts to
achieve safer Shuttle operations.
INTEGRATED SPACE TRANSPORT3%qqON SYSTEM ANALYSIS
Tne C_mittee understands that various mechanisms are being used by
NASA to examine total system operation, including propagation of fail-
ure modes to interfacing or physically adjaoent modules or subsystems.
_he Ccmnlttee does not perceive, _er, any formal relationship of
such evaluation methods to the ongoing FMEA/CIL process. The Ommnit-
tee suq_ests that NASA devise an integrated STS systems a____= nt
process which is closely coupled with the FMEA/CIL activity to assure
assessment of the truly critical safety elements in the STS.
includes all cumbinaticns of hardware/software/p_ failures and
cascading failures.
RELATION _-qWEEN FMEA/CIL-HAZARDANALYSIS AND DESI__
We note that many engineering changes have been _ since the
51-L accident to improve Shuttle safety prior to resumption of flight,
now scheduled for February 1988. In parallel, the FMEA/CIL and hazard
analysis reevaluations are under way with ccmpletion expected during
the _ of 1987. THUS, the FMEA/CIL reevaluation may not adequate-
ly reflect all of the engineering changes, nor will there be time to
incorporate any substantial design changes that may be indicated by
the outcume of the FMEA/CIL reevaluation, hazard analyses, and related
activities. The Committee _ that NASA assure a close linking
between the STS engineering change activities and the FMEA/CIL-hazard
analysis processes.
I O0
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F0_JRE W_RK
The Ommuittee is ccrfcinuing its effort to audit the FMEA/CIL, hazard
analysis, and related prooesses dealing with risk _ .... nt. We have
planned additional visits to NASA oenters and oontractor facilities
where we will continue to examine the mechanisms used by NASA and its
contractors to pruvide for the uv_l safety of the STS as an inte-
grated system. We also will further refine some of the points raised
here in future reports to you. _hile we recognize that it is not
possible a priori to ensure mission success and flight safety, through
this review and audit we hope to assist NASA in taking those prudent
steps wh/ch will provide a reas_mble and responsible level of assur-
ance of flight safety. We will, of course, r_main in close contact
with your staff thr_cut this activity.
cc: Admiral Richard H. Truly
S_ly yours,
Cummittee on Shuttle Criticality
Review and Hazard Analysis Audit
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APR 22 '98T
General Alton D. Slay
National Research Council
National Academy of Engineering
2101 Constitution Avenue, NW (NAS 307)
Washington, DC 20418
Dear A1 :
In reply to your January 13, 1987, interim progress report of the
Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis, your four
suggestions are repeated, along with NASA's response to each.
NRC Comment: "Criticality 1 and 1R items should be assigned priorities
based on the probability of occurrence." (This comment also suggested the use
of probability analysis techniques and the delegation of certain criticality
items to lower levels of the organization.)
NASA Response: The National Space Transportation System is in the
process of selecting and implementing a critical items prioritization
technique for the Shuttle program. Five different techniques have been
evaluated by review teams at JSC, MSFC, and KSC. One of these techniques has
been selected to be presented to the program manager at a Program Requirements
Control Board (PRCB) for baselining as a formal program requirement. The
chosen approach will overlay the existing Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) activity with minimum perturbation,
yet provide an effective measure of relative risk in order to focus future
review emphasis and resource allocations. In parallel with the prioritization
technique development, an effort is also under way to assess the utility of
probabilistic risk assessment in the NSTS FMEA/CIL process. Activities have
been initiated to engage two independent firms with expertise in probabilistic
risk assessment to perform detailed reviews of the orbiter auxiliary power
unit and the shuttle main propulsion pressurization system. A decision to
apply such probabilistic risk assessment techniques to other elements of the
Shuttle will depend upon assessments of the results and impacts of those
efforts and comparison of these results with the results of the mainline
FMEA/CIL activity. Delegating the review and approval of certain critical
items will be decided after the results of the prioritization and risk
assessment activities have been thoroughly assessed.
NRC Comment: "Since many of the Criticality 1 and 1R items differ
substantially in terms of the probability of failure, NASA should consider
modifying the definition of critical items to account for these differences."
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NASA Response: We expect the FMEA/CIL prioritization process Will
provide the necessary definitions and program focus in this regard.
NRC Comment: "NASA should incorporate its present total system review
procedures in an integrated systems assessment process coupled closely with
the FMEA/CIL reevaluation now being undertaken."
NASA Response: Since the Challenger accident, NASA has reemphasized its
risk management effort. An important feature of the revised effort must be a
"systems engineering" approach that integrates the various elements of the
risk management process to assure assessment of the combinations of hardware,
software, procedures, and cascading failures. NASA's new Associate
Administrator for Safety, Reliabilility, Maintainability and Quality Assurance
has been tasked to develop a new agencywide risk management system.
NRC Comment: "Linkage between the STS engineering change activities and
the FMEA/CIL hazard analysis processes should be assured."
NASA Response: Engineering changes are processed through the same Space
Shuttle configuration control boards that conduct the review of the
FMEA/CIL. A recent change to the procedure requires an assessment of each
change request to determine if it affects any Criticality I or 2 hardware.
The nature of the combined change control and FMEA/CIL processes is such that
the total process cannot be completed until the last change to be implemented
before flight has itself undergone a FMEA and been dispositioned by the
board. Regardless of the timetable established by the NSTS working schedule
for FMEA/CIL preparation and review, the changes that result will be dealt
with in the same manner as the generating FMEA items. All changes mandatory
for first flight will undergo the same rigor, even if this results in a flight
schedule impact. The NSTS Systems Design Reviews which began early last year
have significantly reduced the likelihood of new changes being identified that
have major schedule impacts.
The dedication of your committee and the sincerity of its comments are
very much appreciated by NASA. I hope you find our actions in response to
your suggestions to be both appropriate and timely. Thank you again for your
help.
Sincerely,
a_mes C{ Fletcher
/Administrator
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EIFA's have been conducted on ET/
orbiter, SSME/orbiter, and SRB/ET/orbiter
interfaces. These analyses have been
reviewed by NASA and the systems integra-
tion contractor, and the results are under
evaluation by the element project offices and
the NSTS Engineering Integration Office.
When this review is completed, the finalized
EIFA's will be presented to the PRCB for for-
real approval.
NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL AUDIT
The Shuttle Criticality Review and Haz-
ard Analysis Audit Committee of the
National Research Council (NRC), chaired
by retired USAF General Alton Slay, reports
directly to the NASA Administrator and is
responsible for verif,,,ing the adequacy of the
proposed actions for returning the Space
Shuttle to flight status (see Appendix F for
panel membership and a summary of
responsibilities}.
The committee has discussed the FMEAJ
CIL.,'HA reevaluation process with repre-
sentatives from NASA Headquarters, JSC,
KSC, and MSFC. Meetings have been held
at the centers and at Rockwell Internation-
al's Space Transportation Systems and
Rocketdyne divisions; Morton Thiokol;
United Space Boosters, Inc.; Sundstrand
Corporation; and NRC Headquarters. The
committee is evaluating the adequacy of the
review process, checking for continuity
across all elements of the program, and
reviewing changes that NASA and its con-
tractors have made since the accident.
A preliminary report was submitted to
the NASA Administrator on January 13,
1987, indicating that the committee has been
favorably impressed with the results obtained
from the FMEA,'CIL and hazard analysis
processes. While the committee's general
impressions were favorable, it did make some
suggestions for improvements. In summary,
these suggestions are: (I) Criticality 1 and IR
items should be assigned priorities based on
the probability of occurrence; (2) since many
of the Criticality 1 and 1R items differ sub-
stantially in terms of the probability of fail-
ure, NASA should consider modifying the
definition of critical items to account for
these differences; (3) NASA should incorpo-
rate its present system review procedures into
an integrated system assessment process
coupled closely with the FMEA/CIL reevalu-
ation now being undertaken; (4) linkage
between the STS engineering change activi-
ties and the FMEA/CIL/HA processes
should be provided.
NASA has responded to these sugges-
tions in the following manner:
1. Several candidate systems for prioritizing
critical items have been evaluated by each
of the projects. A hybrid system has been
developed that incorporates the positive
features of the candidate systems and spe-
cifically addresses probability of occur-
rence. The approach can be overlaid on
the existing FMEA activity with mini-
mum perturbation, providing an effective
measure of relative risk.
In parallel with the development of
prioritization techniques, an effort is
under way to determine the applicability
of probability risk assessment to the
FMEA/CIL process. This technique is
used in the nuclear power industry to pro-
vide relative-risk assessments. Two firms
with expertise in probability analysis have
been selected to perform detailed assess-
ments of the orbiter auxiliary power unit
and the main propulsion engine pressur-
ization system. A decision to apply proba-
bility analysis techniques to other systems
of the program will depend on the results
of these assessments.
2. The FMEA/CIL prioritization process
will provide the necessary program focus
and more definitive definitions in
response to the committee's concern
expressed in their second suggestion.
3. Since the accident, NASA has reempha-
sized its risk management effort. An
important feature of the revised effort is a
"systems engineering" approach that inte-
grates the various elements of hardware
and software failure analysis. Further dis-
cussion of risk management is included in
the response to Recommendation IV.
4. Engineering changes are processed
through the same project and program
control boards that conduct and approve
the reviews of the FMEA/CIL. Each
41
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change request will be assessed to deter-
mine if it affects any Criticality 1 or 2
hardware to ensure that the required link-
age is provided.
The NRC audit committee is reviewing
additional areas to identify potential meth-
ods of reducing risk. These include the design
qualification and flight certification pro-
cesses, launch commit criteria and waiver
policy, and the generation, review, and
approval of retention rationale for waivers to
critical items.
Also being reviewed are the overall
safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality
assurance program, the definition of struc-
tural analysis requirements, the establish-
ment and verification of analyses for margins
of safety, the risk management processes for
software, and the processes for analyzing pay-
load safety.
Interim findings and recommendations
from these reviews will be submitted to the
NASA Administrator through letter reports,
as required. The final report, anticipated in
1987, will include an assessment of the proce-
dures reviewed and recommendations for
improving the Shuttle risk management sys-
tem. As reports are received, any recommen-
dations included will be reviewed by NASA
and responses will be provided to NRC.
42
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AERONAUTIC S AND SPACE
ENGINEERING BOARD
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
COMMISSION ON ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL SYSTEMS
2101C_n_tltutlon Avenue %',_4hlEl_4ton D C 2ll41_
July 22, 1987
The Honorable James C. Fletcher
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546
Dear Jim:
I am pleased to provide this second interim progress report of the
National Research Council's C_ttee on Shuttle Criticality Peview and
Hazard Analysis Audit. I wish to thank you for your letter of April 22,
1987, in which you summarized the steps that the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) is taking in response to the suggestions in
our first report to you of January 13, 1987. The Committee is indeed
gratified by the progress NASA is making in strengthening the Space
Transportation System (STS) risk management program. We also appreciate
the continued close collaboration with NASA and contractor personnel, and
note the interest they show and their responsiveness to the Cccmnittee's
suggestions. The purpose of this letter is to react to the actions of
NASA taken in response to our first letter, and to comment on some
additional aspects of STS risk management.
Since our last report, the full Committee has met six more t_,
including visits to Marshall Space Flight Center, Kennedy Space Center,
again to Rocketdyne on the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), and with
Rockwell Space Transportation System Division on STS integration. Working
groups of the Committee also met at appropriate NASA centers and
contractors to review the risk management aspects of the Solid Rocket
Booster (SRB) ; orbiter Auxiliary Power unit (AI_d) and SRB Hydraulic Power
Unit (HI=J); Shuttle structural analysis, margins and verification; Orbiter
nose wheel steering; software; and Space Shuttle Main Engine. This
continued audit has allowed the Committee to evaluate the changes NASA is
making in the STS risk management processes and to identify some
additional views which we thought would be useful to share with you in
this interim report.
Regarding the response of NASA to the first report, the Cor_ttee's
reaction is, in summary:
o The work underway to assign priorities to Criticality 1 and IR
items appears to be a significant step forward. We also are
pleased to note the tests of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
now being conducted.
o The Committee looks forward to learning howthe prioritization
process will be used to redefine the critical items by taking
into account the differences in the probability of occurrence.
The Natto.al Research Council rs the principal operatl.g agency o[ the National Academy o¢ Sc:ences and the National Academy of Engineemng
to serve governraent and other organxzattons
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We enthusiastically support the agency-wide risk management
system now being developed. However, we are still concerned with
the apparent lack of consideration of the STS as a single,
complex system rather than a collection of subsystems.
The steps taken to link the engineering change control and the
Failure Modes and Effects Analyses/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL)
processes are both appropriate and welcome. We are also
reassured by your statement that the flight sc/ledule will not be
allowed to reduce the rigor with which the risk management tasks
will be conducted.
The Committee's continuing audit since our last interim report leads us to
provide initial comments on the following topics:
Persons involved in the STS program frequently give the
impression that decisions are made collectively by panels,
boards, etc., rather than by the responsible individuals. We
believe that the Administrator of NASA should periodically remind
the NASA organization of the specific individuals responsible for
final decisions based on the advice received from each advisory
body.
The new System Integrity Assurance Program (SIAP), especially its
Program Compliance Assurance and Status System (PCASS), now being
i_plemented by the National Space Transportation System (NSTS)
Program office, will be invaluable as a tool in support of STS
risk management. The STS failures data base, when completed, can
be of major importance in determining the probability that the
worst case effect postulated in the FMEA will actually occur.
The progress being made in improvements to the SSME as a result
of the FMEA/CIL reevaluation is very encouraging.
The changes being introduced in NASA Headquarters Safety,
Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA)
appear to be well planned and in the right direction. However,
we are concerned that it is not adequately staffed to cope with
the demands placed upon it, and recognize t_hat close
collaboration with the centers and program offices is necessary
to i_rove risk management in NASA.
A risk assessment report, based upon both the FMEA/CIL/retention
rationale and a ccmlorehensive hazard and safety assessment,
should be the basis for the acceptance rationale in considering
waivers to fly Criticality 1 components.
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o
There appear to have been unexplained differences among the STS
elements in the approach to and the rigor of the FMEA/CIL
reevaluations. The methods being used should be reviewed to
assure that any differenoes which exist will not ccmprcmise the
FMEA/CIL reevaluation process.
The panels and boards (Program Requirements Change Board, Flight
Readiness Review, etc. ) that advise key NASA decision makers are
not adequately staffed with people skilled in the statistical
sciences of data analysis, statistical inference, and
probabilistic risk assessment; persons with such skills should be
added to provide improved support of the decision making process.
A greater effort is needed to plan for additional elimination or
reduction of risks in the STS.
Following is an elaboration on these topics.
COMMENTS ON NASA RESPONSE
Settinq priorities for Criticality 1 and IR items
We are pleased to see the steps being taken to assign priorities to the
critical items. The Committee notes that the technique proposed for
implementation lends itself to the incorporation of quantitative measures
of risk and probabilities of occurrence as these measures are developed.
However, the Committee _es that care be taken to assure that over
simplified but potentially inaccurate quantitative measures are not used.
We have been assured by a representative of the NSTS office that the
prioritization process can be completed well before the next Shuttle
launch, which we believe to be an important consideration. We look
forward to learning how NASA plans to use the results of this process. I
can understand your desire to defer a decision to delegate from Level I of
NASA the review and approval of waivers on certain critical items until
you have assessed the results of the new prioritization and risk
assessment processes. However, the Committee believes that before the
next launch sc_e method should be used to assure that NASA Level I gives
special attention to the highest priority items identified through the
prioritization process.
The Committee is delighted to learn that NASA is testing the use of
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) on the APU and HFJ, and the Shuttle
main propulsion pressurization system. We also are aware of the SSME
certification process assessment study being conducted at the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, which includes a PRA of the SSME. The Cc_ttee
cautions NASA on its intention to evaluate PRA by ozmparing the results of
only two or three disparate tests of PRA with the results obtained earlier
by the FMEA/CIL process. The criterion should not only be whether a
significant new problem is identified by the PRA. The PRA test results
should be used by NASA to answer the questions: Would the PRA have helped
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in making NASA's original decisions, e.g., on a Criticality 1 waiver?
Would it have given more confidence in the decisions that were made? The
current sample size is too small to judge its merits when applied to the
entire STS or even a ccm_01ex element such as the Orbiter. The PRA should
increase in value as the scope of its coverage of the STS is widened. It
also should be useful in better understanding the nature of the failure
modes.
Inteqrated Space Transportation System analysis
The Committee is pleased to note that the NASA Associate Administrator for
SRM&QA has been directed to develop an agency-wide risk management
system. We believe that it is in_0ortant to call attention to the totality
of "risk management" as the sum of a number of separate processes which
ultimately must be considered on an integrated basis.
The Committee is still concerned that at the NSTS office at JSC we have
not found a consolidated, integrated STS systems er_ineering analysis,
including system safety analysis, that views the sum of the STS elements
as a single system. Such a "top-down" engineering analysis would help
avoid potential gaps which may exist as a result of the present very
thorough "bottom-up" analyses centered at the subsystem and element
project levels.
We have recently become aware of the Avionics Audit which is conducted by
Rockwell International-STS Division for the NSTS Program office. We
understand that this audit process will be expanded to embrace eventually
the entire STS. The Co_ttee believes that an expanded audit of this
type could serve as the nucleus of the needed integrated STS engineering
analysis in support of risk management.
Relation between FMEA/CIL-Hazard Analysis and desiqn chanqes
The Committee is reassured by the steps NASA has taken to tighten the
procedure for assessing the impact of any proposed design change on
Criticality 1 or 2 hardware; by the requirement that all changes
introduced before a flight must undergo a FMFA which also must be accepted
by the change board; and by your statement that the flight schedule will
not be permitted to reduce the rigor with which these risk management
tasks are conducted.
ON NEW TOPICS
Role of panels and boards in STS decisions
The Ccmmittee recognizes the important role played by the many panels and
boards in the NSTS program in providing ooordination, resolving problems
and technical conflicts, and reviewLng and recommending actions. These
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entities allow the different interests and skill groups to bring forward
their inputs, contribute their knowledge, and thus minimize the risk that
a proposed action will negatively affect some aspect of the STS. We
presume that each of these entities recommends an action to an appropriate
official, such as a project manager at Level III or the Deputy Director of
the NSTS Program at Level II, who actually makes and takes responsibility
for the decision.
The Committee is concerned about a possible attitudinal problem regarding
the decision process on the part of the NASA personnel engaged in it.
When we ask a NASA manager about how a decision is made, often we are told
that it is made by such-and-such a board. We are concerned that there may
be a tendency for those involved in the multi-layered review and decision
process to hide in the anonymity of panels and boards, and that each
person who must sign off on an item may not be inclined to concentrate
enough on his or her individual responsibility in light of the number of
levels of group reviews involved in the decision process. The Committee
recommends that the Administrator of NASA periodically remind all of the
NASA organization of the specific individuals by name and position who are
responsible for final decisions (and the organizational relationships
among them) based on the advice coming from each panel and board. This
would not detract from the important role played by all members of the
panels and boards in providing advice to the decision maker.
Potential of the Proqram Compliance Assurance Status System CPCASS)
The Cc_ttee is enthusiastic about the potential of the PCASS, which is
being established as a major part of the new System Integrity Assurance
Program (SIAP) of the NSTS. It should i_rove the quality of information
available to key decision makers (e.g., at Flight Readiness Reviews) by
providing in near real-time an integrated view of the status of problems
with the STS, including trends, anomalies and deviations, assessments, and
closure information. Plans to keep up to date and cc_terize the FMEA
will provide a very useful input to PCASS. The Cc_ttee also has learned
of the data base maintained by the Johnson Space Center (JSC) SR&QA office
which documents in one place the failures which have occurred on the
Orbiter during ground testing and in flight. It is encouraging to note
that of those failures of ccmponents on the Orbiter categorized as
Criticality 1 which have occurred during flight, none resulted in the
worst-case effect postulated in the FMEA. These failure data can be very
valuable in connection with the new CIL prioritization system in
establishing the probability that the postulated effects will actually
occur, given the failure in flight. We understand that this, and similar
data bases for the other STS elements, will be integrated into the PCASS.
We believe that PCASS, as a real-time data base, has the potential to
become a key element of the STS risk management, and thus its full and
timely development should be encottraged and supported. The Committee
recommends that this development be given a high priority and that the
potential users of PCASS, including key decision makers, be involved
closely now in its development.
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Proqress on the SSME as a result of the FMEA/CIL reevaluation
Based on its second visit to Rockwell International - Rocketdyne Division,
the Committee is _ged with the progress being made in i_roving the
SSME as a result of the FMEA/CIL reevaluation. We also applaud the
i_rovements in the test program which are designed to validate the
reliability of the modified SSME before first flight. The SSME is one of
the few cases in which the Co,tree has found that changes have been made
as a result of the FMEA/CIL. In most other cases, the C_ttee observes
that the initiation of changes has not originated with the FMEA/CIL
process.
NASA Headquarters Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality
Assurance (SRM&OA) Droqram.
In April, the Committee received a comprehensive briefing regarding the
status and plans for the NASA Headquarters SRM&QA program. We are
encouraged by the progress that has been made. The Committee believes
that the program is going in the right direction. We recognize the
magnitude of the task ahead; however, the goals and the program plans
developed so far appear to be sound. The Committee is concerned that
SRM&QA (at Headquarters and the centers) is not adequately staffed to cope
with the demands being placed upon it, perhaps necessitating the
additional use of contract personnel in order to carry out their functions
before the launch of the next Shuttle. The Cc_ttee also believes that
it will be particularly ir_portant to develop close collaboration with the
NASA centers as well as other program offices in order to do those things
which are needed to create a total risk management system augmenting the
independent check and balance role of SRM&QA.
Input to waiver decisions
The Committee understands that FMEAs, CIL determinations, and their
retention rationale are developed by the STS design and development
people. The SRM&QA, operations and other relevant personnel contribute as
appropriate. The FMEA/CIL and retention rationale so produced are among
the inputs to the hazard analyses which are done by the safety people. In
this case, design, develo_m__nt, operations and other relevant personnel
contribute as appropriate. The output of these two processes (FMEA/CIL/
retention rationale on the one hand, and hazard analyses on the other) are
individually approved by the Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB).
H_4ever, the Committee is concerned that the FMEA/CILe with their
design-based retention rationale have become the only effective input to
Levels II and I in their waiver decisions to accept the designs as safe
enough to fly.
The Committee recommends that the present design-based retention rationale
should be only one part of the rationale required to accept the hazards
which can result from each critical failure mode. The other part should
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be the output of the hazard and safety assessments, including evaluations
of the probability that the hazardous corditions will actually develop and
the probability that these oonditions will lead to a Criticality 1
consequence. A risk assessment report, embracing the design retention
rationale and the hazards/safety assessment, should provide the aooe_
rationale for consideration by Level II and I managers in reaching their
decisions on the granting of waivers.
Differences in FMEA/CIL reevaluation process amonq STS elements
In the Committee's audit of the reevaluation of the FMEA/CILs, a number of
diff_ces were found in the process being used by different element
project offices and contractors. In some cases, we were unable to
ascertain the reasons for the observed differences. For example, the
independent contractors evaluating the FMEA/CILs for the STS elements
managed by the Marshall Space Flight Center are required to review all
subsystems and to file a Review Item Discrepancy (RID) when they differ
with the results of the element contractor's analysis. On the other hand,
the independent contractor for the Orbiter evaluation was not directed to
review all parts of the Orbiter and does not file RIDs. We understand
that JSC now has directed the contractor to review all subsystems in the
orbiter. An audit by the Committee of the documentation and review
process used in the case of the Orbiter indicates that it is a reasonable
alternative to the RID process. Nevertheless, the Committee suqqests that
the NSTS program office review the FMEA/CIL reevaluation processes as
implemented for each STS element to assure itself that any diff_
will not compromise the quality and completeness of the STS FMEA/CIL
effort as a whole.
Expertise in Statistical Sciences
The key technical decision makers in NASA operate as chairmen of bodies
that review relevant technical information. The decisions involve design,
requirements, waivers, launch decisions, etc. Much of this information is
in the form of cc_plex engineering data, such as test, inspection, flight,
ard weather data. These bodies draw upon experts in many engineering
disciplines to deal with the oumplexities. Indeed, it is important that
there be close ties among the design engineers, test and analysis people,
and decision makers throughout the process of designing, building,
certifying, and using ccmloonents and systems. However, the Committee
finds that these bodies are not adequately supported by people skilled in
the statistical sciences to aid in the transformation of complex data into
information useful for decision making.
The Committee r_ that NASA build up its staff of experts in the
statistical sciences (civil servants and contract support) to provide
i_proved analytical support of risk management and of key decision makers
by the application of modern statistical analysis, inference and
assessment techniques.
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Reducinq the risk in the Space Transportation System
Even with the current FMEA/CIL and hazard analysis efforts which are
supported thoroughly within NASA and by its contractors, the Ccmmittee
receives the impression that changes often may only be considered which
will reduce risks to that level which has been previously accepted in the
STS program. The C_mnittee believes that such risks, accepted in the
past, logical as that may have appeared to be at the time, should not now
be accepted without a concentrated effort to plan and implement a program
to re_e or reduce these risks.
WORK
The Committee is continuing its audit by examining other aspects of the
STS risk management process. Among these are the design qualification and
flight certification processes; a further look at integrated systems
analysis; launch commit criteria and waiver policy; the process for
generating, reviewing, revising and approving the retention rationale for
waivers to permit flight of the Shuttle with critical items that affect
safety; the process for structural analysis, establishment of margins, and
verification of analyses and margins; the risk management process for STS
software; and the process for analyzing the effect of payloads on the
safety of the Shuttle, ground personnel, and flight crews.
We plan to issue a final report of the Conm_ittee late this year. It will
include our assessment of all of the procedures reviewed and _-
tions for improvement of the STS risk management system. If it should
appear desirable, we will provide another interim letter report to convey
findings and _tions which may emerge from the reviews now under
way.
Sincerely yours,
Alton D. Slay
_ain_
Ccmmittee on Shuttle Criticality
Review and Hazard Analysis Audit
cc: Admiral Richard H. Truly
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APPENDIX D
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
1. THE APPROACH TO QUANTITATIVE
RISK MANAGEMENT
The output of a quantitative risk management
function is a quantification and prioritization of
issues, the controlling of which leads to optimal
decisions law, lying safety, reliability, quality, per-
formance, and cost. The approach is to implement
a methodology that interprets, synthesizes, and
integrates all elements of a product assurance
program into a form suitable for decision making.
The input would be the results from the various
safety, reliability, and quality assurance programs
of the field offices. The transformation of this
information into a useful basis for decision making
is the step that enables meaningful risk management
to occur.
The National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (NASA) has a variety of documents covering
the approach to be taken in the discipline areas of
safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality as-
surance. These documents, subject to revisions,
would be the basic guides to be implemented by
the various centers. It is the task of the risk
assessment function to systematically process the
output of the centers into a form suitable for
meaningful risk management. The key require-
meats for this critical information processing and
assessment step are as follows:
• The figures of merit must be explicit and
quantitative.
• The information processing must be based on
an integrated systems engineering approach
(see also Section 5.11).
• ]he quantification of uncertainty must be an
integral part of the information processing
(see also Appendix E).
• The contributors to risk must be explicit,
prioritized, and defined in terms that enable
measurable corrective actions.
• Finally, the results should provide the basis
for rational analysis of alternatives for reduc-
ing and controlling risk.
The logic engine for carrying out the information
processing is a risk-based model of each space
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system. The model should be structured to give
perspective to the importance of the various tasks
associated with the product assurance activity. The
model must be a living model with continuous
input into and from the design process. While this
approach probably is not warranted in many cases,
such as small automated spacecraft, it should be
considered in large, complex programs--especially
those with potential risk to human life--such as
the STS or the Space Station.
2. TWO KINDS OF CONFIDENCE
The essential objective of the risk management
effort is "confidence"--confidence that each space
mission will perform substantially as planned, and
confidence that it will not be destroyed or rendered
significantly less useful by accidents or unforeseen
problems (including excessive cost). Now, what is
meant by confidence? One way we humans increase
our confidence is to believe that we are highly
competent. We shall call this "psychological" con-
fidence. It can be extremely important for the
effectiveness of an organization. NASA has done
an excellent job in this area in the past, and this
needs to continue.
There is another kind of confidence that we shall
call "engineering" confidence. This comes from in-
depth understanding of the system under consid-
eration, from deep knowledge of the design and
testing program, and from knowing how to achieve
quality in manufacturing, maintenance, operation,
and flight readiness.
There is another dimension to this notion of
gaining engineering confidence. This comes from
acknowledging that nothing ever built by man is
100% reliable. It comes from knowing that risks
are always present. The objective, therefore, is to
know just how large the risk is. Thus, engineering
confidence and success come not from eliminating
risk, which is impossible, but from controlling it
and managing it. That means knowing what it is--
measuring it, knowing its size, shape, structure,
etc.--and taking steps to reduce the risk to ac-
ceptable levels. Thus, the idea of engineering con-
fidence is essentially equivalent to the quantification
of risk. This equivalence makes engineering coati-
dencean objectivequantity, asdistinct from psy-
chological confidence, which is subjective. Psycho-
logical confidence is a matter of good feeling.
Engineering confidence is objectively and logically
related to the evidence available--to the informa-
tion, experience, test data, calculations, and, in-
deed, to the consensual judgments of the experts
involved. Engineering confidence is the quantitative
expression of that evidence. That expression is
formulated according to strict, logical, invariable
rules. It is not a matter of opinion or mood.
When a satisfactory level of engineering confi-
dence has been established, then those involved in
the program indeed will have a "good feeling."
Therefore, engineering confidence produces psy-
chological confidence. The reverse, as we know
to() well, is not necessarily true.
3. HOW IS CONFIDENCE GAINED OR
REGAINED?
The public and Congress, based on past tech-
nological failures in the nation's space programs,
are probably not going to be moved by psycholog-
ical confidence in the future. Engineering confidence
needs to be created. The issue of quantification
needs to be faced. Those responsible for a program
such as the NSTS need to be willing to ask
themselves: "How confident are we that this design,
this mission, this launch will succeed?" This is a
powerful question, if it is properly used. How is
this question used properly? The first step is to
provide the format in which the answer is to be
given. This makes the question into a workable
tool.
The proposed format is as follows, taking the
STS as an example: Let us project ourselves into
the future to a time when we can imagine that
many thousands of Shuttle missions have been
launched. One can now look back at the record
and ask the following question: "In what fraction
of these launches was the vehicle lost?" Let this
fraction be dhov. This parameter would then be a
very meaningful figure of merit describing the
success, safety, and effectiveness of the program.
At the present time, of course, the numerical
value of this parameter is not known. One can
only tell the state of knowledge about what this
value will be. This is done in the form of a
probability density curve against (b_x_v, using a
logarithmic scale, as shown in Figure D-1.
116
PROBABILITY
DENSITY
P0 (q_LOV)
10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 10 0
_LOV
FIGURE D-1 State of knowledge probability curve
for frequency of loss of vehicle.
This curve expresses the current knowledge about
(brov based on all the information and evidence
available. The width of the curve reflects the degree
of uncertainty about the value of (bl.ov. The whole
shape and location of the curve is a portrayal of
the current state of confidence in the vehicle.
Therefore, this "state of knowledge" curve can be
adopted as the format for quantitative expression
of confidence. This curve is also the bottom-line
output of a risk analysis of the vehicle.
With curves of this type, together with an orderly
compilation of the evidence on which the curve is
based, NASA can build confidence in a tangible
form. They can then communicate it convincingly
to the whole technical and management team, and
also to Congress, to review committees, and to the
public at large.
4. DOCUMENTING CONFIDENCE
THROUGH A QUANTITATIVE RISK MODEL
At any point during the life of a project it is
desirable to be able to reach for a document that
presents the current risk status of the project in a
compact, succinct, and quantitative form. This
document should contain the bottom-line figures
of merit and the numbers, tables, graphs, and
diagrams that would capture and characterize the
risk of the project. It also should make clear the
main contributors to risk and the main sources of
unreliability, doubt, and uncertainty at that time.
The document, which might be called the Risk
Summary Report, would be updated regularly and
might be the basic document upon which the risk
management function would draw. It would con-
tain in an organized way the combined knowledge
of the entire technical team on issues of risk. It
would spell out what is known and not known on
each point and would quantify all uncertainties so
that decision makers could clearly understand the
trade-offs among costs, benefits, and risks.
Such a document can only be generated as the
summary output report of an ongoing quantitative
risk model (QRM) of the project. This model and
this report, properly handled, could become an
extremely useful mechanism, a primary channel for
communication between management and the tech-
nical team. Indeed, it could become an important
framework and mechanism for communication and
coordination among all parts of the technical team.
If used in this way, the report would make a major
contribution to the success of the project.
The Risk Summary Report may be thought of
as the final stage of an information machine. This
machine is depicted in Figure D-2 as a kind of
megaphone. At the right end in the figure are
represented the working levels of the project and
the design, fabrication, testing, and research or-
ganizations. The information from all these activ-
ities, relevant to risk, is continually gathered into
the machine at the right. This information is
digested and processed, through the logic of the
QRM, and emerges finally as the Risk Summary
Report.
The primary information flow is thus from right
to left in this figure. However, there is also a very
important reverse flow, a kind of "back EMF."
The fact that this machine exists, that it is orga-
nizing and processing the information in certain
ways, and that people are reading the output in
certain ways, exerts a valuable orderly discipline
on the working levels. Questions move from left
to right, forcing the working levels to continually
structure and organize their data and their thinking
about risk.
If the information machine is properly con-
structed, it establishes not only an orderly calcu-
lating and recording mechanism but, perhaps even
more importantly, it establishes a language and a
conceptual framework that unifies and organizes
the thinking, communication, and decision making
of the whole project. Not only are better design
decisions thus made, but enormous savings in time
and talent can result simply from the fact that
everybody is using the same language so that, to a
great extent, all participants mean the same things
by the same words.
The QRM approach can provide an extremely
valuable integrating framework for the Safety,
Reliability, and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) ac-
tivities. This framework would include the Failure
Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEA) and hazard
analysis work, which would become in effect part
of the QRM. Indeed, one of the benefits of the
QRM approach is that it would help to ensure that
the results of the FMEA and hazard work are fully
recognized and acted on at the decision level. One
of the ways this benefit is achieved is through the
discipline of quantification, which forces the major
items to the surface, where attention must be paid
to them. A second way is through the quantification
of uncertainty, an even more stringent discipline,
which forces an organization (for example), before
it dismisses an item as an "acceptable" risk, to
show quantitatively that the evidence available
provides sufficient confidence to support that de-
cision. The quantification of uncertainty also helps
decision makers to know when a change in the
hardware is needed or when the problem is just
lack of confidence--so that perhaps more testing
is needed, rather than new designs.
RISK REPORT PROPER
(INFORMATION MACHINE)
RISK SUMMARY
REPORT _ _. _, PROJECT
\ .J \ co  . cmo.s
PROJECT _ _ | _,
MANAGEMENT _1_ #%._N,._ I WORK PACKAGES,
AND _I\_N, 1 _ I DESIGN, FABRICATION,
DECISION-MAKING _ ,_ / _ = TEST, etc.
__NJFORM_,O N " OUTSIDE EXPERTS
FLOW
BACK EMF
FIGURE I)-2 The Risk Summary Report as the final stage of an information machine,
117
5. THE ELEMENTS OF PROBABILISTIC
RISK ANALYSIS
5.1 The "Set of Triplets" Definition of Risk
In contemplating the design or operation of a
project, those involved should say to themselves:
"We know how things are supposed to work out;
we know our plan. Now we would like to know
what are the possible departures from that plan."
Specifically, they would ask three questions:
• What can go wrong?
• What is the likelihood of that happening under
the current plan?
• If it does happen, what are the consequences;
i.e., what is the damage?
The answers to these questions constitute a risk
and reliability analysis. The answers might be
arranged in a table as in Figure D-3. The first
column contains descriptions and names of scen-
arios. This is the answer to the first question above.
The second column contains the likelihoods, l,, of
the scenarios, s,. Here we use the word likelihood
in a generic sense. How to quantify likelihood will
be discussed in Section 5.2. The third column
contains "damage index," x,, which is a measure
of thc consequences of the ith scenario.
denoted by the outer brackets, provides the total
risk; in particular,
R = {<s,, li, x,>}
is the complete answer to the questions. Therefore
this set of triplets is adopted as the definition of
risk, R.
This definition becomes the organizing principle
for the QRM and, thus, for the SR&QA work on
the project. What is being sought in this work is
the identification of all possible significant scenarios
and the characterization of their likelihood and
consequences.
5.2 Quantifying Likelihood
The idea of likelihood can be expressed quanti-
tatively in different ways. For NASA-type risk work
the most useful way might be what is called the
"probability of frequency" approach. In this ap-
proach, one can imagine a "model" in which a
vehicle is launched, or a facility operated under
specified conditions many, many times. In this
thought experiment the scenario, s,, will occur with
a certain "frequency," which is denoted cb,, and
which is measured in occurrences per mission, per
launch, per year, or other appropriate unit.
Each row of the table thus constitutes a triplet
<s,, I,, x,>
giving a scenario, its likelihood, and consequences.
This triplet constitutes then one answer to the three
questions. Thc table itself, i.e., the set of all triplets
These frequencies (b, may be thought of as
abstract in the sense that, since the experiment
cannot be run completely, the 4), cannot be meas-
ured precisely. The (b, actually are parameters of
the model and they can be usefully adopted as
figures of merit indicating the safety and reliability
of the system.
ANSWERS TO: (lJ WHAT CAN GO WRONG?
(2} WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD?
(3) WHAT IS THE DAMAGE?
FIGURE D-3
SCENARIO LIKELIHOOD DAMAGE
s1
s2
s3
sN
£1
£2
_3
R_-RISK= {<si,£i, xi> }
Quantitative definition of risk.
x 1
x2
x3
xN
We would like then to know the numerical values
of these parameters, ¢b_.As mentioned above, these
values will never be known precisely. However, we
are not totally at a loss either. There is always a
certain body of evidence and information relevant
to these values. So now one can ask, "What
inferences can be drawn from this evidence about
the values of these parameters, and with what
degrees of confidence can those inferences be drawn ?"
The answers to this question can be expressed
in the form of probability curves against the pos-
sible values of the parameters (as in Figure D-I).
These curves are called state of knowledge curves.
They become the final quantitative expression of
risk and reliability.
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The remaining question is how these curves are
developed from evidence available, considering that
the evidence may be of very differing types: test
data, actual flight experience, calculations, ludg-
ment of experts, experience of other similar equip-
ment, etc. The answer is that the development of
these curves makes heavy use of the fundamental
theorcna of inference, Bayes theorem. The use of
this theorem is partly art and partly science, but it
always can be done in a way that is meaningful
for decision making purposes.
in order for the individual state of knowledge
curves on the 6,'s to be a complete specification of
the knowledge available, certain assumptions must
be made. One is that the scenarios are approxi-
mately mutually exclusive; i.e., only one can happen
at a time. Another is that conditional on the data,
different (b,'s are statistically independent. If these
assumptions are not satisfied, more complex ap-
plications of Baycs theorem are required. However,
for this discussion, we make these simplifying
assumptions.
5.3 Structuring and Categorizing the Triplets
Since the number of possible scenarios for a
system can be very large, it is important in carrying
out a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to or-
ganize and categorize the set of triplets. This can
be done in many ways.
Perhaps the most important categorization of
triplets is by the magnitude of the consequent
damage. For this, one wants to know what scen-
arios lead to destruction or inactivation of the
space mission. What is the total probability of such
scenarios? What scenarios lead to substantial de-
creases in the system's performance or usefulness?
What is the probability of that outcome?
A second way would be to categorize scenarios
by the part of the system complex in which they
originate. This would give us a picture of the risk
of the various elements and subsystems. Another
important way of looking at the problem is to
categorize the triplets by the phase of the flight in
which they take place, thus making visible the risks
attendant on each flight phase.
5.4 Pictorial Representation of Risk
It may be useful for some purposes to express
the damage x, on an index scale, [0, 100]. The
value x, = 0 represents no damage and the value
x, = 100 represents loss of vehicle (LOV). Inter-
mediate values of x, represent partial loss of mission
or vehicle. With this idea a useful pictorial pres-
entation of risk can be developed in the following
way: In the risk table, Figure D-3, the scenarios
can be numbered in order of increasing damage;
that is, such that
Xt+l _Xi
and let N be the total number of scenarios. Then
we can define
N
a,(x,) =
p' -- I
Thus defined, _(x,) is the total frequency of all
scenarios having damage level x, or greater.
If these _(x,) are plotted on a log scale versus x,
and the resulting step-function is smoothed, a curve,
6(x) vs. x, is obtained which is known variously
as the "risk curve", the Rasmussen curve, or the
"frequency of exceedance" curve as in Figure
D-4. Its ordinate over any x is the frequency with
which scenarios occur having damage equal to or
greater than x. This curve also may be viewed as
a figure of merit of the system.
As before, since the _, is not known exactly, one
will not know the risk curve exactly. But from the
uncertainty in the individual d),, the uncertainty in
10o
10-1
10-2
10-3
10-4
I I I
0 50 100
FIGURE D-4 Risk curve.
X
119
_(x) canbecalculated.This uncertaintycan then
bepresentedin theform of a familyof risk curves
{Op;,(x):O<P<_1} ,
shown, for example, in Figure D-5. This graph is
called a "risk diagram." For a fixed x, the uncer-
tainty about _(x) can be quantified by
l'r{qb(x) <--gO;,(x)} = I' .
Suppose, for example, that _9_(100) = 10 ". This
means a confidence level of 99'/0 that the frequency
of LOV [i.e., _(100)] is less than or equal to .01.
From a portrayal of such risk diagrams one can
gain a rapid understanding of the contributions
that various sources make to the overall risk of a
system or program.
5.5 Use of Risk Diagrams in Decision Making
Like everything else in life, large engineered
systems, such as the STS, necessarily involve a
degree of risk. In the case of engineered systems,
however, intelligent design decisions can control
the amount of risk. Sometimes through a flash of
insight it is possible to change or simplify a design
in a way that not only reduces risk but also improves
performance and reduces the cost. This does hap-
pen, and these arc happy occasions. More often,
however, the situation is that risk can be made, in
principle, as small as one likes, but the price for
this is diminished performance and increased cost
of the system.
The task of management, therefore, is to strike
an optimal balance between risk, cost, and per-
formance. The balance is struck and fine-tuned
continuously through day-to-day decisions, as the
design evolves. In the "flash of insight" cases, the
decisions are easy to make. In the more usual case,
trade-offs are required. In these situations, it is
useful and necessary to have quantitative input so
that the amount of risk can be weighed against the
levels of cost and performance.
The situation in such cases is portrayed in Figure
D-6, which shows the anatomy of a general decision
problem. Each option brings with it a certain risk,
cost, and performance. If these three factors were
precisely known, it would be easy to make the
decision. What makes that problem interesting in
real life is that these factors are never known with
complete certainty. It is important, then, to quantify
these uncertainties as part of the input to the
decision analysis.
Figure D-6 shows the uncertainties in cost and
performance quantified in the form of probability
curves. Each option, therefore, can be characterized
by triplet <C, B, R> diagrams. The decision maker
must then choose which triplet (i.e., which option)
hc prefers. In the language of decision theory his
degree of preference, as a function of the triplet, is
called a utility function, U.
The rule of quantitative risk analysis, as shown,
is to provide the assessment of risk, including
uncertainty, as part of the input to decision prob-
lems. Strictly speaking, PRA per se is limited to
the risk part of the problem, but the same quan-
titative way of thinking, the same probabilistic
methodology, can be and should be applied to the
cost and performance factors as well.
5.6 Assembly and Disassembly of Risk
FREQUENCY OF
EXCEEDANCE
P
FIGURE D-5 Risk diagram.
100
x
5.6.1 Identifying Scenarios
According to the definition of risk noted above,
the first and most important step in risk assessment
is to identify the scenarios. In this connection, the
following are some key ideas. First of all, note that
any scenario that can be described is actually a
category of scenarios. Thus, "the pipe breaks" is
a category that includes as sub-categories, "the
pipe breaks longitudinally, .... there is a double-
ended guillotine break," "the pipe breaks in such
and such location," etc.
A second point is that since the objective is to
identify all possible significant scenarios, any method
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FIGURE D-6 Decision model
that helps one do that is good. Any new way of
h)okmg, any new way of categorizing that helps
to be sure that no significant scenarios have been
overlooked is good, so it is perfectly acceptable to
use more than one approach to scenario identifi-
cation.
One approach that is quite useful is to break the
overall engineered system into parts and subparts.
Each part can be examined in detail and the
questions asked: "What can go wrong with this
part? What scenarios can originate here?" This
approach would seem to be particularly appropri-
ate for space systems. "Parts" could be interpreted
successively as physical segments of the total sys-
tem, as functional subsystems in the system; they
could also mean different phases of the system's
mission life. Again, all different ways are helpful.
Another point of interest is that some scenarios
arc single-event scenarios. Something fails and the
system is damaged or destroyed. Other scenarios
require several different events to happen coinci-
dentally, sometimes referred to as multiple failures.
Other scenarios are "chains" of events. These are
"cascade" or "domino" scenarios. Something hap-
pens initially and because of that something else
fails, which causes a chain of propagating events
resulting in overall system failure.
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Each of these types of scenarios reqires its own
typc of analytical tools. Failure modes and effects
analyses (FMEAs) are useful for single-event scen-
arios; event trees and event sequence diagrams for
chains of event-type scenarios; and fault trees for
coincident failures. In space systems and missions,
one can expect all these types of scenarios to be
present and expect all these analytic tools, and
others, to be useful. The specific mix of methods
and approaches should be determined by what is
contributing to the risk.
5.6.2 Quantification of Scenarios
In a methodology that has worked well, long
run frequency is used as the measure of likelihood
of the scenario. Thus, an underlying Poisson-type
random process model is used as the framework
for discussing the risk and reliability behavior of
the system. Thc scenario frequencies are then viewed
as parameters in the Poisson model, and these
parameters are used as figures of merit to indicate
the safety and reliability of the system.
The values of these scenario frequencies are
determined from the frequencies of all the com-
ponent events (the "elemental" events) in the scen-
ario, such as failure of valves, pumps, human errors,
etc. The results of the modeling logic are thus to
expressthe frequenciesof the scenariosin terms
of the frequencies,X,,of theseclementalevents,
¢, = F(k,X,,..._, ...) (1)
- 1
Now, the discipline of data analysis and statistical
inference is applied. The question is asked: How
big are the numbers ;%? Again, the state of knowl-
edge probability curves are used to provide the
answer (see Figure D-7).
These curves must reflect all of the evidence and
information available which are relevant to the ,k,:
all operating experience, test data, calculations,
etc. In putting together this information, the logic
of Bayes theorem is used to help evaluate and
combine the various types of evidence correctly.
The discipline of this theorem forces one to organize
and codify the evidence and helps to curb wishful
thinking.
To apply Bayes theorem one needs two basic
ingredients. The first ingredient is a "'prior" state
of knowledge curve I',,,(a_) which quantified the
available qualitative information about X,. Quali-
tative information may bc in the form of precise
knowledge of related componcnts or expert engi-
neering judgement. The fact that this qualitativc
reformation can bc quantified as a probability
density is the major result of the theory of subjective
probability that has been developed since the 1950's.
The second ingredient is the "'likelihood func-
tion" associated with the available data that con-
tains information about ,_,. These data could be
industry data, test data, and/or field data. Let D
= (D,, D2 .... ) be the vector of data available.
The likelihood function, L(k,,D), is proportional
to the conditional probability of observing the data
D given k,. For example, if the data are observed
defects, then the likelihood function may be derived
from the Poisson distribution.
Bayes theorem integrates these sources of infor-
Pi (q)i)
I I ._ _i
10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10 -1 10 0
FIGURE D-8 State of knowledge probability curve
for scenario frequency,
mation. The state of knowledge curve for X, given
all information is P,(k,), which is proportional to
Po,(X,)LX,, D) .
The proportionality constant is chosen so that
P,(X_) is a probability density (i.e., it integrates
to 1).
Having the curves P_(k,), they can now be "prop-
agated" through equation (1) to obtain curves for
the (b, (Figure D-8). Finally, since the total loss-of-
vehicle frequency is the sum of the d),,
+;,,v= _ +, ,
the curves P,(_b,) (through a mathematical convo-
lution) arc simply aggregated to obtain a new
curve, I'_ (¢1 ,_), for the LOV frequency. This curve,
m relation to the initial curve, P.(+l_Jv) from Figure
D-I, might appear as in Figure D-9. Curve P, is a
more satisfactory state of knowledge than P0 and
thus is a better basis for a "go" decision.
This aggregation should be done in stages, so
they can be viewed at various levels of aggregation
such as system, subsystem, unit. In this way, one
could answer macroscopic questions like: "What
is the total frequency of events that could destroy
or inactivate the system?" By proceeding down-
ward in the aggregation, one could then see, at
successively greater levels of detail, where the bulk
of this frequency is coming from. This draws
management's attention to the aspects of the design
needing further attention.
b 2'i
10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 100
FIGURE D-7 State of knowledge probability curve
for elemental parameter Xj.
P1 (_LOV)
PO (_°LOV)
"._ _LOV
10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 10 0
FIGURE D-9 States of knowledge (confidence) be
fore and after PRA.
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5.6.3 Design hnprovement
The improvement between curves P_ and P_ in
Figure D-9 is simply an improvement in knowledge
and confidence coming from study and analysis
(PRA). It does not reflect any actual changes to the
design of the system, if one now recognizes that,
in the course of such a study and analysis, many
areas of the design or maintenance/operation prac-
tices will surely be discovered where we can do
better, and if those improvements are then imple-
mented, the probability curve will change again,
hopefully to something like the curve P2 in Figure
D-10.
With repeated cycles of this type of analysis and
with continued experience and technology im-
provement, one may hope ultimately to achieve
something like curve P_, which perhaps is what is
needed to support a viable manned space program.
P3 (q)LOV)
A,_," P2 (q)kOV)
/P1 (q)LOV)
I I _ (_LOV)
10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 10 0 101
FIGURE D-10 Evolutionary system improvements are reflected in changes
in the state of knowledge curves.
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APPENDIXE
AN IMPROVED CRITICAL ITEM RISK ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE
FOR THE
NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
(With an Example of Application to the 51-L Field Joints)
1. INTRODUCTION
On May 28, 1987, a NASA reprcscntative made
a presentation to the Committee on Shuttle Criti-
cality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit entitled,
"Critical Itcms List (CIL) Prioritization." The method
discussed was subsequently issued in modified form
as NSTS Instruction 22491, Reference [31. This
Instruction for the preparation of Critical Item Risk
Assessments (CIRA) provides a method for prior-
itizing the faihlre modes in the CIL. It contains
many excellent ideas and is a significant step
forward. However, the Committee has s()me con-
corns and some related suggestions on how to
simplify and clarify the method.
This Appendix also contains in Section 5 an
example of the application of trend analysis and
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to the pro-
Challenger O-rings. This application, included here
only as an example of some applicable analysis
techniques, makes heavy use of modern statistical
science and Bayesian ideas.
2. CONCERNS WITH THE CURRENT
METHOD
The Committee's concerns with the CIRA method,
as currently formulated, can be summarized as
follows:
1. In Table 1 of Reference I3] (shown here in
Attachment 1) the column labeled "SEVER-
ITY" DEFINITIONS really contains worst-
case damage states.
2. In Table 1, the columns labeled SUCCESS
PATHS and STATUS CODE FOR REDUN-
DANCY/BACKUP are really descriptions of
system or subsystem architectures. They affect
risk by affecting the probabilities in the last
two columns. However, the relevant informa-
tion is in the probabilities themselves--not in
the architecture. Any guidelines written on
how to assess the probabilities, either empir-
ically or subjectively, should contain much
discussion on how success paths, redundancy
structure, and periodic checking strategy af-
fects the probabilities in columns 4 and 5.
3. The probabilities in the last two columns of
Table 1 are qualitative and open to interpre-
tation as to what the terms "Very Likely,"
"Likely," "Unlikely," and "Very Unlikely,"
mean. The two columns, which have the same
qualitative scale, appear to have different
quantitative scales associated with them. In
column 4, "Very Unlikely" appears to mean
something like <-10 _ and "Very Likely"
means something like 10 i. In column 5, the
scale depends on whether or not there is
redundancy . If there is no redundancy, then
"Very Unlikely" means something like 10 2
and "Very Likely" means something like
greater than .95. But if there is redundancy,
then "Very Unlikely" may mean 10 _. With
the qualitative definitions of probability, it is
quite possible that two engineers working on
two failure modes with the same severities
and probabilities would assign them to dif-
ferent probability categories and therefore
produce inconsistent priorities. It is very im-
portant that the probabilities have opera-
tional definitions. Terms like "Unlikely" are
not operational definitions.
4. There is no way to produce a unique priority.
Suppose there are two failure modes, and
Table 1 is filled out as follows:
Failure Severity Success Redundancy/ Design Likelihood of
Mode Definition Paths Backup Confidence Worst Case
1 (A) Loss 0 (a)--None (ll)--Likely (iv)--Unlikely
of Life
2 (A)--Loss 0 (a)-- None (IV)--Untikely (ii)--Likely
of Life
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PRECEDLNG .rA,,I_] BLANK NOT FILMED
Which oneshouldhavethehighestpriority?
Suppose that the last two columns were
replaced by the following structure:
Probability of
Failure Probability of Worst Case Probability of
Mode Failure Given Failure Worst Case
1 Likely 01 Unlikely = .01 .0001
2 Unlikely- .00001 Likely = 5 .000005
Now it is clear that failure mode 1 presents
a higher risk.
3. PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS
As an improvement to Reference [3}, the Com-
mittee proposes the procedure described in Table
E- 1 below:
All failure modes with the same Worst Damage
State Given Lack of Redundancy or Redundancy
Failure would be ranked by column Z.
Thc probabilities shown m Table E-1 arc for
illustration only and do not reflect any specific
example. In actual application, it would be highly
desirable for the analyst to include confidence limits
(or the equivalent) for each of the probabilities
listed in the tables produced through the CIRA.
The Committee recommends strongly that such
probabilities be documented by a rationale. Many
of the facts mentioned in the current CIL "Rationale
for Retention" would be cited in the probability
rationale--but in the quantitative manner illus-
trated by the example in Section 5. In addition,
facts that imply higher probabilities would also be
analyzed. For example, the long-run frequency of
catastrophic failure for solid rocket motors of a
mature design is 1/50; and therefore 1/25 for two
solid rocket motors. A dis-aggregation of this
frequency by failure mode would be a useful
baseline for an analysis. How are our design and
failure modes different from history? For example,
the field joint is similar to Titan III, but also
different. The redundant O-ring points to a smaller
probability, but the insulation geometry points to
a higher probability.
In Table E-l, failure mode 3 has the most risk,
even though it is only a Criticality 1R item. For
this case, the computation of column W uses the
following estimates:
(i) There is one success path remaining after
the primary failure.
(ii) The availability of the backup is not readily
detectable and is checked every third flight;
and the estimated availability is .99.
(iii) The probability of a secondary failure is
.05.
The formula for column W is
W = Pr{BackupAvailable} × Pr{SecondaryFailure}
+ Pr{Backup not Available}
= (.99)(.05) + (.01)
= .0595 . (1)
For failure mode 1, there is no backup; but, it
is a relatively rare (probability = .001) failure
mode and infrequently (probability = .01) causes
the worst damage state.
Failure mode 2 is much less risky. The compu-
tation of column W uses the following estimates:
(i) There is one success path remaining after
the first failure.
TAB/I= E-1 Improved Risk Assessment Procedure
Failure
Mode
1
2
3
V
Probability of
Primary Failure
During Mission
W
Probability of
Redundancy Failure.
Given
Primary Failure
X
Worst
Damage State.
Given Lack of
Redundancy or
Redundancy Failure
Probability of
Worst
Damage State,
Given Lack of
Redundancy or
Redundancy Failure
z -- (v)(w)(Y)
Criticality
1 001 1 (A)---Loss of Life .01 00001
and/or Vehicle
1R .001 001999 (A)--Loss of Dfe .t 0000001999
and;or Vehicle
1R 01 .0505 (A)-Loss of Life 1 000595
and/or Vehicle
Probability o1
Worst
Damage State
Event
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(ii)
(iii)
Use of
The backup is readily detectable and fixed
when failed and the availability of the backup
is .999.
Given the backup, the probability of sec-
ondary failure is .001--the same as the
primary.
equation (1) in this case yields
W = (.999)(.001) + (.001)
= .001999
4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IMPROVED
PROCEDURE AND TABLE E-1
There is a strong relationship between the im-
provements described in Section 3 and NASA's
Table l (Attachment l here). From the "SEVER-
ITY" DEFINITIONS in column 1 of Table l, we
can deduce the following Worst Damage States:
A. Loss of Life and/or Vehicle
B. Mission is Aborted
C. Degraded Operational Capability or Early
Mission Termination or Damage to a Vehicle
System
D. Loss of Some Operational Capability of Ve-
hicle, but Full Mission Duration.
E. No Operational Effect
The probability scales could be set up as categories
with the definitions given in Table E-2.
The Committee urges the use of quantitative
definitions of probability. Even though for some
failure modes the probabilities will be assessed
subjectively, it is very important that the analyst
have an operational definition. To reiterate, terms
like "Unlikely" are not operational definitions. In
addition, use of a quantitative probability scale
will augment the pure engineering judgment ap-
proach.
The factors in Reference [3], Section 3.4, are
very relevant to assessing the Probability of Primary
Failure During Mission in Table E-1. Other factors
include:
• Product design certification test results
• Manufacturing process qualification test re-
sults
• Engineering analytical models
• Related industry data
• Etc.
The number of SUCCESS PATHS and the
REDUNDANCY/BACKUP scenarios given in
NASA's Table 1 (Attachment 1 to this appendix)
are very relevant to assessing the Probability of
Redundancy Failure Given Primary Failure in Table
E-I.
The factors relevant to assessing the Probability
of Worst Damage State Event in Table E- 1 are very
similar to those listed in Reference [3], Section 3.5.
As part of the exercise of assessing this probability,
one could list all the events subsequent to redun-
dancy failure that do not lead to the worst damage
state.
5. APPLICATION TO THE O-RINGS
Only as an example to illustrate the foregoing
proposal, consider the field joint O-rings prior to
the Challenger flight 51-L at a joint temperature
of 31°F, which was predicted for the Challenger
flight. It is based only on a limited knowledge of
the subject derived from References [1] and [21,
TABLE E-2 Probability Scales For Improved Risk Assessment Procedure
Description
Very Likely
Likely
Possible
Unlikely
Very Unlikely
Probability of
Primary Failure
During Mission
10'
10
10
10 "
10
Center Point of Ranges of Probability Values
Probability of
Redundancy Failure
Given
Primary Failure
10 _
10
10 _
10 _
10
Probability of
Worst
Damage State
Given Lack of
Redundancy
or Redundancy Failure
10
,5
t0 _
10 :'
10
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and thus must be viewed ONLY AS AN ILLUS-
TRATION OF A PROCESS.
To keep things simple, only one failure scenario is
considered, in the language of Table E-1 we have:
TABLE E-3
Field Joint
Application of Table E-1 to the SRM
Language of Table E-I
Pnmary lailure
dunng m_ssJon
Application to Field Joint
Erosion and blowby
of the pnmary O-ring
Redundancy failure gwen Failure of the secondary
primary failure O-ring gwen erosion and
blowby of the primary O-ring
Worsl damage state Loss of life and vehicle
The reason for considering this scenario is that
data are readily available. Also, in Reference [1],
p. 135, it is stated that bypass erosion or blowby
was considered much more serious than just im-
pingemcnt erosion.
"file data set used in this analysis (see Attachment
2) is taken from pages 129-131 of Reference [ll.
The subset of these data used here involves only
the actual flights and only the field and nozzle
joints. A useful organization of this subset is shown
in Attachment 3. In the columns labeled "erosion,"
"blowby," and "erosion or blowby," the blanks
mean that the event did not occur. In the column
labeled "blowby given erosion," the blank means
there was no erosion and the zero means that there
was erosion but no blowby. Most of the data are
for the primary O-rings; but the data with an
asterisk are for the secondary O-rings.
5.1 Primary Failure
For primary O-ring failures, we consider the
scenario of erosion and blowby. The primary failure
probability is:
Pr{Primary Failure} = Pr{Primary Erosion}
,, [Primary Primary /
x l-r]Blowby ErosionJ. (2)
The vertical bar in the probability expression (2)
reads "conditional on." So, for example,
Pr{Blowby I Erosion}
would read, "probability of the event Blowby,
conditional on the event Erosion occurring." For
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two events A and B, a fundamental law of prob-
ability is
l'r{A and B} = Pr{A} x Pr{B I A } .
5.1.1 Primary Erosion
A plot of the incidents of field joint primary O-
rings with erosion is shown in Attachment 4. For
example, flight 51-C, in January 1985, had two
field joints with primary O-ring erosion; this mis-
sion experienced a joint temperature of 53 ° F and
a leak check pressure of 200 psi. The fitted curves
are derived from a statistical model which allows
for possible joint temperature and leak check pres-
sure effects.
Flight 51 -C experienced both erosion and blowby
of the field joint. At a subsequent Flight Readiness
Review where 51-C was discussed, there was a
concluding statement, "Low temperature enhanced
probability of blow-by" (Reference [1], p. 147).
On page H-73 of Reference [2], it is stated that,
"Frequency of O-ring damage has increased since
the incorporation of... higher stabilization pres-
sures in leak test procedures...". So it is of interest
to statisticallv model the effect of temperature and
leak check pressure on O-ring anomalies.
Let
p(t, s) = Probability of erosion per field joint
primary O-ring,
where
t = Joint temperature
s -- Leak check pressure.
The assumptions for this statistical model are:
1. The model for p(t, s) is:
In 1 p(t,s) = c_ + f3t + ys . (3)
This is called a Logistic Regression model. The
variables c_,_3,y are unknown parameters to be
estimated from the data. Different values of these
parameters represent different relationships be-
tween erosion probability and (temperature,
pressure). For example, if 13< 0, then probability
decreases with temperature; but if 13 > 0, then
probability increases with temperature. We will
let the data determine which of these is most
likely.
2. Given p(t, s), the field joints are statistically
independent.
Let
x(t, s) = Number of field joint primary O-rings
with erosion for a launch with joint
temperature t and leak check pressure s.
Under these assumptions, the probability distri-
bution of x(t, s) given p(t, s) is binomial with
parameters n = 6 (i.e., 6 field joints) and p = p(t,
s). So for k = 0, 1, ... , or 6,
Pr{x(t,s) = klp(t,s)}
={_}[P(t,s)]_[ 1- p(t, s)]" k
Let the subscript i represent the ith launch in
Attachment 3. Sol = 1,2,...,23. Let
x, = Number of field joint primary
O-rings with erosion
t, = Joint temperature
s, = Leak check pressure
p, = p(t,, s,)
Also let
X = (Xl,X_,,...,X_,_)
t = (t_, t. .... , t_,_)
S = (Sl, S_,, . .., S,_).
The likelihood function, L, given the data x, is
defined as the probability of observing x conditional
on t, s, and (o_,B,y). The variables t and s are
regarded as known variables (in standard regression
analysis they are called independent variables); and
((x,[3,y) are the unknown parameters. The likeli-
hood function is regarded as a function of (ot,[3,y)
and is
-" (6)p7,(1-p,)_ .,-,= ,H, x,
Recall that p, is a function of (c_,13,y).
The maximum likelihood estimates of the (oql3,y)
are those values that maximize the likelihood
function. In effect, they are the values of (oql3,y)
that make the observed value ofx the most probable
under our model.
There is a close relationship between maximum
likelihood estimation and least squares. The least
squares estimates of (c_,lB,;_) are those values that
minimize
2_
(x,- 6/,,)e ,
t - 1
where 6p, is the expected value of x, under our
model. If the x;'s had a Gaussian (normal) distri-
bution with common variance, then the maximum
likelihood estimates and the least squares estimates
would be the same. This is because the Gaussian
probability density would then be monotonically
related to the sum of squares above. However, the
probability densities of the x;'s in our problem are
binomial and not Gaussian. And it is a well
established fact in statistical science that maximum
likelihood estimation is usually more efficient (closer
to the truth) than least squares; so we use maximum
likelihood.
The results of a maximum likelihood analysis of
these data under the above model yields the values
in Table E-4.
TABLE E-4 Maximum Likelihood Analysis of the SRM
Field Joint Primary O-Ring Erosion Data
Max mum Likehhood 90% Confidence
Parameter Eslimate Interval
_ 78 [ 1 157]
[3 17 [ 28 06]
"/ 0024 [ 012 016]
The 90% Confidence Interval reveals the fact
that from our data we cannot learn the "true"
value of ((_,13,,_) with great precision. For example,
a Bayes interpretation of the interval [ -.28, -.06]
for the temperature effect, [3, is that given our data,
there is a .9 probability that the "true" value of [3
lies in the interval [-.28, -.06]. Note that this
interval does not include the value [3 = 0 (i.e., no
effect). This means that the temperature effect is
"statistically significant;" or that there is only a
very small probability that the true value of _ is
greater than or equal to zero.
Also note that there is no statistically significant
pressure effect on field joint erosion. That is because
most of the variation is explained by temperature
variation. This is curious, because in Reference [1],
blow-holes caused by high pressure were cited as
a cause of erosion.
Plugging the maximum likelihood estimates into
equation (3) yields
= 7.8 - (.17)t + (.0024)(200)
p(t,200)
In 1 -p(t,200)
= 8.3 - (.17)t .
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This implies
p(t,200) =
Clg,:_ , 7)t]
1 + eIs_ (.17)t[ " (4)
Plugging (5) and (6) into (2) yields
Pr{Primary Failure} = (.95) (.292)
= .277
]'he curve for 200 psi (plotted in Attachments 4
and 5) is (6)p(t,200), because there are 6 field
joints.
The predicted probability per joint of primary
()-ring erosion at 31 ° F joint temperature and 200
psi leak check pressure is
p(31,200)=.95 [Pr°bability°f ] (5)Primary Erosion
The 90 percent confidence interval for the "prob-
ability of primary O-ring erosion" is shown in
Attachment 5 and is [.5, 1.0]. This shows that the
extrapolation to 31 ° F introduces considerable
uncertainty in the estimate. The propagation of
this uncertainty to the final result will be discussed
ill Section 5.5.
5.1.2 l_rimary Blowt O, Git,en Primary Erosion
Tile frequencies per primary ()-ring of blowby
given crosion were extracted from Attachment 3
and are given in Table E-5. An analysis of the
blowby given erosion data shows no statistically
significant effects of joint type, joint temperature,
or leak check pressure. So we use the estimate
p[ Primary Blowbv ]Primary Erosion ]
r_ for Fiel'dJoint " for Viel'dJoint f
[Primary BlowbYl Primary Erosion]
Pr{for Fiel'd or I for Field or _,
[ Nozzle Joint [Nozzle Joint j
= .292 (6)
TABLE E-5 Frequency per Primary O-Ring of
Blowby Given Erosion
Frequency
Joint per O-Ring
Field
Nozzle
Field plus
Nozzle
2 = 286
7
_5 = 294
7
7
-- - 292
24
It is revealing to look at the frequency of primary
O-ring blowby, given no erosion, in Table E-6.
TABLE E-6 Frequency per Primary O-Ring of
Blowby Given No Erosion
Frequency
Joint per O-Ring
Field 1 = .50
2
1
Nozzle _ = 20
Field plus 2
Nozzle _ = .286
Comparison with Table E-5 shows that there is
a strong statistical dependence between primary
O-ring erosion and blowby--particularly for the
field joint. For the field joint, blowby was rare
(frequency = .015) when there was no erosion,
but not rare (frequency = .286) when there was
erosion. So
Pr{Blowby ! Erosion} >> Pr{Blowby I No Erosion},
which implies strong statistical dependence. If blowby
and erosion were statistically independent, then
these two conditional probabilities would be the
same.
The strong statistical dependence shown above
suggests that erosion might be a causal factor for
blowby. This idea is born out by field data and
various experiments. Experiments (reference [2], p.
H-82) showed that an O-ring will fail to seal with
an erosion depth of 0.15 inches. In flights 51-C
and 51-B, there was both erosion and blowby of
the field primary O-ring, and a heat effect or erosion
of the secondary O-ring. In both cases, the erosion
of the primary O-ring was among the worst ero-
sions experienced (reference [2], p. H-71, H-72) as
measured by cross-sectioned depths of 0.038 and
0.171 inches, cross-sectioned perimeters of 130 °
and 360 °, and a top view of affected lengths of
58.75 and 12 inches. This implies that blowby can
be caused by excessive erosion. So our model that
the higher the probability of primary O-ring ero-
sion, the higher the probability of primary O-ring
blowby, is plausible.
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5.2 Probability of Secondary Failure
Next we consider the Probability of Redundancy
Failure Given Primary Failure in Table E-1. This
would be failure of the secondary O-ring. Our
model of secondary failure is secondary erosion
and failure given primary erosion and blowby.
I'hcrefore,
[Secondary Primary Erosion/
Pr[Failure ' andBlowby J
= Pr'[ Sec°ndarY[Erosion I andPrimarYBlowbyEr°si°n'[J
x l,r/Secondarv Secondary /
[ Failure ' Erosion J. (7)
A statistical analysis of secondary erosion given
primary erosion and blowby shows no statistically
significant effects of joint type, joint temperature,
or Icak check pressure. So we use the estimate from
Table E-7 below:
. - .- IPrimary Erosion and}
Secondary e_roslon I ,, , '
Pr ,- ,,, _/ ; • I DIO%VDV
for t'leicl .Ioint for Fieid Joint
[ Secondary Erosion IPrimary Erosion and 1
= I'rifor Field _,r [Blowby for Field J[.Nozzle Joint ]or Nozzle Joint
= .286 . (8)
TABLE E-7 Frequency per SRM Joint of
Secondary O-Ring Erosion Given Erosion and
Blowby of the Primary O-Ring in 23 Flights Prior to
Challenger 51-L
Secondary Erosion
Joint Given Primary Erosion and Blowby
Field
Nozzle
Field plus
Nozzle
1
- _ .50
2
1
- 205
2
- = .286
7
The estimation of
l,r _Secondary Secondary}[Failure I Erosion
in equation (7) presents some difficulties because
there were no secondary failures before 51-L. So
we shall express the solutions parametrically in
terms of the parameter
M = Pr{Secondary FailureISecondary Erosion} (9)
The state of knowledge curve (described in Appen-
dix D) for X4 could be determined on the basis of
engineering information. Examples of relevant en-
gineering information which was available before
51 -L are:
1. Joint rotation created doubt about the ability
of the secondary O-ring to seal. In fact the
O-ring failure mode was considered Critical-
ity 1, not Criticality 1R. So, officially, the
FMEA did not recognize the secondary O-
rings as providing redundancy. However, ac-
cording to Reference [1], p. 126, NASA
management and Thiokol still considered the
joint to be a redundant seal because there
were flights where the primary O-ring failed
and the secondary O-ring sealed in accord-
ante with its design intent.
2. In July 1985, a Thiokol engineer, in light of
the 51-B nozzle joint secondary O-ring ero-
sion, expressed his concern that if the same
scenario should occur in a field joint (and he
believed it could), then it would be a "jump
ball" as to the success or failure of the joint
because the secondary O-ring could not re-
spond to the clevis opening rate and might
not be capable of pressurization (i.e., in the
51-L design, which has been changed in the
redesigned joint). (See Reference [1 ], p. 139.)
3. The qualitative assessment (Reference [2], p.
H-84, Chart 166) of the probability that the
field joint secondary O-ring will fail given
erosion penetration of the primary O-ring
seal is listed in Table E-8.
TABLE E-8 Qualitative Probability of SRM
Secondary O-Ring Failure Given Erosion Penetration
of Secondary O-Ring
Qualitative Probability of
Time After Ignition Secondary O-Ring Failure
Ignition Transient:
0 to 170 ms
170 to 330 ms
330 to 600 ms
Steady State:
60 ms to2mbn
low
medium
high
high
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4. There were only two incidents of secondary
O-ring erosion in a field joint. So there was
no solid statistical evidence that the secondary
O-ring would work given primary O-ring
failure; i.e., nothing like 1,000 successes with-
out a failure. Also, as seen in Table E-8, the
probability of secondary O-ring failure de-
pends o13 time after ignition.
5. The night before the Challenger launch, a
chart provided to NASA by a Thiokol engi-
neer about the possible temperature effect on
the O-rings (Reference [ll, p. 89, Chart 2-2)
included concerns that: (i) lower temperature
of the O-rings would result in a change in
their sealing timing function which would
result in higher O-ring pressure actuation
time; (ii) if the actuation time increases,
threshold of secondary seal pressurization
capability is approached; (iii) if threshold is
reached, then secondary seal may not be
capable of being pressurized.
l_lugging (8) and (9) into (7) yields
/ Secondary
l_r[.Failur e " }
(Probability of )= (.286)X4 Secondary Failure (10)
5.3 Probability of Worst Damage State Given
Redundancy Failure
If the field joint seal were to fail, there is some
possibility that the crew and vehicle would survive.
For example, the seal might fail right before the
solid rocket motors completed their burn. How-
cver, the chances are very high that such a failure,
should it occur, would be earlier in the flight. This
suggests a value approaching 1 for the probability
of loss of life and vehicle given total seal failure.
Thus, the closest probability value of 1 from Table
E-2, column Probability of Worst Damage State,
is selected in this example.
5.4 Probability of Worst Damage State Event
Using the estimates derived above, the value for
column Z in Table E-I is
Z = (.277)(.286) X4 [l'robability perJoint_
\of Worst Damage ]
= (.0792)_4 . (11)
5.5 Probability of At Least One Field Joint Failure
The estimated probability in Section 5.4 is for
only one field joint. The estimated probability of
field joint failure for the mission is
p [Mission Field]
r].Joint Failure f
/
= 1 - [JointFailuresJ
= 1 - [1 -(.0792) _,416
(Probability of Failure) (12)
It is dear from the statistical analyses that there
is uncertainty in the estimates of the probabilities
used. For example, the 90 percent confidence in-
tervals in Table E-4 show that the parameter
estimates are uncertain. Also, the .286 estimate in
equation (8) was based on two failures out of
seven, and is therefore uncertain. The uncertainty
associated with equation (12) is quantified in At-
tachment 6. The two almost linear curves form a
90 percent confidence interval for the "probability
of mission field joint failure," conditional on the
value of )x4. So if the value of ,X4 is .25, for example,
then the conditional 90 percent confidence interval
is [0.010, .118].
A subject matter expert could analyze the rele-
vant engineering information and assess a state of
knowledge curve for 4. If this curve were centered
on )_4 = .25 with a considerable variance, then the
unconditional 90 percent confidence interval for
the "probability of mission field joint failure,"
would be much wider than the [.010,. 118] interval
cited above.
The 90 percent confidence intervals in Attach-
ment 6 were derived by a Bayesian analysis (see
Appendix D for more discussion). For the 51-L
environment (e.g., 31 ° F), we define the following
long run "true" frequency probabilities:
0 = Probability of mission field joint failure
per mission; and for a given field joint,
do = Probability of failure
_ = Probability of primary O-ring erosion
_2 = Probability of primary O-ring blowby
given primary O-ring erosion
)x_ = Probability of secondary O-ring erosion
given primary O-ring erosion and
blowby
h4 = Probability of secondary O-ring failure
given secondary O-ring erosion.
132
Our modelis that 0 = 1 -(1 -+)_ (13)
4
+ = II x, (14)
a-I
LetA = hih2_._ (15)
then 0 = 1 - [1 -Ah4] 6 (16)
In the Bayesian analysis we assume that, condi-
tional on our data, ,_,, ,k2, and ,k_ are statistically
independent. This is reasonable because the h,'s
are successive conditional frequencies. The state of
knowledge curves for the individual X,'s were
derived from Bayesian analyses assuming "flat" a
priori state of knowledge curves. This means that
we did not use much information external to the
data in Attachment .3. For example, we made no
attempt to use the engineering models described
in, e.g., Reference [2], p. H-60. This may have
been possible by modeling the uncertainties in the
variables of the engineering models. This idea was
suggested by Feynman (Reference [2], Appendix
F). The uncertainties in the engineering models are
a possible explanation as to why the models did
not predict very well.
Finally, the state of knowledge curve for A was
derived by propagating the state of knowledge
curves for the h,'s through equation (15). This was
done by a discrete probability approximation tech-
nique. The implied 90 percent confidence interval
for A is [.007, .082].
The upper and lower curves in Attachment 6 are
derived from equation (16) and are
0,,(h4) = 1 -[1 -(.082)h4] 6
01(_.4) = 1 - [1 - (.007) X4]6 (17)
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ATTACHMENT 2 O-Ring Anomalies Compared with Joint Temperatures and Leak Check Prmure
Flight
or
Motor
(Solid Pressure Joint
Rocket Joint/ (In psi) Temp.
Dat.___ee Booster} O-Ring Fleld Nozzle Erosion Blowby OF
DM-1
DM-2
DM-3
DM-4
QM-1
07/18/77 - NA NA - - 84
01/18/78 - - NA NA - - 49
10/19/78 - - NA NA - - 61
02/17/79 - - NA NA - - 40
07/13/79 - - NA NA - - 83
QM-2
QM-3
ST S - 1
STS-2
$TS-3
09/27/79 - - NA NA - - 67
O2/13/80 - - NA NA - 48
04/12/81 - - 50 50 - 66
11/12/81 (Right) Aft Field/Primary SO SO X 70
03/22/82 - - 50 50 - - 69
STS-4 06/27182
DM-S 10/21/82
STS-5 11/11182
QM-4 03/21/83
STS-6 O4/O4/83
STS-7 06/18/83
STS-8 08/30/53
STS-9 11/28/83
STS 41-B 02/03/84
STS 41-C 04/06/84
STS 41-D 08/30184
STS 41-G 10/05/84
DM-6 10/25/84
STS 51-A 11/08/84
STS 51-C 01/24/85
unknown: hardware lost at m
Nozzle/primary
(Right) Nozzle/Primary
(Left) Nozzle/Primary
(Right) Nozzle/Primary
(Left) Forward Field/
Primary
(Right) Nozzle/Primary
(Left) Aft Field/Primary
(Right) Igniter/Primary
(Right) Forward
Field/Primary
(Left) Nozzle/Primary
(Right) Igniter/Primary
- Inner Gasket/
Primary
(Right) Center Field/
Primary
(Right) Center Field/
Secondary
(Right) Nozzle/Primary
(Left) Forward Field/
Primary
(Left) Nozzle/Primary
50 SO NA NA 8O
NA NA - 58
50 SO - - 68
NA NA X - 60
SO 50 (1) - 67
50 50 (1) - S7
50 50 - - 72
100 50 - - 73
100(2) 100 - - 70
200 100 X - 57
200 100 X - 57
200 100 X - 63
2O0 100 (3) - 63
NA NA - X 53
200 100 X - 70
2O0 100 X X 70
NA NA - X 70
200 100 - - 78
NA NA X X 52
200 100 - - 67
2OO 100 X X $3
200 100 (4) - 53
200 100 - X 53
200 100 X X 53
200 100 - X 53
Dash (-) denotes no anomaly; NA denotes not applicable.
See end of attachment for footnotes.
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AI-rACHMENT 2 (continued)
Flight (Solid Pressure Joint
or Rocket Joint/ (In psi) Temp.
Motor Dat___e Booster_ O-RIng Field Nozzl! Erosion Blowb¥ OF
STS 51-D 04/12/U (Right) Nozzle/Primary 200 200 X - 87
(Right) Igniter/Primary NA NA - X 67
(Left) Nozzle/Pflmary 200 200 X - 67
(Left) Igniter/Primary NA NA - X 67
STS 51-B 04/29/88 (Right) Nozzle/Prlmmy 200 100 X - 75
(left) Nozzle/Primary 200 100 X X 7S
(Left) Nozzle/Secondary 200 100 X - 7S
DM-7 05/09/85 Nozzle/Primary NA NA X 61
STS 51-G 06/17/86 (Right) Nozzle/Primary 200 200 X (5) X 70
(Left) Nozzle/Pdmary 200 200 X X 70
(Left) Igniter/Primary NA NA - X 70
STS 51-F 07/29/85 (Right) Nozzle/Primary 200 200 (6) - 81
STS 51-1 08/27/88 (Left) Nozzle/Primary 200 200 X (7) - 76
STS 51-J 10/03/85 - 200 200 - - 79
STS 61-A 10/30/85 (Right) Nozzle/Primary 200 200 X - 75
(Left) Aft Field/Primary 200 200 - X 75
(Left) Center Field/
Primary 200 200 - X 75
STS 61-B 11/26/86 (Right) Nozzle/Primary 200 200 X - 76
(Left) Nozzle/Primary 200 200 X X 76
STS 61-C 01/12/86 (Right) Nozzle/Primary 200 200 X - 58
(Left) Aft Field/Primary 200 200 X - 58
(Left) Nozzle/Primary 200 200 X 58
STS S1-L 01/28/86 200 200 31
(1) On STS-6, both nozzles had a hot gas path detected In the putty with an Indication of heat on the
primary O-ring.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(s)
(6)
On STS-9, one of the right Solid Rocket Booster field Joints was pressurized at 200 psi after a
destack.
On STS 41-C, left aft field had a hot gas path detected In the putty with an Indication of heat on
the primary O-ring.
On a center field Joint of STS 51-C, soot wire blown by the primary end there was • heat effect on
the secondary.
On STS 51-G, right nozzle had erosion In two places on the pdmary O-ring.
On STS St-F, right nozzle had hot gas path detected In putty with an Indication of heat on the
pdmary O-ring.
(7) On STS 51-1, left nozzle had erosion In two places on the primary O-ring.
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APPENDIX F
DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED SYSTEMS SAFETY ENGINEERING FUNCTIONS IN
SUPPORT OF NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM RISK ASSESSMENT
AND RISK MANAGEMENT
In Section 5.11 the Committee recommends that
NASA consider bringing together appropriate ac-
tivities into a focused "Systems Safety Engineering"
function at both Headquarters and the centers.
This activity would apply across the entire set of
design, development, qualification and certifica-
tion, and operations activities of the National Space
Transportation System (NSTS) Program in support
of risk assessment and risk management. Systems
safety engineering would embrace the functions
(listed in Section 5.1 l and illustrated here in Figure
F-I) which arc described briefly in the following
paragraphs.*
1. IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE
MODES AND EFFECTS
The failure modes of each hardware item can be
identified at this step without addressing the prob-
ability of each failure mode occurring. All of tile
significant effects of each failure mode also would
be identified. These effects (not just the estimated
worst-case effect) are needed also for identification
of hazards and for evaluating potential cascading
influences on the failure modes of other parts of
the system. All of the causes of each failure mode
(including the feedback influences from the hazard
analysis, step 3 below) should then be identified.
The control of all causes of each failure mode by
design margin, process controls, redundancy, and
operating constraints would bc defined. This in-
formation would be an input to the analysis of
safety risks in steps 5, 8, and 9.
2. ESTABLISHMENT OF DESIGN
CRITERIA FOR REDUNDANCY
Design criteria for redundancy would be based
on functional and fail-operational requirements for
components or units which do not have cata-
strophic singlc failure modes. These criteria would
be based on reliability analyses of components
using either statistical data bases where available
or estimated failure rate functions.
:: In Figure F-I, tile thirteen functions discussed in this appendix are
shown by the boxes which are numbered to correspond. [bis diagram
can be C(mlpared to that currently described for the NSTS Program
by the,ISC SR&QA office, as shown m Figure 5-12 m Section 5.11.
3. IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS AND
THEIR POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
Hazards associated with the system can be sys-
tematically identified using various methods such
as fault-tree or event-tree networks. Inputs will
come from mission requirements, the system con-
figuration, the applicable identified hardware fail-
ure effects, human factors and the expected envi-
ronments. Potential consequences o[ the presence
of each hazard can then be derived without regard
for the probability of the events or mishaps occur-
ring. (However, some screening out of very low
probability failure events would simplify this ef-
fort.) Mishaps resulting from combinations of events
and the impacts of created hazards on failure modes
in other hardware can be identified. Each of the
causes of the identified hazards, along with pro-
posed controls, would be defined for later risk
assessment in steps 5, 8, and 9.
4. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL ITEMS
Using the set of information generated in the
previous steps, hardware failure modes could be
categorized on the basis of their potential conse-
quences. Those designs having failure modes with
consequences that could result in loss of vehicle or
life would be returned to engineering for possible
alternative concepts. Failure modes that remain
after this cycle could be put into criticality cate-
gories to be prioritized based on severity of the
failure cffects and the probability of occurrence
(steps 8 and 9). Those in prioritized categories
which require Level 1 approval for either retention
or a waiver authorization would be submitted
through Level II PRCB along with a full safety-
risk assessment produced under the direction of
NASA systems safety engineers (step 13).
5. EVALUATION OF THE PROBABILITY
OF OCCURRENCE OF CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE MODES
AND HAZARDS
An evaluation can be made of the probability of
occurrence of each of the causes and consequences
for each retained failure mode and hazard. These
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analyses could be performed by both the contrac-
tors' and NASA's systems safety engineers. A va-
riety of tools can be used to perform these evalu-
ations. The determination of probability of
occurrence of the causes of failures would be
expressed as a set of functions related to:
a. Reliability data for hardware items having
causes of failure modes that are statistical in
nature, such as electronic boards.
b. Wear-out functions for hardware line replace-
able units where the causes of the failure
modes are both statistical and have safety
operating margins that are either time or
cycle dependent.
c. Opcrating margins required where the causes
of the particular modes of hardware failure
are dependent on stress, temperature, or other
environmental factors to which the unit may
be subjected.
d. The control which can be exercised over the
true configuration of the part, unit, sub-
system, or system. This inch, des both the
validation and control of manufacturing and
intcgration processes, and the ability to ex-
plicitly verify the configurations prior to op-
erations.
Evaluation of the probability of occurrence of
each of the possible consequences of critical hard-
ware failures or the presence of other severe hazards
requires assessment of each path of the fault tree.
Thc prevention of certain consequence paths would
be evaluated relative to the system design and the
specific operational hazard control techniques.
Probability functions need to be determined for
both the causes and consequences in order to
provide inputs, both to the overall risk assessment
which will guide the final design (or for the current
STS, the proposed design changes), and to the
criteria on which the validation and certification
test programs should be based.
6. ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFETY-RISK
LEVEL CRITERIA FOR DESIGN
MARGINS AND HAZARD CONTROLS
Using relationships of the types derived under
step 5 as a framework, risk levels can be allocated
among thc various subsystems, units, and compo-
nents that would be consistent with the acceptable
safety-risk requirements established by NASA for
the overall NSTS program. Design criteria can then
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be established for the margins required against each
cause of a critical failure mode (using the functions
developed in step 5) and for the controls required
to limit the consequences of each hazard. This task
is critical to providing assurance that the NSTS
system has been configured to a given (acceptable)
set of safety-risk levels. (Note that one cannot
assure fully safe operations.) Those risk levels
(which may be quite different for loss of hardware
versus loss of life) must have a definable and
objective set of measures that can be agreed upon
by Level ! and the Administrator of NASA. They
must later be verified during the test programs.
Without such quantitative safety-risk level assess-
ments, assurances of acceptable safety are not
meaningful and the fulfillment of responsibility is
not measurable.
7. DESIGN OF QUALIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION TEST PROGRAMS
Oncc safety margins have been determined for
each failure mode of the accepted designs, quan-
titatively significant validation, qualification, and
(where required) time or cycle (reuse) dependent
certification test programs can be designed. These
tcst plans must be optimized to extract the maxi-
mum amount of information on operating margins
against critical failure modes from the most cost
effective quantity of hardware and the time period
which can be allocated to tests. Design of the test
programs is crucial to the viability of making risk
assessments. The criteria for the tests should be
established by reliability and/or systems safety
engineers who specialize in test program design
and statistical analysis of test data.
8. OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY
RISKS
The test data should be statistically analyzed to
establish credible validated margins against the
causes of each significant potential failure mode.
When these measured margins are compared with
the margin criteria from step 6, and when the
probability functions for configuration control (step
5.d) are derived, there will be a meaningful basis
for making assessments of the probability of oc-
currence for each failure mode and its associated
hazard. These probabilities of occurrence must be
combined with the appropriate analyses of the
probabilities of the consequences being realized for
each failure at the subsystem and total system levels
to provideanobjectivemeasureof theportionsof
the overall safety-risksthat are associatedwith
eachretaineddesignand hazard.
9. DEVELOPMENT OF ACCEPTANCE
RATIONALE FOR RETAINED HAZARDS
AND HAZARD REPORTS
Rationalesfor acceptingthesafetyrisksassoci-
atedwith all created and intrinsic hazards would
be developed. For those hazards caused by hard-
ware failure modes, these rationales would embody
the Critical Items List retention rationales devel-
oped by the various engineering groups and the
test-based safety-risk assessments generated in step
8. This information would be published as a set of
risk assessed hazard reports. These reports would
go through the approval and data management
process shown in Figure F-I. Upon approval by
Level II PRCB, they would constitute the NSTS
Accepted Hazards Data Base.
Those hazards in the data base which result from
the currently defined Criticality 1 and IR items
could then be further classified and prioritizcd
based on their assessed safety risks. Those requiring
final acceptance at Level I would have special
request packages prepared by NASA systems safety
engineering. To avoid the misconceptions associ-
ated with thousands of waivers to an accepted
system design, these requests should fall into two
categories:
I. Items which met their specific design criteria,
including safety-risk criteria (step 6). These
items should not require a "waiver," but only
Level 1 approval of the retention requests
because of their perceived importance or risk
contribution.
2. Items which did not meet their specific safety-
risk design criteria as indicated by test mar-
gins or detailed risk analyses. These items
would therefore require a "waiver" for re-
tention.
These approval requests to Level 1 would be pre-
sented in conjunction with an overall System Safety
Assessment Report and specific Mission Risk As-
sesssment Reports (step 13 below).
10. SPECIFICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
AND OPERATING CONSTRAINTS
Having accepted a residual hazard (whcthcr
contained or catastrophic) the NASA systems safety
engineers must specify very explicitly for all equip-
ment levels (part, unit, subsystem, element, and
full system) the environmental and operating con-
straints which will assure that the validated margins
will not be violated. In this regard, this task also
would have a major interface with the operations
activities. The analysis of such things as the effect
of environmental conditions on the validity of
validations and certifications is usually not done
by the quality assurance engineers; therefore, the
systems safety engineers should be the responsible
focus for this task.
11. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF
FLIGHT DATA TO UPDATE SAFETY
MARGIN VALIDATIONS
By reviewing all flight data (or other off-line test
data and even test data from other programs) for
explicit information, updated quantitative assess-
ments of the validated design criteria can be made.
In order to retain the assured level of risk as new
data become available, specifications may have to
be changed for some hardware or new operational
constraints may have to be defincd.
12. OVERSIGHT OF QUALITY ASSURANCE
FUNCTIONS TO CONTROL SAFETY-RISKS
In order to fulfill its responsibility to assure
control to the accepted levels of risk, the systems
safety engineers must oversee the appropriate qual-
ity assurance functions. This is essential because
the validated margins and assessed risks of the
retained hazards are dependent on total configu-
ration verification of the overall system and each
of its constituent parts. By "total" configuration
one means all aspects of the hardware, software,
external environments and operating constraints.
13. OVERALL SYSTEM SAFETY RISK
ASSESSMENT AND DEFINITION OF THE
POTENTIAL TO REDUCE THE LEVEL
OF RISK
Using all of the above information, the NASA
systems safety engineers can prepare a serics of
"System Safety Assessment Reports." These reports
would continuously update overall system risk
assessments against the safety-risk objectives estab-
lished for the various phases of the NSTS Program
by the risk management activity. The systems safety
engineers also would define the potential to reduce
the levels of risk in the program. Mission risk
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assessmentreportswould alsobepreparedwhich
would incorporatemissionaccomplishmentrisk
assessments,of which the safety risks would be
one input.
Whererequired,retentionrequestpackagesgen-
eratedin step9 would besubmittedthroughLevel
II to Level1alongwith the approvedsafety-risk
assessmentsfor each item and an appropriate
summaryof the overall system safety-risks assess-
ment report. Thus, the retention requests can be
considered by Level ! within the context of a
definable and objective risk management process.
The arguments for retention of prioritized critical
items would be combined with objective assess-
ments of safety-risks for each item's contribution
to the overall system's safety risks.
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